The July 1995 Srebrenica massacre is a notorious illustration of how humanitarian efforts and international peacekeeping could overlook one of the most horrifying crimes in Europe since World War II. Srebrenica was designated a “safe area” by the United Nations (UN) in 1993, allegedly to shield residents from ethnic violence during the Bosnian War. Nevertheless, after occupying the town, Bosnian Serb soldiers ruthlessly killed around 8,000 Bosnian men and boys. This essay argues the case that the UN peacekeeping effort’s failure during the Srebrenica massacre revealed serious problems with military planning and command systems in addition to significant ethical flaws in the international community. The writer believes these issues have significant implications for upcoming emergencies and obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
The UN peacekeeping force’s lack of resources and military presence in Srebrenica was one of its most serious failures to solve this problem. Only roughly 7,600 troops were actually sent since member states were hesitant to commit enough resources, despite the UN’s initial request for a force of 37,000 troops to defend the area (Brunborg et al., 2003). The UN force’s capacity to properly protect civilians was severely compromised by this significant weakness. Later, the massacre was characterised by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a failure of political will as well as military strategy (Britannica, 2024). The international community’s commitment to upholding human rights is seriously called into question by this. What does it say about the UN’s dedication to its own ideals if it was unable to raise enough troops in spite of urgent and obvious warnings about the risks, especially those to civilians?
Another factor in the UN peacekeeping force’s failure in Srebrenica was its management structure. First, the Dutch field commanders were subject to strict rules that restricted their use of force unless they were in immediate danger (Leann, 2002). The Bosnian Serb forces were able to execute their plans without opposition or hindrance because of this passive strategy. According to reports, higher UN command levels either disregarded or failed to effectively respond to the Dutch soldiers’ urgent calls for reinforcements (Brunborg et al., 2003). Additionally, it argues that peacekeepers feel helpless due to this lack of response, which also impacts operational effectiveness. A serious weakness in UN operational protocols that must be addressed if future operations are to be successful is basically: the inability to adapt quickly and effectively to changing conditions on the field.
There were ethical consequences to the inaction, as Dutch forces allegedly assisted in the deportation of Muslim males who sought safety in their compound rather than aggressively defending civilians (Britannica, 2024). This betrayal exposes a moral shortcoming in the peacekeeping mission of the international community. Mass murders and other crimes were able to take place without intervention or resistance because the offender was not immediately confronted. The UnThe UN Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, later acknowledged that “we failed to do our part” in ensuring civilian safety at this crucial period (Britannica, 2024). Such acknowledgements are insufficient– They reveal an institutional culture that values protocol over direct humanitarian assistance, particularly when civilians are involved.
There are also “allegations” that UN officials attempted to conceal proof of human rights abuses during the fall of Srebrenica, along with the failing to protect civilians. According to investigations, Dutch authorities have either destroyed or misplaced crucial papers related to missing persons (Leann, 2002). In addition to hindering accountability, these acts also endanger attempts to provide victims and survivors of the brutality with justice. This behaviour is an obvious resemblance of a larger pattern in international organisations where individual humanitarian duties are frequently sacrificed to self-defence. Is it possible to expect future peacekeeping operations to function with integrity if accountability is not enforced at all levels of governance?
Furthermore, the obligation to protect civilians during armed conflict is clearly and specifically established under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). International humanitarian law provides special protection for certain categories of civilians, recognizing that some groups face higher risks during armed conflict. For example, women, children, refugees, and displaced persons are given additional protection because of their vulnerability (ICRC, n.d.). The Fourth Geneva Convention specifically protects civilians from acts committed by opposing parties to a conflict (ICRC, n.d.). Also, the two core principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) are proportionality and distinction, which require parties of a conflict to make a distinction between combatants and non-combatants (Hoare, 2021). All of that was grossly violated in Srebrenica when Bosnian Serb forces deliberately targeted civilians. Not only did the UN forces’ disregard for their duties under IHL lead to fatalities, but it also created a risky precedent for global accountability and when civilians are in danger, the international community has an obligation to act accordingly under IHL. Tragedies like Srebrenica gave rise to ideas like the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), which emphasises that states have a duty to protect their citizens from horrific acts and genocide. It becomes necessary for the international community or organizations, for example, the UN, to take decisive action and support innocent civilians when states fail to do so.
In short, the Srebrenica massacre serves as a clear and striking reminder of the fundamental weaknesses of aid efforts, international peacekeeping, and particularly the application of international humanitarian law. Systemic issues inside the UN itself need immediate modification, as seen by issues with the military presence, command failure, peacekeeper challenges, and evidence suppression. There is an urgent need for reconstruction. It is crucial that the lessons learnt from Srebrenica guide strategies meant to increase the efficacy and accountability of foreign involvement as we consider current and future implementations. On the other hand, upholding the responsibilities established in international humanitarian law is crucial for both preventing further crimes and regaining public trust in the global systems that are in place for protecting vulnerable groups globally. Without such reform and commitment, we run the risk of reliving the past—letting another tragedy like Srebrenica happen while international players do nothing.
