Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) has exploited the global tumult facilitated by geopolitical confrontations, technological developments, armed conflicts, and political instability to remain relevant as a critical security threat physically and expand its digital Caliphate simultaneously. This has taken place on a more global level vis-à-vis Al-Qaeda (AQ), another Salafi-jihadi, albeit a rival terrorist organisation, whose exploitation of tumult and insecurity has primarily taken place in Somalia, Mali, and Burkina Faso, via its affiliates – Al-Shabaab and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). As would be evident in this paper, ISIS has touted greater success vis-à-vis Al-Qaeda in cementing itself as the deadlier terrorist group through the various attacks carried out by ISIS Central or its affiliates.
Understanding the Backdrop
Like in the past, ISIS has relied on cycles of upheavals to incite attacks against selected targets and consolidate its presence as a significant security threat. However, unlike its heyday, when the sectarian conflict concentrated in Iraq allowed it to flourish, today, regional conflicts in Europe and West Asia, or socio-political polarisation elsewhere have simultaneously created viable conditions for the terrorist organisation to remain a festering trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific security threat despite widespread territorial losses.
On the other hand, Al-Qaeda has largely, having fallen behind in the jihadi media propaganda turf war with ISIS, concentrated its efforts on radicalising and carrying out attacks in Eastern and Western Africa. It has exploited factors such as weak institutions and governance, regime instability, withdrawal of foreign troops, coups, and local disputes between herders and farmers to carry out deadly terror attacks against state forces and civilians. As mass casualties have become common in these regions, groups like Al-Qaeda have dented the narrative the military juntas have crafted, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso, about their ability to eliminate terrorism after replacing democratic regimes and forcing French forces to withdraw the boots on the ground. Similarly, countries like Somalia have been susceptible to extremist violence due to the absence of stable governance, inter-clan disputes preventing state cohesion, and the death of economic opportunities, making it a fertile ground for groups like Al-Shabaab to recruit fighters and inflict violence.
ISIS & Al Qaeda: Posing Critical Security Threats
ISIS
As indicated previously, periods of instability and crisis have allowed terrorist groups like ISIS to emerge and rejuvenate themselves. Initially, the schism between the Shiite and Sunni communities and the sectarian civil war that followed in Iraq had cultivated a conducive ecosystem for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to announce the establishment of ISIS’ physical Caliphate in 2014 and engage in mass sectarian violence against those who did not adhere to its brand of Salafi-Jihadi ideology. Similarly, post-February 2022, i.e., after the outbreak of the wars in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip, and the heightened polarisation and competing narratives that have followed, have facilitated the expansion of ISIS’ digital presence where the terrorist group has used its propaganda to remain a persisting threat to the international order. This could be understood through the 2024 Global Terrorism Index Report’s findings, according to which it remains the deadliest terror group for the 9th consecutive year, claiming the maximum number of fatalities related to terrorism-based activities.
At the same time, it has tapped into the domestic polarisation and disillusionment widening in Western societies like the United States to encourage self-radicalised individuals to formulate attacks. This comes at a concerning point for American society as the surge in socio-political polarisation and far-right extremism that reached a tipping point with the Capitol Hill Riots in 2020 has only exacerbated instead of gradually receding as the country heads to the results of the upcoming Presidential elections this year.
Furthermore, ISIS has used the recent attacks – successful and foiled – and the perceived threat associated with its affiliates, lone wolves, and trained fighters to continue outbidding its rivals like Al Qaeda in the exploitation of digital and social media forums and subsequent staging of attacks. The surging Islamist threats across Europe, attacks at Crocus Concert City Hall in March 2024 (Moscow) and Imam Ali Mosque in July 2024 (Muscat), and recent arrest of an ISIS supporter looking to inflict violence during election day in the United States are a testament to ISIS remaining a festering threat. Notably, these attacks or the threats of these attacks have occurred only after the outbreak of the most recent phase of the Gazan conflict, which could be perceived as a trigger.
This has allowed the terrorist outfit (bolstered by self-radicalised individuals inspired by its extremist ideology and potent wilayats or affiliates like Islamic State in Khorasan Province), to push the states into a state of insecurity. The state of insecurity referred to here is different from how the world perceived the Salafi-jihadi organisation during its heyday in 2015 and 2016.
Unlike the period when it exercised territorial control, and therefore the movement of its supporters and its geographical positioning were more susceptible to surveillance and neutralisation, its transition to the digital sphere after March 2019 has made it challenging for state actors to monitor and neutralise the threat effectively.
Furthermore, instead of ISIS supporters being concentrated in a physical Caliphate with a centralised leadership issuing orders and deploying fighters to carry out attacks, affiliates and informal cells have cropped up globally, exercising greater leeway without a cohesive central leadership. This has allowed, as the world has become increasingly preoccupied with great power rivalry between the United States and China, the maritime crisis in the Red Sea due to attacks on shipping vessels by Houthi rebels, or the armed conflicts in West Asia or Europe, ISIS to diversify the types of fighters it uses to stage attacks.
The abovementioned trends have made the group’s modus operandi more complex and unpredictable and it appears to have transitioned from West Asia to conflict-ridden places like Somalia as a key base of its terror financing operations. Notably, the exploitation of weak or ineffective governance and the absence of stringent anti-money laundering or countering of terror financing legislations in Somalia has transformed it into a lynchpin for ISIS’ terror financing operations, including raising funds for the strike on the Hamid Karzai International Airport in August 2021.
Moreover, despite the frequent raids carried out in places like Iraq and Syria to eliminate ISIS fighters and leaders by members of the Global Coalition Against Daesh (Arabic term for ISIS), states’ ability to achieve success in blocking access of ISIS members to digital and social media platforms to disseminate propaganda and radicalise people or regulation of cryptocurrency platforms has been limited. One of the primary reasons has been the resistance displayed by platforms like Telegram (one of the preferred mediums used by ISIS) to cooperate with state officials in shutting down accounts and channels created by violent extremists and radicals under the guise of freedom of speech and expression.
Additionally, given the fast-paced and evolving trends within the virtual currency domain, state actors worldwide have yet to find ways to prevent the misuse of cryptocurrency wallets, such as Monero. As a result, such modes of terror financing have been increasingly featured in ISIS publications like Voice of Khorasan to raise funds for terror strikes or to smuggle detainees out of camps in Syria to create a new wave of terrorists. One of the greatest challenges lies in constantly monitoring, regulating, or banning the use of newer or smaller cryptocurrency platforms that terrorists keep transitioning to and promoting in their propaganda pieces.
ISIS’ exploitation of digital and social media platforms to its advantage due to decentralisation of access to technology and end-to-end encryption thwarting monitoring efforts by states could also be partially understood through the widespread dissemination of manuals by ISIS supporters on encrypted forums detailing methods to build 3D weapons like an FGC-9 MK II (considered effective for tactical use) to broaden the accessibility of weapons in extremists’ hands. The use of 3D weapons by violent extremists has become a more concerning phenomenon given that they can evade suspicion by authorities surveilling the purchase of deadly weapons, mainly in Western countries, like the United States, which has seen a rise in this trend, including among white supremacists as well.
Al Qaeda
On the one hand, in August 2024, over 600 casualties occurred within a few hours in Burkina Faso when JNIM fighters shot dead civilians attempting to defend their town of Barsalogho (Central Burkina Faso), less than four hours away from the country’s capital Ouagadougou. This is part of the broader trend across the Sahel region, which accounts for at least 43 per cent of deaths worldwide due to terrorism-related activities. Despite the growing threat of radicalisation and violent extremism, junta leaders in Burkina Faso or its neighbouring state of Mali have erected a bulwark against regional or international cooperation, further prolonging the threat of terrorism.
On the other hand, countries like Somalia, which have been at the forefront of experiencing terrorism-related casualties carried out by Al-Shabaab for at least two decades, have witnessed nearly 184 deaths due to approximately 127 acts of terrorism this year alone. On the other hand, countries like Kenya have also been one of the primary victims of terrorism, with approximately 2,235 deaths since 2008 in Africa, a region now worst affected by terrorism globally.
Notably, despite AQ’s focus primary activities being witnessed in the African continent, it has attempted to exploit the events in the Gaza Strip through its propaganda and extending support to Hamas to rejuvenate its ideological appeal, which had broadly diminished following ISIS’ emergence. It could be understood as part of the larger ideological (despite both groups being adherents of the Salafi-Jihadi ideology) and territorial turf war with ISIS going back over a decade. However, the efforts to rejuvenate its ideological appeal through media propaganda featured in the English language Inspire magazine has not gained much traction and there is little evidence of it attaining tangible success.
Moreover, in what could be considered perhaps as a bid to re-internationalise its ideology, after having been eclipsed by ISIS’ more radical and violent brand of Salafi-Jihadism, it has sought to revitalise the notoriety it gained following the 9/11 attacks. As reports indicate, the trial of Cholo Abdi Abdullah, a Kenyan national who trained as a commercial pilot in the Philippines, is underway after he was arrested following the discovery by authorities of a plot to target a building in the United States and potentially recreate the Twin Tower-styled attacks that took place in New York City in 2001. Allegedly a member of Al-Shabaab, Abdullah’s three-week trial in November 2024 is expected to determine whether he will face the maximum penalty of a 20-year sentence in prison.
Conclusion
The perceived threat of ISIS and its affiliates has continued attracting more violent extremists to strengthen their ranks in the digital and physical domains to ensure the relevance of the Salafi-jihadi ideology propagated by them endures despite various arrests and counter-terrorism raids worldwide aimed at neutralising this threat. Unsurprisingly, the terror group has consolidated its position as the most ruthless and persisting security threat in the modern era despite the defeat it encountered with the fall of its last territorial stronghold, Baghouz (Syria), in March 2019. Without a global consensus on dealing with the ISIS threat, which seems unlikely considering that competing foreign policy objectives and regional conflicts which are pushing the world towards a wider war and polarising the world order, the terrorist group will continue exploiting the various crises to its advantage.
Finally, one must consider that despite Al-Qaeda-related threats being more region-specific than global in their appearance for now, its violent ideology is likely to aggravate the instability plaguing terrorism-stricken Africa, resulting in domino effects. This remains a possibility, considering that socio-economic challenges, regime and political instability, and weak security infrastructures, which have long been the continent’s defining attributes, have prevented local stakeholders and their allies from systematically rooting out terrorism and factors contributing to this security threat.
