After the Second World War, the rush to promote democratization across the Third World began in full swing; however, the lasting legacies of these efforts have often been counterproductive. Within Collier and Levitsky’s analysis of binary classifications of democracy and the challenges of democratization, one of the main potential challenges was foreign interference in domestic policies, using democratization efforts as a means of geopolitical rivalry, inadvertently supporting problematic elite structures through aid, and exacerbating historical divides, working against the creation of a unified nation.
One of the popular methods of democratization that worked in deeply divided states was consociationalism, which relied on power-sharing among different social groups, arguing that it would create grand coalitions for widespread legislative efforts, provide proportional representation, and that mutual vetoes would give minority voices a powerful means of dissent. The model’s singularity has failed to adequately account for ethnic and social roles across different regions, often leading to further authoritarian rule.
Traditionally, western organizations have tried to streamline democratization efforts, which has ignored local political and economic context, undermined local ownership of governing institutions, reduced flexibility within institutional models, and created room for ineffective and problematic policy recommendations; consociationalism has been a popular form of democratization within ethnically conflicted countries, however, due to international organizations implementation and failure of accounting for local power dynamics, this model has rarely succeeded.
Post-war Iraq was strongly recommended to adopt a consociational democratic model, particularly by the US, which argued that this model would create large coalitions among different ethnic groups and give elites the role of ensuring stability in the region, prioritizing economic stability over perceived ethnic tensions. Lijpharts’ recommendations were adopted within Iraq and argued that majoritarian rule wouldn’t correctly address the political and national cultural divides, and therefore, institutional measures to maximize power sharing within the executive branch would increase representation and stability.
In the critical analysis of the model’s implementation, the US had severely misjudged key political, social, and economic actors in the state, and the problematic, standardized implementation of consociationalism in Iraq led to elite rule and ineffective governance. Younis’s analysis of the implementation of consociationalism in Iraq critiques Lijphart’s sole assumption that the underlying issues in Iraq were ethnic and sectarian divisions and a lack of identity fluidity, which account for potential changes in political behavior.
Younis argues that the lack of shared national identity has created difficulty in uniting for a shared national agenda setting; different studies show the importance of a shared national identity being a causal variable to strong democracies, and the implementation of consociationalism only deepened the existing ethnic and sectarian divides, further weakening a shared national identity. The US had failed to account for how fundamentally different nationalism manifested in the MENA region than within Western contexts, and these assumptions had led to misaligned policy implementation, which had furthered ethnic tensions and neglected deeper issues within the country.
The top-down implementation of the model lacked Iraqi input, which increased widespread skepticism and resistance and created a system in which elite power consolidation and political gridlock became key features. Elite groups within particular ethnic groups manipulated established governing structures to benefit themselves, establishing patronage networks and undermining the equal distribution of public goods, further eroding the integrity of the system. Elites monopolized control of resources (e.g., oil), and power struggles among ethnic elites heightened political tensions, creating institutionalized instability.
Younis fundamentally critiques Lijphart’s recommendation, mainly because it was offered with limited cultural and historical context, and recommends implementing an alternative vote system over Lijphart’s proportional representation model, which would incentivize coalition-building before elections based on local context.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, many Western countries had an added geopolitical interest in supporting democratizing efforts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, with comparative research pointing to internal mass mobilization and the timing of nationalist protests being significant factors in reducing uncertainty within regime transition, something that can be negatively impacted by international linkage.
Emil Ordukhanyan analyzed that the political layout of the South Caucasus would lead to more favorable conditions of consociationalism as a model for democratic transition in a state of ethnic and cultural diversity; Ordukhanyan argues that for a proper consociational governing structure would need to be culturally relative, and the balance would need to be maintained through a commitment to diplomacy through soft power (i.e., cultural education, exchanges, and cross-cultural dialogue). Throughout the implementation process, there would need to be a conscientious effort to address historical tensions between ethnic groups and avoid institutionalizing ethnocentric views, acknowledge weakness within the existing democratic systems in the South Caucasus and potential areas where a consociational government might exacerbate power consolidation (i.e., limited rule of law, ineffective checks, and balance, corrupt governance), create barriers against patronage, and warned against external interference as a detriment to peace and stability within a newly formed democratic institution; although these factors are likely to interfere with the success of a consociational government, with a commitment to careful planning, strong leadership and commitment to dialogue, there would be a higher rate of success.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the European Union (EU) took an interest in the South Caucus, providing conditional financial assistance to improve human rights conditions, funding initiatives focusing on strengthening civil society (i.e., electoral reforms, human rights NGOs, and democratic institutions), focusing on enhancing cross-cultural political dialogue, emphasizing the rule of law, and including technical assistance to build institutional capacity. Although the EU has been heavily focused on increasing democratization within the region, the impacts have not been positive; the EU has struggled to keepl clear and consistent stances on territorial disputes, had limited leverage within the area due to Russian and Turkish influence, the conditionality of the aid created regional backlash, geographical constraints of the organization, and internal divisions within member states.
The European Union has struggled to gain political leverage in the South Caucasus, partly because of the overwhelming political power of Turkey and Russia in the region and the lack of consensus among member states. Many member states disagree on the actions that should be taken against Russia and Turkey due to historical ties with the countries, different levels of willingness to impose sanctions on countries that violate democratic norms, and, most importantly, the reliance the EU has on Russian oil, which is an incentive not to encroach on established spheres of influence.
Another major problem within the EU’s messaging of democratization is the ambiguity and non-recognition of the Republic of Artsakh (a de facto independent nation) and oscillating views between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territorial disputes in Nagorno-Karabakh; the ambiguity and non-recognition of culturally significant events have led to the resentment of the EU’s role within the region and has been perceived as interference within domestic policies, and the non-action and inconsistent messaging of the organization has led to further conflict in democratization. The EU’s “Europeanisation” model of democratization has been widely criticized for failing to take into context local institutions, historical conflicts, and culture; the EU’s current role has been unable to meet any of Ordukhanyan’s recommendations of transformative external influence to increase democratization efforts and has arguably worsened conflicts and created a hostile environment for western intervention.
Although Western institutions have played an essential role in funding democratization, election-monitoring services and institutions help build capacity. Without proper research and analysis within local institutions and cultures, most of these democratic efforts have either failed or created resentment within communities. The case studies analyzing the potential impact of consociationalism in Iraq and the South Caucasus relied heavily on expert research from the region, an understanding of local institutional and cultural contexts, and a commitment to cross-cultural dialogue to avoid deepening ethnic divides (e.g., in Iraq). A deeper commitment to institutionalizing cultural relativism within democratic institutions, especially consociational systems that tend to deepen ethnic divides if installed haphazardly, and encouraging organic democratization, rather than international external influence, would be beneficial in democratization efforts that last.
