Examining the Origins of the Concert of Europe
This article investigates the causes that united the major European powers in 1815, leading to the establishment of the Concert of Europe, which endured until the outbreak of the Great War. Critical analysis of secondary and tertiary sources have been used to examines the post-Napoleonic period in Europe, from the end of the Battle of Waterloo and the formation of the Congress of Vienna to the establishment of the League of Nations. The Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) laid the groundwork for the Concert based on core values of Legitimacy, Shared Values, and Stability. The Concert, also known as the Congress System, aimed to prevent war, address nationalist outbursts and preserve the conservative order. Accordingly, the Concert maintained order for approximately 100 years. This research sheds light on diplomatic efforts and mechanisms the Concert of Europe employed to unite Great powers to maintain peace through diplomacy and strategies.
Introduction
The Concert of Europe, also known as the Congress System, emerged after the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) with the ambitious aim of revising the conservative order and undoing the impact and devastation of Napoleon Bonaparte’s rule. This cooperative alliance sought to enforce laws and treaties through table diplomacy, underpinned by shared goals; to preserve peace across the European continent. Key proponents of the Concert were; Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, later joined by France. United by the principles of Legitimacy, Shared Values, and Stability, these great powers employed diplomatic means to address disorder and maintain international peace, rather than just resorting to the traditional balance of power strategies which emerged after the Westphalian system. Challenges such as the work of Cardinal Richelieu and Austrian nationalist movements in the Balkans posed significant obstacles to the Concert’s objectives. Richelieu, who with his raison de ‘tat policy; left disintegrated Germany and paved the way for the expansionism of France; intensified the unpredictability and volatility in the region, which after King Louis XIII; Napoléon Bonaparte used to execute his plans to dominate Europe through universalization policy. The Congress’ Statesmen recognized that to maintain peace and stability in Europe, it was imperative to undo the work of Cardinal and forestall French expansionism. Thus, the Statesmen including Castlereagh, Klemens von Metternich, Talleyrand and Tsar Alexander I decided to consolidate 300-odd pre-Napoleonic states into some thirty-nine bounded states called German Confederation.
The ultimate goal of forming the confederation was to forestall French aggression and simultaneously prevent the unification of Germany based on nationalism. Another challenge that needed to be solved in the Concert was; of nationalism movements in the Balkans, which threatened the whole of Austria and it was Metternich who played the great realpolitik diplomatic game through the help of Congress, the Holy Alliance and Quadruple Alliance; tackled the issue. However, after the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853, the Concert lost its effectiveness and started to crumble, yet still lived until Wilhelm II’s obsession with naked power ignited the fire of the Great War and destroyed the whole system; notwithstanding, Napoleon II and Otto Von Bismarck’s paradoxical policies did play a significant role in weakening the Concert, but it was Wilhelm II, who in the pressure of public opinion, obsession with naked power and promise of proving that Erb’s palsy won’t stop him from dominating Europe; wrecked the Concert from its roots to achieve domination over Europe. Unfortunately, everything went against his wishes, despite Germany’s powerful army, economy and nationalism, he, could not achieve what he desired, resultantly he lost, paving the way for Wilson’s idealistic idea of self-determination, which became the basis for the so-called League of Nations, an ironic alternative of Congress of Vienna. However, it is important to note that the whole Concert of Europe provides a comprehensive view of diplomacy, balance of power, emerging states, and raison de’ tat.
Congress of Vienna
The order created during the Congress of Vienna represented the closest approach to universal governance that Europe had witnessed since Charlemagne’s Carolingian Empire. The devastation and chaos caused by Napoléon in Europe led both critics and defenders of the balance of power system to agree that facing warlike conditions on the continent was unacceptable and intolerable. As Alexander Pope once said, “Now Europe ‘s balanc’d, neither Side prevails, For nothing’s left in either of the Scales”. In response to this common realization among the major powers, a meeting was arranged in September 1814, where the victors of the Napoleonic wars gathered to design the post-war world. The meetings in Vienna continued from the time of Napoleon’s escape from Elba until his final defeat at the Battle of Waterloo and Congress completed its final act in June of 1815. In the Congress, Klemens von Metternich served as Austria’s negotiator, Prince von Hardenberg served as Prussia’s negotiator, France relied on Talleyrand, Britain sent, Lord Castlereagh and from Russia, Tsar himself came to speak. These five men representing their respective countries, finally achieved what they had ought to; a long period of peace Europe had ever experienced; based on a common realization. The common realization was based on legitimacy, Shared Values, and Stability. The conscious design that used balance of power with the amalgam of aforementioned values maintained equilibrium, not only physical but moral as well. Former, based on the balance of power which reduced the chances of using force and later supported by a shared sense of justice that reduced the desire of using force. In the whole system of Congress from equilibrium to a shared sense of justice the Pits plan was followed implicitly and Metternich’s explicitly. After the Congress of Vienna, the relationship between the balance of power and shared values were shown into two separate yet interconnected alliances; Holy Alliance and Quadruple Alliance. Prussia, Austria and Russia belonged to the former and later consisted of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. This collective cooperation played a substantial role in the Vienna settlement paving the way for the Concert of Europe.
The major statesmen of the Congress agreed on the conclusion that apart from undoing Richelieu’s work, the three major yet complicated objectives, at the end of Congress needed to be solved. The objectives were, the restoration of the ruler based on the same principle on which the Congress of Vienna was based, legitimacy; rewarding the victors vis-à-vis punishing the losers, and lastly, maintaining peace in Europe. First Objective: The chief advocates of restoration, Metternich and Talleyrand, emphasized the restoration of old monarchial legitimacy, where the Monarch did not share sovereignty with parliaments. The results were evident in France, Spain, Piedmont, Modena and the papal States. Whereas the exception was King Murat of Naples, who remained as King of Naples, despite being disliked by the Congress members. Second Objective: Further, Congress also wanted compensation and rewards as they were victors and needed to be rewarded but not without imposing penalties on France. However, Lord Castlereagh’s advocacy for treating France moderately saved France from severe punishment but later treaty of Paris compelled France to go to pre-war territorial arrangements. The territorial arrangements process got Russia to get Finland; Prussia kept the Rhineland, Duchy of Westphalia, and some parts of Saxony and Pomerania. The Kingdom of Austria received Lombardy, Venetia, Illyria and Venetia. Whereas, Britain was not interested in mainland gains, rather she took potential naval bases in the North Sea, Malta, and Ionia Islands. Third objective: Maintaining the peace in Europe was achieved through two means. By creating a strong enough Buffer states around France that acts as a Barrier against French aggression, Belgium and Holland were combined in the north to form a strong State; Nice and Genoa were given to Piedmont in north West of Italy’s border; the Swiss Confederation’s restoration in Western Frontiers, all these Buffers were assurance that France won’t provoke the aggression again. Apart from buffer States, the Balance of power with the amalgam of shared values, played a significant role in maintaining peace. To lower the chances of Risk, alliances were made among the powers, if in case any State try to throw the established equilibrium.
Furthermore, the Congress of Vienna gave birth to two alliances, different yet interconnected; The Holly Alliance and Quadruple Alliance, the former consisting of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, were limited to so-called Eastern Courts. These three countries of Holy Alliance wanted to observe Christian principles and probably wanted to see the renewal of the old Christian order and unity that existed once. Whereas Quadruple Alliance consisted of Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria; and had a clear goal to forestall any French aggression, and for another two decades by resisting and excluding the dynasty of Napoléon Bonaparte. Both alliances had different ambitions, yet were interconnected because the same countries were in both except Great Britain.
From the strategic and Diplomatic sides, these both alliances were necessary for maintaining order and fulfilling the interest of Austria. In the words of Metternich “Austria considers everything with reference to the substance. Russia wants above all the form; Britain wants the substance without the form…. It will be our task to combine the impossibilities of Britain with the mode of Russia”. However Unlike Metternich, Castlereagh saw Holy Alliance stupidity, due to the vague goals of Holly Alliance, Castlereagh called it “a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense”. All this national interest games paved the way for the great Concert of Europe.
Concert of Europe
The congress system that Vienna build in the hope of maintaining peace and order in Europe through a series of conferences, paved the way for the Great Concert of Europe; the initial and the paramount importance was given; on tackling the revolutions which broke out in 1820. To solve these issues, from 1820 to 1822, four congressional meetings were held.
The first, as such conference was, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818; which was – centered around the issue of France. The Congress settled the of payment of indemnity against France and ordered that France should be freed of occupation. The role of Lord Castlereagh was absolute, regarding the central issue, that Congress should be focusing on France only. As Lord Castlereagh was sent with sound instructions that “We approve [a general discussion] on this occasion, with difficulty too by assuring [secondary powers] that…periodic meetings… are to be confined to one… subject, or even…to one power France, and no engagement to interference…Our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies and then with commanding force”. Clearly, the Great Britain wanted to put checks and balances on France more than anything else.
However, Russia thought otherwise, Tsar wanted to convert the established system into an alliance against the revolutions that Great Britain did not like that much, as it was against its traditional foreign policy of Britain. Yet, Russia was firm on its proposal and wanted to send troops to South America to crush the revolutions in the Spanish colonies. The reaction regarding the proposal was obvious from Lord Castlereagh who made his point clear that this proposal should not be followed. Which marked the first break among the powers in Congress.
The next meeting was held in 1820, Congress of Troppau, Silesia. The main agenda revolved around the revolutions that broke out in Spain, Portugal and the Kingdom of Two siliclies. In so, Russia, with so-called Eastern Courts, supported the interventionist policy; asserted that it is their right to intervene in any country which threatens the interests of their States. Apparently, no State was more vulnerable to revolutions than Austria; Metternich was a staunch supporter of intervention of the countries to suppress the revolutions, whereas Lord Castlereagh, made his position clear and objected to the intervention policy and remarked that Congress is supposed to prevent Bonaparte dynasty in France and sustain the Vienna Settlement nothing more nothing less. Although Lord Castlereagh disliked volatile revolutions, yet he was against intervention of the countries in other State’s affairs and he considered revolutions as their internal matters, further, he also feared that intervention could disturb the equilibrium of the Balance of power. Despite the disagreement between the Eastern Courts and Britain; the former got authorization and exercised its plan accordingly and in reaction Castlereagh protested against it.
The third congressional meeting, Congress of Laibach held in 1821, revolved around the same cliché, that intervention should be the way to suppress the revolutions and the Holly Alliance further claimed that it should support the established government against the erupting revolutions. Resultantly, the British again opposed it for the same reasons that were discussed in the Congress of Troppau.
In 1822, the Congress of Verona took place where France was authorized to intervene in Spain. Russia supported France and Tsar gave his sympathy to the Greeks who revolted against the Turks and made international order unpredictable. Despite Holly Alliance’s decisions, Metternich knew that Austria cannot afford to support the actions of Russia in the Balkans because it was clear that its domestic institutions were not compatible with national and liberal trends of the century and the Balkans issue was one of that. Yet, Metternich could not afford to lose Russia either, so opted to support Russia in its crusade while maintaining that nationalism does not stir up in Austria by any chance. Whereas, after the suicide of Lord Castlereagh; Foreign Secretary George Canning withdrawn from the Quadruple Alliance because, it could not fulfil the goals on which it was established, further, British could not afford the loss in profitable trade with Latin America and simultaneously could not afford to go against traditional conservative policies. As a result, the British supported the United States, endorsed the Monroe Doctrine and granted formal diplomatic recognition to Latin American Republics.
While in the Balkans, the tussle over the eastern question remained even after continuous diplomatic negotiations, Russia’s aggressive expansionist foreign policy made Britain and Austria skeptical, and Metternich was sure that independence movements that today are happening in the Balkans tomorrow may attack Austria. The aura of Metternich’s diplomacy made for time being possible to halt the instant action, he anonymously affirmed Europe’s unity, by flattering Russia and Cajoling British. Saving both options that later for a few years Austria used. However, after the removal of Metternich from office in 1848, Austria lost its grip over the Vienna Settlement, resultantly, the concert started to crumble in 1854 over the anvil of eastern question.
In 1852, Napoléon III ascended to power through a coup, emulating the actions of his predecessor. He attempted to convince Sultan Abdulmejid I to bestow upon him the title of protector of Christians within the Ottoman Empire, a role Russian Tsar traditionally reserved for himself. As a result, Nicholas I was enraged and resisted even the possibility that Napoléon’s role as protector of Balkan Slavs; the Tsar considered Napoléon an illegitimate usurper and unworthy of putting his feet in Russia’s shoes as a protector of Balkan Slavs. When the Ottoman sultan rebuffed the Russian emissary, it broke diplomatic ties with Ottomans, as a result, Russia unleashed his anger and asked Berlin and Vienna to support him in the occupation of principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Though it was Holly Alliance on which Tsar was dependent, Austria thought otherwise regarding the proposed plan of the Tsar. Austria had the most to lose from the war; apparently Austria proposed that France and Russia both act as joint protectors of the Ottoman Christians. Neither, Russia nor France agreed on the terms that Austria proposed. Observing the situation and deadlock between both countries, Lord Palmerston sent the Royal Navy to the entrance of the Black sea, to strengthen the bargaining position. Resultantly, Turkey declared war on Russia when Russia occupied Turkish territory on the Black sea and destroyed its fleet in 1853; Turkey was backed by Austria, France and Great Britain. Some historians blame France for igniting the war not by the countries such as Austria, Russia or Great Britain who had relatively more interest in the eastern question than any other state. That is why the Crimean War is condemned by some historians as a senseless and stupid and avoidable war.
Although it might seem, Tsar had put religion over strategic gain, religious claims were just a pretext for both political and strategic gains. As a landlocked country, Tsar wanted to secure a warm water port, and access to the Black and Mediterranean Sea, and had dreamt of gaining Constantinople and the straits. On observing the aggressiveness of Russia, France saw an opportunity to weaken Russia and break the Holy Alliance. While Palmerston was actively seeking a justification to definitively curb Russia’s ambitions regarding the straits, Austria found itself in a complex position. On one hand, Austria sought to uphold its longstanding friendship with Russia, but on the other hand, it harbored concerns that Russia’s actions in the Balkans could spark unrest among Austria’s Slavic population. Additionally, Austria was well aware that aligning with Russia might expose it to potential attacks from France on its Italian territories. As a result, at first, Austria declared neutrality and when the country found inactivity unproductive, Austria sent the Ultimatum to Russia to retreat from Moldavia and Wallachia; Austria’s action was one of the significant factors in ending the Crimean War. Consequently, Austria left Holly Alliance, destroyed the glue of conservative values; left Russia free to conduct its policy based on geopolitics. The war concluded in 1856 with the Treaty of Paris. Although, the Crimean War had crumbled the whole Concert, yet it survived until two blows, one from Bismarck and another from Wilhelm II.
The collapse of Metternich’s designed system after the Crimean War led to a period of restlessness and conflict in the continent that persisted for nearly two decades. This era saw significant events such as the War of Piedmont and France against Austria in 1859, the conflict over Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and ultimately, the Franco- Prussian War of 1870. Out of this bloody turmoil; a new balance of Power emerged; where France had participated in three wars lost its position of predominance to Germany. Further, the glue of morality that Metternich had put in order was destroyed and the new term Realpolitik emerged that replaced French Raison d’état. The new world order that emerged was the result of collaboration between two counterparts who initially held a strong dislike for each other. These individuals later became arch-adversaries: France and Prussia. French Emperor Napoléon III and Germany’s Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck, chose to disregard the traditional principles of Metternich’s old beliefs. These principles emphasized preserving the legitimate crowned heads of state in Europe for the sake of stability, suppressing national and liberal movements, and determining state relations through consensus among like-minded rulers. Instead, the Chancellor and the Sphinx of the Tuileries crafted their policy based on Realpolitik – the notion that State-relations are solely determined by raw power and that the mighty will prevail. They ignored the traditional norms and pursued a pragmatic approach to politics, and made Concert weaker than ever before. Both had personal reasons to weaken the Metternich system and overturn the Vienna settlement. Napoléon disliked and hated the Vienna settlement because it was created to forestall French expansionism and contain it.
France thought that it was entitled to occasional territorial gain and did not want a unified Europe standing in its way; another reason was Napoleon’s obsession with liberal ideas and nationalism; he thought both are the core values of France and Metternich’s system hindered it and for that it needs to be wrecked, on the other hand Bismarck resented Metternich’s handiwork because it locked Prussia into being Austria subordinated partner in German confederation and Bismarck knew that if German state were to be unified; it is imperative that Vienna settlement must be destroyed. Both countries destroyed the Vienna settlement. Napoléon fancying himself the destroyer of Vienna Settlement and inspiration of European Nationalism, threw diplomacy into a state of turmoil. Although, Napoléon got nothing in the long run but indirectly made possible the unification of Italy and Germany. In July 1871 Franco-Prussian war took place, and Prussia won it eventually made Germany’s unification possible. The destruction of the Vienna system that Napoléon had begun, Bismarck ended it and annexed Alsace and northern Lorraine to the new German Empire.
Bismarck’s realpolitik and unified Germany made Europe more unpredictable; Britain with France feared the new player which could dominate Europe anywhere soon. Although, for the time being, Bismarck managed to preserve peace through his complex diplomacy by signing treating like Reassurance with Russia and the Three Emperors League. However, his successor could not understand or imitate the greatness of Bismarck’s diplomacy resultantly, they took another meaning of Bismarck’s realpolitik and multiplied arms and supported wars. By the end of twentieth century’s first decade, the Concert of Europe which had maintained peace for a century for all practical purposes ceased to exist.
After the departure of Bismarck, Emperor, Wilhelm II could not handle the ever-growing power of Germany resultantly, he got obsessed with naked power, and for obvious reasons, unlike Britain, France or Russia where philosophical, moral and religious values existed, in Germany, there was nothing like that which could act as guidance for him. Because of Bismarck’s complex realpolitik, Germany had lost connection with every other philosophical meaning but national interest. Wilhelm II, could not foresee the future and resultantly took the steps that only a man with Erb’s palsy could do, who wanted to prove that he was better than Bismarck.
However, unlike the Chancellor, the Emperor had no clear agenda regarding foreign policy but an obsession that even made him think that Germany has the power to defeat all neighbors simultaneously. He was partially right. This obsession boosted his ego leading him to reverse the relations that Bismarck had established and eventually, tussling with France, Britain and Russia. He broke the reassurance treaty, France with the help of Russia Alsace-Lorraine back and the United States got involved in the war and Germany lost it, paving the way for Versailles where penalties were decided on Germany and the idea of self-determination was discussed which eventually led to the formation of the league of nations, an ironic alternative of Congress of Vienna which could not avert the emergence of Nazi Germany and indirectly paved the way for Nationalist fascist regime leading to world war II.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Concert of Europe, also known as the Congress System, emerged as a collaborative alliance after the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) with the ambitious goal of revising the conservative order and undoing the devastation caused by Napoleon Bonaparte’s rule. This cooperative alliance sought to enforce laws and treaties through diplomatic negotiations, underpinned by shared goals, with the aim of preserving peace across the European continent. Key proponents of the Concert were; Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, later joined by France. United by the principles of Legitimacy, Shared Values, and Stability, these major powers employed diplomatic means to address disorder and maintain international peace, departing from the traditional balance of power strategies that emerged after the Westphalian system. The Concert of Europe offers a comprehensive view of diplomacy, the balance of power, emerging states, and raison d’état. Despite its eventual downfall, the Concert’s attempt at cooperative diplomacy serves as a valuable lesson, highlighting the complexities and challenges in maintaining international peace and order. The insights gained from the Concert continue to influence global governance and diplomatic strategies to this day.
