On September 6, 2025, the 47th President-elect of the United States, Donald Trump, posted on his favorite social media platform, Truth Social, a statement that could cause controversy in US foreign relations. The full text is as follows: “Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China. May they have a long and prosperous future together!” According to Trump, India and Russia have turned to China, which he describes as “darkest,” and New Delhi is no longer a reliable partner for Washington in its efforts to contain Beijing.
The statement immediately attracted great attention, as India has long been considered a pillar of the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Indeed, it has been represented in the Quad grouping since Trump revived the alliance in 2017. Trump’s public skepticism about India’s commitment raises an important question: is New Delhi really shifting toward Russia and China, or is this just a politically biased assessment? To answer this, it is necessary to carefully analyze the reality of India’s bilateral relations with Russia, China, and the United States in the current context.
The reason for Trump’s statement can be explained first of all by the symbolic images that took place simultaneously. In late August 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, where he appeared publicly with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Here, Mr. Modi made a remarkable speech when he linked India’s interests to the future development of the SCO.
For US observers, especially White House hawks, they consider anyone who is not completely on Washington’s side to be leaning towards the opponent, an image that is provocative. In addition, India continues to be Russia’s largest oil customer since the West imposed sanctions after the Ukraine conflict, despite pressure from the US and the European Union. Data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) shows that in 2024 alone, more than 35% of India’s total crude oil imports came from Russia, helping Moscow maintain its revenue in the context of being isolated by the West. In addition, India’s participation in promoting the expansion of BRICS+ and supporting the strengthening of the role of the New Development Bank (NDB) also increases suspicion that New Delhi is moving away from the West to “lean” into the “Southern Hemisphere” sphere of influence built by Moscow and Beijing. As President Trump returns to the White House with a tougher trade and security agenda after four years of Joe Biden’s weakening of America, India’s continued pursuit of pragmatic relations with Russia and China has become a convenient excuse for him to openly criticize.
However, for a comprehensive assessment, it is necessary to take a deeper look at the India-Russia relationship. Historically, the Soviet Union was India’s most important strategic partner in the security and defense sector. Russia has remained a major arms supplier, even as India has increasingly diversified its imports from the US, France, and Israel. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in the 2018–2022 period, about 45% of India’s arms imports still came from Russia. After the outbreak of the conflict with Ukraine, Moscow has become increasingly dependent on the Asian market for its resource exports, with New Delhi being a key partner. Bilateral trade in 2024 is expected to exceed $65 billion, five times higher than before the crisis. But the engagement is more pragmatic than strategic: India takes advantage of cheap crude oil and traditional defense supplies while maintaining ties with Russia to avoid being left out of the Central Asian arena, where Beijing is quietly expanding its influence through Xi Jinping’s BRI. The Modi government has repeatedly stressed that its relationship with Russia is not aimed at countering the West but is driven by economic interests and energy security. So if you look at trade figures alone, it is easy to mistake India for “leaning” toward Moscow, while in essence it is a pragmatic relationship with limited benefits.
Meanwhile, India-China relations are more complicated. The two countries maintain cooperation within the framework of BRICS and the SCO and often call for a “multipolar” international order to limit the dominant role of the West. At the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2023, India and China supported the admission of new members, thereby increasing the voice of the “non-Western” group in the international arena. However, behind the statements of cooperation are deep disagreements, especially on the Himalayan border. The bloody clash in the Galwan Valley in 2020 still leaves scars, and the two sides have not yet reached a comprehensive agreement on troop withdrawal. In addition, India is strongly concerned about Beijing’s “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean, as well as China’s large-scale investment in neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, which weakens New Delhi’s traditional influence in the South Asian region. At home, the Modi government has maintained a ban on hundreds of Chinese-origin apps while tightening foreign direct investment and increasing controls on Beijing-linked technology. Chinatowns can be found almost everywhere in the world, but they are nowhere to be found in India. Data from the Indian Ministry of Commerce shows that the bilateral trade deficit will still be over $70 billion in 2024, reinforcing the view that economic relations with China are unfavorable. So the claim that India is “leaning” toward China is unfounded: cooperation exists but is limited to multilateral frameworks, while the bilateral reality is strategic competition.
To understand this better, it is also necessary to assess the India-US relationship, which both sides call a “global strategic partnership.” On the security front, India is an important member of the Quad grouping with the US, Japan, and Australia, with the common goal of maintaining a “free and open Indo-Pacific” to balance China’s influence. Washington has become an increasingly large supplier of defense and aerospace technology to New Delhi, from MQ-9B drones to cooperation in developing next-generation fighters. In the high-tech sector, the US and India have signed many agreements on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and space. Corporations such as Micron and Applied Materials have invested billions of dollars in India, turning the country into a potential global chip manufacturing hub. However, this relationship is not without friction. The Trump 2.0 administration has imposed a 50% tariff on goods imported from India, under the pretext of protecting domestic production. Washington has also criticized New Delhi for continuing to buy Russian oil, seeing it as undermining efforts to punish Moscow. In addition, some human rights issues, such as India’s controversial citizenship law, have also caused disagreements between the US and India. But overall, the two countries still see each other as long-term strategic partners. As analyst Ashley Tellis at the Carnegie Endowment notes, “India may be tough in negotiations, but that doesn’t mean New Delhi will abandon its increasingly extensive security relationship with Washington.”
Putting the three relationships into a strategic triangle, Trump’s assessment only reflects part of the overall picture. India has indeed increased its oil imports from Russia and continued to participate in Chinese-sponsored forums, but these factors do not mean that New Delhi has “tilted” completely toward Moscow and Beijing. For Russia, it is economic and energy interests; for China, it is cooperation in disagreement; and for the United States, it is a complex but fundamentally sound strategic relationship. In other words, India is pursuing a “Look East” policy, maintaining distance to maximize its national interests. This is consistent with the “non-alignment” tradition but adjusted for the 21st century under the slogan of “strategic autonomy.”
In conclusion, Trump is partly correct when observing from the surface: the image of Modi standing shoulder to shoulder with Putin and Xi, the soaring trade with Russia, and India’s active participation in multipolar organizations all make Washington worried. However, the assessment that New Delhi has “tilted” completely towards Russia and China is an oversimplification of India’s geopolitical role. In fact, India both cooperates and competes with China, maintains a pragmatic relationship with Russia, and continues to strengthen strategic relations with the US and its Western partners. This approach reflects India’s diplomatic dexterity in the context of an increasingly fragmented global landscape. If the US applies too much pressure, the real risk is pushing India closer to Russia and China, something Washington wants to avoid. In the 21st century, India is likely to remain a typical and pivotal “swing state.”
