Authors: Kelvin Benny and Shubh Gupta*
Amid escalating global tensions and a rapidly changing international order, India needs to recalibrate its defence strategy, re-strategize, and possibly even realign. Whether it is a Taliban takeover in its Northwest or an ongoing civil war in Myanmar in its Northeast, India must adapt to these challenges. Most of India’s neighbours are undergoing rapid political changes, the latest being Bangladesh, where India lost a trusted partner and ally with the recent ouster of Sheikh Hasina. This situation makes the security of India’s east and northeast more vulnerable. This is compounded by the current ongoing instability in Myanmar, a much less discussed neighbour in the prism of Indian national security, among the academia and people in general. Myanmar, with which India shares a long border of 1,643 km, faces the threat of becoming a balkanised failed narco-state, situated in the infamous Golden Triangle. The security and stability of India’s Northeast and the success of India’s “Act East” policy depend on how dexterously it manages the geopolitical changes in Myanmar.
After the World War II, the local army under the leadership of General Aung San, with support of allied forces gained control over Myanmar, then known as Burma. Aung San, along with leaders of other ethnic groups such as the Chin, signed the Panglong Agreement. The agreement promised a federal structure and that power would be shared among ethnic groups. Later that year, General Aung San, along with six members of his interim government, was assassinated. Therefore, the agreement could not be brought into practice in a timely manner. The army continued to be a powerful institution in the country. Myanmar became a parliamentary democracy in 1948; however, the democracy was short-lived.
Like many other third-world democracies, Myanmar witnessed a military coup under General Ne Win in 1962. Under Ne Win’s leadership, the United Revolutionary Council implemented new economic policies that suited its ideological interests rather than the people’s. The irrational decisions taken by the military, such as the withdrawal of existing currency notes and replacing them with new ones divisible by 9, further plunged the economy into turmoil. In the meanwhile, the Tatmadaw has greatly increased its presence in economic domains in Myanmar, specifically in infrastructure and mining. These significant changes mirror a larger picture observed in India’s neighbourhood: Myanmar in the east and Pakistan in the west. Both nations have witnessed military rule despite the democratic aspirations of people, and both of them face challenges related to insurgency and illicit drug trade, with Myanmar located within the Golden Triangle and Pakistan being a part of the Golden Crescent.
The constitutional changes in 2008 buttressed the influence of the Tatmadaw in politics. It included clauses that required one-fourth of the members in the Chamber to be appointed by the military, thereby effectively granting them veto powers. In 2020, the NLD once again secured a landslide victory. However, in February 2021, the military, referring to its constitutional powers, declared a state of National Emergency, seized power, and announced plans to dissolve the NLD. The military coup crushed the democratic aspirations of people prompting them to organise mass protests. The junta responded with a brutal crackdown on protesting civilians. This movement was soon taken over by various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and Myanmar’s Generation Z, who refused to cow down to the brutal crackdown of the junta. This resulted in a rising civil war in which various EAOs and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) took part enthusiastically. This popular ‘Myanmar Spring,’ which received support even from the Burman (Bamar) majority, has resulted in the historic loss of control of areas by the junta. In the fourth year of the coup, the junta is losing control over large areas, as well as soldiers, and experiencing wide-scale desertions, which shows the plummeting morale of the junta.
Myanmar hasn’t seen functional peace since 1948, therefore it is pertinent for us to analyze the current instability in Myanmar with out-of-the-box solutions. This prompts us to explore the ethnic dimensions of Myanmar’s politics and the ongoing brutal civil war. On the borders of India, Chins form a significant part of the demography and also share ethnic kinship with Kukis in India. In this context, we may note that the Chin National Army is a major participant in the ongoing civil war and is controlling important parts of Myanmar that border India and functions as a quasi-state akin to other rebel groups like the United Wa State Army. India must take this into cognizance along with the deteriorating political conditions in an increasingly balkanizing Myanmar, where the junta struggles for control amidst the popular resistance. The areas controlled by Chin today have developed aspects of a quasi-state like defined territory and a functioning government in the form of the Chinland Council. While the population of Kuki Chin is spread over the territory of India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, it is in India that their rights are more respected than in any of these countries, where they face suppression and war. This is acknowledged by Chins in Myanmar who view India with admiration and hopes for working relations which can protect the national interests of India. It is pertinent for India to look into how another neighbour, particularly China, deals with both Tatmadaw and various EAOs, leveraging various ethnic kinships to protect its national interest.
Considering the definitions in the Montevideo convention, the Chin are not recognised as a state by the international community and are not aspiring to form a separate nation, they do form a de facto quasi-state. Other examples of quasi-states include the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq and Abkhazia in Georgia. In a destabilized state like Myanmar, there are more chances that such quasi-states will continue to exist, and one best example is Wa State, which is aided by external patron China. Given these conditions, it is much needed for India to develop working relations with the emerging Chin quasi-state in Myanmar. India must use humanitarian aid as a mechanism to develop working relations with China in Myanmar. We must also note that India would be the first beneficiary with reduction of refugee flow into northeastern states. Further, as the flow of narcotics and arms is a transnational threat which constantly aids Naxalites, supporting a Chin quasi-state possibly as a client state suits the national interest of India in the long term. With a changing global climate, India must face the contemporary realities and establish friendly ties with the Chin National Army and other rebel groups. This will not only promote stability in India’s neighbourhood but will also help attain the federal and democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar.
*Shubh Gupta is a Post Graduate Candidate in School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University
