While the President-elect Donald J. Trump makes an historic come back to the White House; the future of talks about the “arms control talks” between US and China remains erratic, and shilly shallying on part of concerned officials likely to persist. Trump’s unconventional approach to the delicate business of arms control will complicate the process and his aloofness to diplomatic niceties will hamper the conclusion of any meaningful agreements in the near future. During the first tenure as United States (US) President, Trump beefed up strategic competition with China reflected through fostering military partnerships with alliances in the Indo- Pacific, modernization of nuclear arsenal and deployment of missile defenses in the South Korea. As the 78-year-old populist leader, stages a comeback to Presidential office, it is likely that confrontation with China will be exacerbated, thus further dimming the prospects of arms control talks.
Arms control talks have been held between US and China in 2018 under Trump administration, and resumed in 2023 during the tenure of President Biden after a hiatus of four long years. However, no fruitful outcomes were observed.
A foreign policy hinged on the rhetoric of “America First” skewed Trump’s understanding of managing strategic competition with the China. Trump’s disdain for multi-lateral forums for furthering arms controls agenda, pushed him to bi-laterally engage China. The inclination towards bilateralism was indicative of the fact that Trump approached diplomatic negotiations in a zero-sum manner, and tried to amplify the gains while exploiting the power asymmetry. The same logic can be applied to US-China arms control talks in the near future. In the midst of Russia-Ukraine war, and solidification of alliances in the Indo-Pacific; Trump’s arms control playbook needs a major overhaul Vis a Vis China.
Arms control negotiations are often pursued in a graduated manner while paying heed to diplomatic nuances; Trump’s diplomatic naivety and transactional approach to arms control discussions will definitely stymie the negotiations outcome.
Trump remains vary of the rampant modernization of Chinese nuclear arsenal, and National Defense Strategy (NDS) published by his administration in 2018 labeled China as a strategic competitor. Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for flexible & tailored deterrent responses, thus created a space for limited nuclear use and reiterated the modernization of nuclear arsenal amid brewing geo-political tensions. Annual report published by Pentagon in 2023 indicates that China will double its nuclear warhead count by 2030. It is likely that President-elect will continue his earlier legacy, and prioritize arms build-up over arms control.
On Monday, latest addition to Trump’s cabinet took place, and Mike Waltz was named as national security advisor. Mike Waltz served in the U.S Army Special Forces, and was elected to congress in 2018. While serving in the China task force in congress, he was a hypercritic of engagement with China on variety of issues. US-China arms control talks will be hobbled by Waltz’s antipathy towards China.
Recently, US Congressional Research Services (CRS) published a report on the Sentinel Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program, while highlighting the concerns associated with the land-based leg of US nuclear deterrent. Despite the cost-over runs of this project, US Department of Defense (DOD) places a heavy premium on Sentinel missiles for ensuring deterrence. Opponents critique that in presence of SSBN’s (Nuclear powered Ballistic Submarines), spending a lion’s share on ground based new ICBM’s might create a resource imbalance for modernizing other legs of the nuclear triad. Ongoing debate pertaining to modernization of US nuclear arsenal will potentially overshadow arms control agenda, and consume President-elect’s resolve.
Donald J. Trump was skeptical of New START treaty, and opposed his extension without involving China. The insistence to bring China under the New START treaty to cap its different kind of nuclear delivery systems through tough talks didn’t yield any fruition. Trump’s arms control policy with China aimed to seek more transparency pertaining to its nuclear weapons deployment, development and the doctrine itself. At the prima-facie, extracting information about Chinese nuclear arsenal will amplify its concerns and act as a stumbling block to US-China arms control talks. Trump rationalizes disparity between US-China nuclear arsenal as a premise for initiating arms control talks with the China. President-elect must not employ arms control as a tool of information gathering for maturing the crisis responses.
Chinese concerns on the US-China arms control talks emanates from preserving strategic autonomy under the assertive leadership of Xi-Jinping. China seems unwilling to participate in New START or any tri-party arms control agreement with US and Russia, as it will be compelled to pursue significant reductions in its nuclear stockpile while ignoring the baseline asymmetries. China has been consistently projecting a principled stance that without serious reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenal, it will not engage with them on arms control. Moreover, due to US military support of Taiwan, US-China arms control talks will probably run into a brick-wall.
China has a declaratory policy of No First Use (NFU), and has a doctrine of minimum deterrence. China’s nuclear deterrence is based on the punishment model having Assured Second Strike Capability (ASSC) as its main stay. China feels its second-strike capability compromised by deployment of US missile defenses in the South Korea, modernization of US nuclear arsenal, and its defiance of NFU policy.
Furthermore, Trump’s proclivity for wining a nuclear arms race with Russia and China fuels his aversion for putting the arms control agenda on the back-burner. Trump’s withdrawal from Open Skies Treaty and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty reinstates Chinese paranoia about US pulling out of any futuristic arms control agreements.
According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) latest global nuclear inventories published in 2024, US possesses 5044, Russia 5580 and China has 500 nuclear warheads. This yawning gap between US and Chinese nuclear warheads count, accounts for Chinese lack of interest in engaging bilaterally with US on arms control. As New START treaty expires in 2026, the absence of any arms control agreement between US and Russia will have a deteriorating ripple impact on US-China equation.
As the Trump 2.0 administration is gearing up to officially take the reins of White House in January; it seems far-fetched and implausible that any futuristic arms control talks between US and China will result in notable reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals. If President-elect Donald Trump wants to pursue arms control talks with the China in good faith, more focus should be placed on ensuring co-operation rather than confrontation. A graduated approach towards US-China arms control talks grounded in diplomatic niceties could only prevail, if amicable US-China bi-lateral relations exists. In absence of arms control agreement between US and China, there is likelihood of a fast-track arms-build up in the South Asia as well.
