Recent Trends: Revolution in Military Affairs in PLA post-gulf war?

“A war that changed the world ultimately changed the war itself.” Unrestricted Warfare[1]

The first Gulf War lasted only 42 days, with extensive aerial bombardment, that destroyed Iraq’s air defence system, military command and control centers, and critical infrastructure. A coalition of 42 countries, led by U.S. forces, successfully pushed back the Iraqi forces from Kuwait.[2] It became a decisive moment in the realm of war. It was an effective display of power projection by the American military forces, which later orchestrated the path of future warfare in the 21st century.

Iraqi forces were considered a formidable force to be reckoned with. Iraq’s military ranked fifth largest and was equipped with an army of tanks and combat aircraft. In spite of that, the U.S. forces successfully knocked down the adversary in quick battle with fewer casualties. It was an eye-opener for the Chinese, who realized the extent of change that technology had brought about in the conduct of war.[3] The Gulf War became a harbinger of change in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) for the PLA.

Building on the lessons learned, key features of Operation Desert Storm were impressive air-land joint operations with precision-guided ammunition, with the help of SATCOMs. It exhibited the interoperability of a united command structure on the battlefield, which gave the American forces an edge over Iraq’s fragmented military services.[4] New nomenclature was given by scholars to this modern warfare, calling it “no-contact war,” “information warfare,” “electronic warfare,” “precision-guided ammunition,” and “quick and relentless battle.”

The Chinese were aware of their asymmetrical capabilities relative to the West. But the swift victory of the United States against the Iraqi forces, whose military principles were similar to the Chinese, revealed the magnitude of the problem. Before the Gulf War, the Chinese had modeled their organizational structure based on the Soviet Union. The PLA followed conventional military strategy, which was primarily dependent on its ground combat forces from nationwide mobilization campaigns. The Chinese came to the realization that, in modern warfare, numerical superiority of forces was no longer a key to winning a war. It was a wake-up call for the PLA to kickstart its military reforms. The military modernization process was executed gradually at all levels.

Strategic Shift in the Military Doctrine

Modern military theory divides warfare into three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Since each level is interrelated to another, it becomes difficult to put limits or boundaries amongst the levels. The key to success is to adapt according to the evolving threats. Militaries modernize based on their experience, but since the PLA had not fought a major war since 1979, it lacked operational combat experience. So, the Chinese assessed the newer developments in the conduct of war and formulated their military doctrine.

Since its establishment, the PRC was greatly influenced by its leader’s approach to military affairs. Chairman Mao’s “People’s war” guided the military tactics of the PLA, employing active defense with guerrilla warfare. Deng Xiaoping realized the need to build an economic base, characterizing the 1980s as the period of “Peace and Development.”[5] Xiaoping guided the military doctrine to “Local War Under Modern Conditions,” stressing modern strategy and tactics. Under Jiang Zemin, a shift to, “Local Wars Under Modern, High-Tech Conditions,” was a major change in the strategic guidelines announced in 1993. He updated it again in 1999 with, “Local War Under Modern Informatized Conditions.” Military strategists were crystal clear that, if war broke out, it would be local and limited, with high-tech weapons systems.[6] The Gulf War set the stage for intense development in military technology. Hu Jintao reinforced “New Historic Missions” by emphasizing on securing China’s territorial sovereignty and simultaneously protecting its expanding maritime claims. The Chinese military modernized and restructured gradually to build a powerful military.

Under Xi Jinping, the PLA has been manoeuvering assertive policies to accomplish the “China Dream” by 2049 and to transform the PLA into a “World-Class” military by 2050. In 2015, the new guidelines for military strategy were revised under Xi Jinping. The new guidelines shift made a minor change, from “winning local wars under the conditions of informationization” to “winning informationized local wars.” Chinese strategists have come to the conclusion that winning in modern warfare would be determined through information dominance.[7]

Consecutively, Chinese leadership has been making efforts to bridge the gap between the PLA’s capabilities and those of American forces. It would be troublesome for the United States since China is on track to achieving its objective.

Organizational restructuring at the Campaign level

The PLA has announced various reforms, over the years, to its organizational structure for greater military preparedness. The modernisation process is inclined to adopt the US-style military structure.[8] Under Xi Jinping, military reforms have hastened to new levels.

On January 1, 2016, the PLA underwent major reorganizational reform at operational level or campaign level. The Restructuring of miliary regions into five theatre commands (battle zones), for streamlining resources to the threats at the border under evolving geopolitical pressure. The new “theatre commands” will support the joint operations of ground, naval, airforce within the battle zones (1 central + 4 regional commands). It has simplified the command-and-control centres, since the commanders of these “theatre commands” now have operational authority, which is essential in conducting integrated operations.[9]

Under the service reforms, the PLA Second Artillery Force, an independent branch which is responsible for conventional and nuclear missiles and operations, was elevated to service status and renamed as PLA Rocket Force. And establishment of new independent services based on the lines of PLASSF, PLA Strategic Support Force. PLASSF is dedicated to modern warfare operations in the “information domain” like cyber, space, electronic and psychological warfare missions. The four general departments under CMC: General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armaments Department (GAD) were replaced into 15 functional departments.[10]

On April 19, 2024, PLASSF was disbanded and transformed into Information Support Force (ISF), Cyber/Network Space Force, Geospatial/Aerospace Force and Logistics/Support Force.[11] The objective of these reforms is to attain the goal set by Xi Jinping of “winning informationized local war.”[12] These reforms will enhance PLA’s joint operation combat capabilities in strategic frontiers.[13]

Tactical Level

Tactical level of war comprises ground execution of strategic and operational planning. This is where the actual mobilisation takes place. The non-conventional tactics may have transformed the conduct of war, but deployment of ground combat forces is still significant to stabilise the situation. In modern warfare, boots on the ground are still essential. Therefore, the PLA has been working on providing military training for joint operations to its soldiers, for them to acclimatise with high-tech weapon systems. The PLA intends to make qualitative improvements by announcing a series of troop reductions.[14]

Blueprints of ground execution are highly classified documents which is highly secretive. States don’t even share with their allies the information regarding the tactics that they are going to use against the adversary. States that are still in progress of implementing theaterisation of command at operational level, may be hesitant to share within the military service itself.

Conclusion

Since the 1990s, China’s internal and external security threats have compelled them to maintain military preparedness. But at that point of time, China was still a developing economy with obsolete defense weaponry. Until recently, with a strong economic base, under President Xi, China has been maneuvering “Gray zone tactics” to pursue its core interests.

So long as, the PLA is restructuring and modernizing its military as per the evolving geopolitical requirements, China will remain in the ranks of great power status.

[1] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (1999), Unrestricted Warfare,” Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House.

[2] https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/march/chinas-desert-storm-education

[3] https://scholarworks.bellarmine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=ugrad_theses

[4] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3118083/china-us-rivalry-how-gulf-war-sparked-beijings-military

[5]https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/files/content/docs/congressional/BLAIRPaper.pdf

[6] https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11964.7.pdf

[7] https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/97097

[8] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44474

[9] https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/793267/chinas-goldwater-nichols-assessing-pla-organizational-reforms/

[10] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3144921/chinas-military-structure-what-are-theatre-commands-and-service

[11] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pla-ssf-scrapped-its-now-the-pla-isf-what-does-it-mean/articleshow/109476958.cms?from=mdr

[12] https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-military-strategy-winning-informationized-local-wars/