China’s growing influence in South Asia has been one of the most notable shifts in regional geopolitics over the past decade. Through a mix of ambitious infrastructure projects, strategic alliances, and robust economic diplomacy, Beijing has steadily deepened its ties across the region, with Bangladesh standing out as a particularly important partner. But recent developments in Dhaka have cast a shadow over this relationship. The sudden and unexplained departure of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has created a wave of political uncertainty, raising critical questions about the future of Sino-Bangladeshi relations. With Bangladesh heading into a tense electoral season, Beijing faces a strategic dilemma: can it sustain its influence amidst this turbulence, or are its regional ambitions at risk of faltering?
Over the past few years, China’s engagement with Bangladesh has been multifaceted, driven by both economic and strategic interests. Bangladesh has been a focal point of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), receiving over $10 billion in investments in key sectors like infrastructure, energy, and manufacturing (Bangladesh Investment Development Authority, 2023). Landmark projects such as the Padma Bridge Rail Link and Payra Power Plant are not just symbols of cooperation but critical parts of China’s broader strategy to secure trade routes across the Indian Ocean. Economically, China surpassed India to become Bangladesh’s largest trading partner in 2022, with bilateral trade exceeding $20 billion (Asia Briefing, 2023).
Bangladesh’s strategic location makes it a linchpin in China’s regional plans. Positioned at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, and with direct access to the Bay of Bengal, the country offers Beijing a critical node for its “String of Pearls” strategy — a network of ports and maritime routes designed to secure China’s energy imports and counterbalance India’s influence in the region. This makes stability in Bangladesh not just a matter of bilateral interest but a crucial aspect of China’s larger regional ambitions.
However, the sudden departure of Prime Minister Hasina has created a political vacuum, sparking speculation about the country’s leadership and casting doubts over the continuity of ongoing projects. Reports suggest Hasina’s exit might be linked to rising political pressure, possibly ahead of national elections. For China, this situation presents a delicate challenge. Historically, Beijing has managed to maintain relations with various political factions in Bangladesh, but its strategic partnership has particularly thrived under Hasina’s leadership. A shift in power, especially if it brings the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) — known for its closer ties with Western powers — into prominence, could disrupt the current dynamic.
The immediate concern for China is the stability of its economic investments. Chinese companies, such as China Harbour Engineering Company and China Railway Group, have faced bureaucratic hurdles and local opposition in the past. Prolonged political instability could exacerbate these challenges, leading to project delays and financial setbacks. According to a report by the Center for Policy Dialogue (CPD), disruptions to major infrastructure projects could have broader economic repercussions, affecting Bangladesh’s growth prospects and denting the confidence of foreign investors, including those from China (CPD, 2023).
Moreover, the possibility of a political shift raises strategic concerns. Under Hasina, China-Bangladesh relations have seen significant growth, but if the BNP gains power, it might aim to diversify Bangladesh’s foreign partnerships. The BNP’s historical alignment with Western nations, especially the United States, suggests that a government led by them might seek to reduce Bangladesh’s reliance on Chinese investments. A 2023 analysis by the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) indicated that any shift in Dhaka’s foreign policy could create strategic openings for India and the U.S., potentially complicating China’s long-term regional strategies.
The security implications of political unrest in Bangladesh are also significant. Heightened instability could pose direct risks to Chinese assets and personnel. Beijing has already faced such challenges in other BRI-partner countries, notably Pakistan, where Chinese workers have been targeted by militant groups at Gwadar Port. Recent advisories from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, urging citizens in Bangladesh to avoid large gatherings, reflect growing concerns over security (Global Times, 2023). Any escalation of unrest could compel China to re-evaluate its security commitments, possibly seeking closer cooperation with Bangladeshi authorities to safeguard its interests.
In light of these complexities, China is likely to adopt a pragmatic approach, balancing its need for stability with cautious engagement. Historically, Beijing’s policy of non-interference has allowed it to navigate political transitions across the world, maintaining relationships with different factions and hedging its bets. This strategy is evident in its dealings with Myanmar, where China continued its engagement with the ruling junta despite widespread international condemnation. In Bangladesh, this means Beijing may choose to keep channels open with all political parties, ensuring that its projects and investments are protected regardless of who wins the upcoming elections.
Economically, China may ramp up efforts to demonstrate the benefits of continued cooperation. By accelerating key projects like the Dhaka-Chittagong high-speed rail link, Beijing can underscore the tangible gains of Sino-Bangladeshi ties. Furthermore, China might explore new loans, trade incentives, and infrastructure deals, not just to solidify its presence but also to counter any narrative that suggests Dhaka should diversify away from Chinese investments. With the region becoming a battleground for influence among global powers, China’s economic diplomacy will be crucial in maintaining its foothold (China Institute of International Studies, 2023).
On the security front, China is likely to push for enhanced collaboration. While such efforts can be framed as ensuring the safety of its personnel and assets, deeper security ties could also provide Beijing with more leverage over Bangladesh’s internal policies. Similar approaches have been observed in Sri Lanka, where Chinese companies were granted rights to secure key infrastructure, reflecting Beijing’s broader trend of proactive security engagement.
The stakes for China in Bangladesh are high. As the political landscape shifts, so does the balance of regional power. Bangladesh’s proximity to India, its strategic position as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia, and its access to the Indian Ocean make it a critical element in China’s regional calculus. The unexpected departure of Prime Minister Hasina has added a layer of complexity, challenging China to adapt quickly to an evolving and potentially volatile situation. How Beijing navigates this period of uncertainty will not only determine the future of its relations with Bangladesh but could also set a precedent for how it engages with other countries across the Belt and Road Initiative.
In conclusion, China’s strategic concerns amid Bangladesh’s political turmoil underscore the difficulties of maintaining a consistent foreign policy in an unpredictable world. The sudden developments in Dhaka have heightened uncertainty, prompting Beijing to rethink how it engages with its partners in South Asia. As the region braces for a period of political maneuvering, the actions of China will be closely watched. Can Beijing maintain its influence, or will it be forced to recalibrate its strategies in the face of shifting power dynamics? The coming months are set to provide crucial insights, not just for China and Bangladesh, but for the broader geopolitics of South Asia.
