Authors: Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee and Divya Malhotra
With inputs from Maj Gen PK Mullick (Retd) and Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd)*
In April this year, PLA’s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) was reorganised and a new Information Support Force (PLAISF) was raised, marking a significant military restructuring in China this decade. China understands that an empowered PLA is a major back-up factor in establishment of its globalized economy, trade and commerce, and protection of its global interests, by force, if necessary, according to Lt Gen Banerjee. As such, building up the PLA to highest military standards is a major factor in China achieving its ‘rightful primacy’ as a super-power in the world order. By disbanding SSF and replacing it with ISF, the Central Military Commission (CMC) has undone and reversed his own work as it wasn’t serving the bigger goal of achieving China’s global military dominance and strategic hegemony.
As the Chinese military transitions to a network-centric force, the PLAISF is now primarily in-charge of the PLA’s information-domain operations, including data and information security strategy. This change demonstrates how the CCP’s reorganisation of the PLA is giving increasing consideration to warfare in the information, space, and cyber realms. Since the 2010s, Beijing has believed that modern battlefields would be led by “informatized warfare”. For instance, a publication in the 2013 edition of Science of Military Strategy journal published by the Academy of Military Science, the PLA’s think tank states that even though up until now, “mechanized warfare” has dominated, modern wars would be information-centric due to the quick development of information and communications technology (ICT) and the advancement of ICT’s military uses. The same was reiterated in 2019 National Defence White paper which stated that “War is evolving in form towards informatized warfare…”
PLA uses the term “Informationized Warfare” to refer to “wars that use informationized weaponry and equipment and related operational methods based on networked information systems, and take place mainly in the form of systems confrontation in land, sea, air, space, cyber, and electromagnetic spaces and the cognitive domain.” Creation of PLAISF is just one more example of the PLA’s ongoing efforts to adjust to an operational environment that is already highly interconnected and information-centric, according to Brig Rahul Bhonsle.
Gen Banerjee explained that the Communist Party of China envisions a modernized, intelligentised PLA that is strong enough to deter the global super-power and its allies, and in the process establish unchallenged hegemony over its less powerful neighbours in the region. The vision is further qualified by the PLA’s mandate of absolute loyalty to the Party that allows the Party to rule China – and in the process, elevate China to the status of another global super-power. Here, the worry is that unlike the democratic and accountable powers, the CPC destines itself to be an arbitrary and domineering, rather than a benevolent hegemon, he added.
President Xi was never shy of expressing his ambitions and founding of Strategic Support Force as an integral part of his 2015-6 military reforms testified the same. The goal was clear – to combine Chinese military’s space, nuclear, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities within the ambit of the PLASSF, and its recent restructure few years later may indicate an evolutionary need. Xi had originally demanded the PLA to make “major progress” toward informatisation by the end of 2020. However, China’s defense white paper 2019 noted that PLA was much behind its goal of achieving seamless interconnection across its various service branches, and thus called for an “urgent need of improving its informationization.”
Transition from SSF to ISF:
For PLA, structural anomalies of the PLASSF had grown to be a serious issue. According to organisational hierarchy, the PLASSF had co-equal command status and authority with the Theatre Commands (TCs), therefore even TCs had to obtain its approval for resources or assets that could be blocked or delayed, besides complicating the inter-service coordination. In summary, the need to limit excessive control was another factor contributing to the change, given that the information and space domains (and associated capability development) interact, both horizontally and vertically, with politically sensitive areas and China’s foreign affairs.
The PLA now has “four services and four arms” after the SSF was dissolved. The four services are the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force. The four arms are the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), the Aerospace Force (ASF), the Cyberspace Force (CSF), the Information Support Force (ISF) and the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF). After the reforms, SSF’s departments of Aerospace Systems and Network Systems have been renamed the Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF) respectively, all under Central Military Commission (CMC). The overall structure of the PLA has been flattened, explained Maj Gen P K Mullick.
Politics of reforms: Senior researcher Meia Nouwens of IISS, Washington, contends that political factors may have also contributed to the organizational transformation. Xi could have more control over the actions of the forces by eliminating the bureaucratic barriers that existed between the CMC and the ASF, CSF, and ISF. She explains that, with the restructuring, senior PLA commanders and even Xi himself who is placed directly above this force, will be more confident in the military’s capacity to defeat a well-prepared opponent in a fast-paced crisis. In conjunction, Maj Gen Mullick has pointed out that the disbanding of SSF also suggests the Chinese political leadership will be playing an even more significant role in military modernization. Xi seemed dissatisfied with the way the prior Strategic Support Force was operating and heeded military advise that ended a whole bureaucracy almost immediately and established a new one. This political argument has been iterated by many international reports.
However, grandiose references to an individual’s vision, even if he is Xi Jinping, may be misplaced, argued Gen Banerjee. Restructure of the SSF is an organisational adjustment based on practical, professional experiences gained by the PLA hierarchy over the past few years. The purpose is to make each element of the erstwhile SSF more responsive to command, control, inter-and intra-arm and service functions and encourage professional innovations. These reforms are mostly related to Command and Control (C2) and therefore the SSF’s restructure does not indicate any dilution in Chinese capabilities in the space, cyber, and EW areas per se. As per some Chinese sources, the reforms are keeping the PLA on course for its 2027 modernization objective, which centers on readiness for an all-domain war.
Bigger picture: Should India be worried?
China’s defence spokespersons, headed by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and with deliberate endorsements from the CPC, have been rhetorically announcing various targets for the PLA’s modernisation, as pointed out by Gen Banerjee. These targets are related to step wise modernisation of: One, various unit organisations, weapons and warlike equipment (by 2010); two, corresponding restructure at the unit levels (2012); modernisation and restructure at the formation levels, selectively to begin with (2014); three, professional assimilation of the modernised and restructured systems in simultaneity while extension of the modernisation schemes to the rest of massive PLA structure continues (2018-2020-2027/2030); and finally, full assimilation of the modernised, restructured and intelligentised attributes of the PLA (2049). Obviously, that is a long-drawn process. However, military modernisation and restructure is a continuous process when modifications necessitated from time to time. It is never full and complete.
The creation of the ISF and a distinct Cyber and Space force may have ramifications for India since it makes it easier for the TCs—particularly the Western Theatre Command (WTC), which is in charge of air and ground operations along the Sino-Indian border—to readily access the resources of the newly formed ISF, Cyber force, and Aerospace force. Although the WTC would have some inherent cyber and EW resources, one of the main reasons for the recent reorganisation was the former PLASSF’s inflexibility in providing support to the TCs. It is however, premature to judge the extent to which these reforms might affect China’s capability against India per se.
China’s rigid and autocratic system curtails expression of reservations against realistic feedbacks. Performance claims are sometimes inflated to outlandish levels, Gen Banerjee contended. Albeit, with its massive superiority of numbers in terms of manpower, weapons and equipment, China can brush aside whatever resistance that the less powerful nations may offer against its military-political actions. To clarify, China is capable of achieving its purpose of military aggression irrespective of suffering minor debacles. As past experience indicates, high casualties and destruction are not of any significant concern to the CPC hierarchy that is accountable to no one but only to itself.
Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee (Retd) PVSM, AVSM, YSM is a former Chief of Staff, Central Command, Indian Army and a former Commandant of the Officer’s Training Academy, Chennai. An acknowledged military analyst, he has been a long-time distinguished fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi, and has authored many articles as and books on military matters including China’s PLA.
*Maj Gen PK Mullick (Retd) VSM is an Indian army veteran. He is a reputed military scholar and speaker on advanced defence technologies, including the domains of Cyber, SIGINT and Electronic Warfare.
*Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd) is an Indian army veteran and a well-known military analyst. He is the Director of Delhi-based ‘Security Risks Asia’, an organisation dedicated to analysis of political-military developments in the region.
