The April 8 ceasefire between Iran, the United States, and Israel has calmed nerves, but it has not repaired the energy system that was thrown into chaos over the past six weeks. Markets may welcome the language of de-escalation, yet energy traders do not buy words alone. They buy confidence, verified shipping access, functioning infrastructure, and insured cargoes. That is why the assumption that oil and gas prices will quickly return to prewar levels is far too optimistic. The near-standstill in Hormuz traffic shows that the crisis has moved from the battlefield into logistics, and logistics always take longer to heal than headlines do.
Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz was not just another shipping lane. It was, and remains, a critical oil chokepoint for the entire global economy. The U.S. Energy Information Administration says about 20 million barrels a day moved through the strait in 2024, equal to roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption, while its broader review of world oil transit chokepoints underlines how few realistic alternatives exist. The International Energy Agency’s overview of Middle East and global energy markets adds that more than 110 bcm of LNG passed through Hormuz in 2025, while UNCTAD’s rapid analysis warns that the strait also carries around a quarter of global seaborne oil trade and major fertilizer flows.
Prices are falling on paper, not in reality.
Yes, benchmark prices have retreated from panic levels. Reuters reported that oil ended the week with Brent at $95.20 a barrel and WTI at $96.57 after the ceasefire, a sharp weekly drop. But that is only part of the story. During the worst of the squeeze, physical oil prices climbed near $150 a barrel, showing that the shortage of prompt, deliverable cargoes was far worse than the futures market suggested. Barclays has already warned in a new forecast note that its $85 Brent outlook depends on fast normalization of Hormuz flows. Even President Trump’s claim that the strait will be “open fairly soon” is really an admission that it is not open in any normal commercial sense today.
The shipping numbers tell the truth more clearly than political statements do. Reuters reported that only 15 ships had passed through the strait since the ceasefire, compared with a pre-conflict average of 138. That gap matters because even if the guns fall silent, insurers, charterers, crews, and refiners do not instantly resume normal behavior. A tanker operator that has just watched a war shut the world’s most important energy corridor is not going to behave as if risk has vanished overnight. This is why the market is still pricing a fear premium into every barrel and every LNG cargo. The ceasefire may have stopped further immediate escalation, but it has not yet restored routine commercial trust.
Gas and LNG will likely take even longer.
Natural gas may recover even more slowly than oil. Reuters says Qatar Energy is preparing a restart at part of its LNG system, but full recovery still depends on safe shipping through Hormuz. Earlier Reuters reporting said Qatar’s giant Ras Laffan system was shut and would take weeks to restart. The IEA estimates that disrupted Hormuz transit has cut LNG supplies from Qatar and the UAE by more than 300 million cubic meters a day, or over 2 bcm every week, while its policy response tracker shows governments are already acting as though this is a prolonged emergency, not a brief spike. If oil needs weeks to normalize, gas may need months.
Supply losses across the wider region also argue against quick relief. Reuters reported that OPEC+ has discussed additional output, but only in a world where Hormuz is functioning again. Meanwhile, Washington has had to release emergency support, including an 8.48 million barrel SPR loan and likely an extension of the Russian oil waiver to keep more barrels in the system. These are not the actions of governments that believe the problem is over. They are the actions of policymakers trying to bridge a supply hole that is still very real.
The wider economy is now part of the story.
The economic fallout is no longer theoretical. Reuters reported that the IMF expects demand for fund support could rise to $20 billion to $50 billion. In a separate Reuters report, Kristalina Georgieva said central banks must respond carefully to war-driven inflation pressure, because sustained energy shocks can spill into broader prices and weaker growth. The World Bank has gone further, warning in Ajay Banga’s assessment that global growth could lose 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points even in a best-case outcome and up to 1 point in a prolonged one. UNCTAD’s separate warning on fertilizer and shipping risks shows why this is not merely an oil story: around 16 million tonnes of seaborne fertilizer trade also depend on this corridor.
My view is simple: consumers should not confuse a diplomatic pause with an economic reset. Oil prices can retreat from panic peaks before they truly normalize, and household fuel bills can stay high long after futures markets celebrate peace. For prices to return to anything like normal, shipping traffic must be restored at scale, infrastructure must be repaired, LNG plants must run steadily again, inventories must be rebuilt, and insurers must believe the war risk premium can be removed. None of that happens in a weekend. In this case, three to six months for meaningful relief looks less like pessimism and more like realism.
