Policy toward Myanmar has always remained on the periphery of the American establishment’s attention. It is all the more surprising that in February 2026, the House of Representatives passed the BRAVE (Bringing Real Accountability Via Enforcement) Burma Act, which proposes significantly tightening sanctions against the “junta” and, consequently, the entire country. The Act was recently introduced in the Senate and will likely be approved there as well, after which it will be signed by the US President.
Compared to previous sanctions packages, the bipartisan bill appears more threatening and clearly aimed at regime change; it directs the US President to annually tighten sanctions against the Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and the Myanmar Economic Bank, which should ultimately collapse the country’s financial system and stimulate the “fall of the junta.” Furthermore, according to the bill, Myanmar’s vote in the IMF is to be blocked, preventing the country from borrowing from the institution. Sanctions are also imposed on all foreign suppliers of aviation fuel to Myanmar, which, according to the bill’s sponsors, is intended to directly hinder the Myanmar Air Force’s operations against the insurgents. The BRAVE Burma Act would establish the position of a US special envoy for Myanmar, whose responsibilities include “promoting an end to violence and protecting human rights” in the most interventionist sense.
During the House hearings, activists from Myanmar’s radical opposition, who typically advocate for maximum US involvement in Myanmar’s civil war, were brought in as experts. The difference is that during Biden’s presidency, the primary focus was on the junta’s violations of human rights, including those of LGBTQ+ people and Rohingya Muslims, while in Trump’s second term, the emphasis shifted to anti-Chinese rhetoric. Members of the National Unity Government (NUG), closely aligned with liberal NGOs, are now making every effort to ingratiate themselves with the Trump administration, as they already have some support among Democrats.
From the perspective of political science and international relations, the BRAVE Burma Act case study could prove quite illustrative. It’s a striking example of how an entity driven by wishful thinking can be manipulated by vested interests and how a lack of knowledge leads to absurd decisions.
Containing China by Empowering China-Backed Rebels?: The Contradiction Between Rhetoric and Reality
It’s telling that one of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Mitch McConnell, stated after introducing the bill in the Senate that the BRAVE Burma Act is being passed at a time when “the military junta’s sham elections threaten to deepen the PRC’s influence in a critical region.” According to McConnell, it “blocks funding to the junta by authorizing stronger sanctions on the entities that finance its operations and strengthens mechanisms to implement these sanctions while countering the growing influence of China and Russia in the region.” Thus, the new stage of sanctions policy against Myanmar is given the character of countering China.
McConnell’s justification for the bill as a blow to the “China-backed junta” appears contradictory against the backdrop of news coming out of Myanmar itself. In February 2026, an opposition ethnic portal published an article entitled “Hsenwi Transformed Under MNDAA Rule: From Saopha Heartland to a De Facto China Annex.” As is well known, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), representing the Han Chinese in the Kokang region, in alliance with other groups, carried out Operation 1027 in 2023-2024, a large-scale offensive against Tatmadaw positions, capturing significant territories rich in resources. The successes of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which includes the MNDAA and two other groups, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA), were enthusiastically greeted by Myanmar’s political exiles. Continuous attacks by the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), subordinate to the NUG, distracted the Tatmadaw from focusing on the ethnic insurgents. It could be argued that the PDF also played a role in the MNDAA’s triumphant capture of the Tatmadaw’s Northeast Command in Lashio in August 2024. A remnant of the infamous Burmese Communist Party (BCP), the MNDAA thus avenged the Tatmadaw’s celebrated victories in the war against the communists when Burma enjoyed positive relations with the United States.
Observers claim that the MNDAA is pursuing a policy of Sinicization in the occupied territories, particularly in the Hsenwi township. Mandarin Chinese has been made a compulsory subject in schools, Burmese classes have been abolished, all city signs are now in Chinese, and preferential terms are being offered to Chinese businessmen. According to reports, Hsenwi is now indistinguishable from a Chinese border town, which is inevitably offensive to the Shan population. Even during the Burmanization period, the local Shan people did not encounter such aggressive chauvinistic policies as they did once their areas fell into the hands of the “democratic forces” with a Han accent.
It’s no secret that the MNDAA and its allies in northeastern Myanmar closely cooperate with China in both economic and non-economic areas. Operation 1027, while officially targeting scam centers used by pro-government militias, also aimed to “clear obstacles to the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).” Previously, Tatmadaw sympathizers in Myanmar circles suggested that China would benefit from direct control over the most important sections of the CMEC, which links Yunnan with the Bay of Bengal. The ethnically Han MNDAA, loyal to China by default, is a more convenient partner than the nationalist Myanmar military.
Of course, China has never sought to completely remove the military from its plans, even when it engaged directly with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government from 2016 to 2021. After the stunning success of the second phase of Operation 1027 in the summer of 2024, Beijing pressured the MNDAA, forcing the rebels to hand Lashio back to the military (while retaining important positions on the approaches to the city). Opposition commentators believe that by ordering the Three Brotherhood Alliance to abandon its offensive, Beijing saved the “junta” from imminent collapse. This is the wrong way to put it. In fact, almost no one is interested in the fall of the Naypyidaw regime, least of all China, which, through its support for the MNDAA, is responsible for the Tatmadaw’s most significant defeat in the history of the civil war. There is a popular saying among Myanmar’s military about China: “They hold fire in one hand and water in the other.” Perhaps this saying best describes the essence of Chinese policy.
In any case, imagining China-Myanmar relations without both sides’ deep-seated prejudices against each other is simply incompetent. The Myanmar conflict, or rather a series of conflicts, has long-standing roots in ethnic and political grievances, and artificially fitting it into the framework of a “new Cold War” means catering to the Myanmar opposition and its short-term lobbying needs.
Despite the ceasefire, war between the Myanmar government and the MNDAA could break out at any moment. Of course, China needs a precarious peace to continue colonizing the region through its proxies. Therefore, Beijing will not hesitate to continue using the MNDAA to pressure Naypyidaw. Anyone who has studied Sun Tzu’s strategems knows that winning a war doesn’t necessarily require military action; the key is for the vital energy factor (the Taoist concept of Qi) to exert pressure on the enemy. China has at least two fully loyal armed groups, the MNDAA and the UWSA, and several others, also dependent to varying degrees, such as the KIA and TNLA.
Analysts ignore the fact that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), lacking combat experience, has long used Myanmar as a testing ground. Myanmar troops who fought against the MNDAA in Kokang in 2015 and 2017 reported Chinese mercenaries among the rebels. Information about the recruitment of PLA veterans in Chinese cities bordering Myanmar can be found on forums dedicated to the topic. At a press conference on February 21, 2015, amid heavy fighting around the town of Laukkai, Myanmar Lieutenant Colonel Mya Tun Oo asserted that “Chinese mercenaries are involved in the fighting with Kokang forces; there are Chinese operating in the Kokang area.” At another press conference on November 24, 2019, Major General Tun Tun Nyi commented on the discovery of a large consignment of Chinese-made weapons at a captured TNLA base: “We are checking whether the weapons are new or old. Most of them are Chinese, and the overall value is high. I’d say the TNLA has illegally acquired weapons from China.” It should be noted that the MNDAA, like the TNLA, enjoyed the full support of the NUG, as the Myanmar opposition had assumed the representation of these armed groups in democratic countries. These and other facts demonstrate the fallacy of the stereotype of a war waged by a “China-backed junta” against “Western-oriented rebels.”
Given the above, it’s difficult to agree with Mitch McConnell’s characterization of the BRAVE Burma Act. It’s unclear how additional sanctions against the Myanmar military (and effectively against Myanmar as a nation) could weaken China’s influence, whose relationship with the regime in Naypyitaw is highly ambiguous and far from idyllic. It would be more logical to impose sanctions against the MNDAA leadership, with its extensive Chinese ties, and it’s important to remember that this armed organization is designated a terrorist group by the Myanmar military government. As strange as it may sound, given the fighting in 2015, 2017, and 2023/2024, only the Tatmadaw has concrete experience in practical “containment of China.” Meanwhile, while the bill is being debated in Washington, “democratic rebels,” enjoying the full moral support of the NUG, are carrying out forced Sinicization in northeastern Myanmar.
Not Just China: The Iran War and Its Impact on Myanmar
The Bill’s lobbyists took into account more than just the Chinese factor: they deserve credit for skillfully exploiting a recent Reuters investigation into the supply of aviation fuel from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Myanmar. In light of the military operation against Iran, this small fact undoubtedly played into the hands of proponents of anti-Myanmar measures.
On the other hand, the rapprochement between Myanmar and Iran is undoubtedly a consequence of previous US anti-Myanmar laws. During the Rohingya crisis in 2017, Iranian officials threatened Myanmar and even proposed the creation of an international expeditionary force to “liberate fellow believers in Rakhine.” At the same time, an international exhibition of anti-Buddhist cartoons in support of the Rohingya was held in Tehran. Following the transition of power from the civilian to the military government in February 2021 and the intensification of Western pressure on Myanmar, Tatmadaw officials apparently established contacts with the IRGC, which, having put aside its fanaticism, has begun pragmatic cooperation in the military-technological and energy sectors. Be that as it may, if there was indeed ad hoc cooperation between the two dissimilar regimes, the current dangers of shipping in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Indian Ocean have rendered it moot.
At the same time, Naypyidaw’s tactical cooperation with Tehran should not be exaggerated. From a security perspective in South and Southeast Asia, cooperation between the Myanmar and Indian militaries is more important, and both countries are concerned about the rise of an Islamist agenda after regime change in 2024. Furthermore, the Saudi Ambassador to Naypyidaw recently met with Foreign Minister Than Swe, confirming Riyadh’s intentions to invest in the country’s economy. Energy issues were discussed at the meeting, which is particularly important in light of developments in the Middle East. It is not difficult to understand that only mutually beneficial cooperation with Islamic countries can improve the situation of Muslims in Myanmar. The rulers of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, who are establishing relations with the “junta,” understand this well enough (the first mosque in Naypyidaw is largely due to the Saudi ambassador).
Isolationist Trump, interventionist Trump: Myanmar’s opposition loses under either option.
It is interesting to speculate that China’s pressure on the MNDAA to reclaim Lashio is partly the fault of the Burmese opposition in exile, which has persistently tried to portray the MNDAA as a democratic and even pro-Western force, which the MNDAA, led by communists and admirers of Xi Jinping, is objectively not. This propaganda campaign has reinforced China’s belief that the MNDAA’s excessive successes could help the pro-Western opposition, while Beijing’s diplomacy doesn’t seek regime change in Myanmar but rather economic preferences. As the example of Donald Trump’s diplomacy shows, China isn’t alone in resorting to targeted interventions without regime change: this is confirmed by the example of Venezuela, where the Chavista regime remained fully intact after Maduro was kidnapped and Caracas complied with American demands. In the same vein is Trump’s recent statement that, instead of Prince Reza Pahlevi, he is considering one of the Islamic Republic’s reformist-minded statesmen for the post of head of the new Iran.
It’s worth noting that since 2021, the Myanmar opposition has been loudly declaring that any power configuration involving the military is unthinkable and that the Tatmadaw must be destroyed as a political entity, after which a “federal army” will be created based on the PDF. At this level, we see a fundamental contradiction between the dreams of the Myanmar opposition and the approaches of American interventionism as implemented by the Trump administration. Even if the much-desired humanitarian intervention were to materialize, it is impossible to imagine anyone from the NUG leading a new pro-American government or even holding a ministerial position in it. The opposition narratives clash even more with the normative isolationist and paleoconservative MAGA rhetoric, which Trump abandoned when he launched the war against Iran, but which the majority of his voters have not abandoned (there is a good chance that after Trump, J.D. Vance, a more consistent isolationist, will come to power, and then American foreign policy will take on the character of the original MAGA).
In line with the spirit and letter of classic American isolationism, the Myanmar regime poses no threat to the United States and, moreover, appears sufficiently pragmatic and nationalistic to enter into a mutually beneficial partnership with the United States against common enemies (China, international jihadism, and narcoterrorism). There is reason to believe that the military regime has attempted to influence the American establishment in a similar vein since Trump’s accession to the White House. But while these efforts are being pursued by the Myanmar side, they have so far been unsuccessful due to the presence of influential Republicans and Democrats with anti-Burmese sentiments, as well as the all-out information war unleashed by political exiles.
Chaos Instead of Victory: On the Prospects of PDF and NUG
Frankly, the reasons for the passage of the BRAVE Burma Act lie less in concerns about human rights than in the warmongering of neoconservative elites, whose credibility Myanmar opposition activists have managed to ingratiate themselves with. The Bill’s lobbyists are fortunate that Burma Studies is suffering from a shortage of competent specialists, especially after the death of Professor David Steinberg, who called for a more balanced policy toward the “junta.” American policymakers have a particularly poor understanding of the structure of the “Spring Revolution.” The NUG and the armed groups that recognize it, primarily the PDF, are portrayed as a monolithic revolutionary liberation force with hundreds of thousands of fighters and a ready-made plan for democratic reforms after achieving victory. However, this is a clear distortion of the actual course of the fighting in Myanmar, which presents a more complex, multi-factorial picture.
First of all, the PDF, which the US already provides non-lethal support to under the Burma Act passed under Joe Biden, is not a centralized structure. It is a multitude of small armed groups that are only formally subordinate to the NUG. The PDF’s most combat-ready units are operationally subordinate to ethnic armies, which view them as “Bamar cannon fodder.”
A telling example is the Mandalay PDF (MDY-PDF), which was operationally subordinate to the TNLA and participated in the capture of Mogok, a city rich in ruby deposits. Despite the bloodshed of the PDF and Mogok’s Bamar ethnicity, the city was governed by the TNLA administration. The city was later surrendered under a Chinese-brokered agreement with the Tatmadaw, and the TNLA ordered the MDY-PDF to leave. The Mogok case highlights the extent to which the PDF and the entire “democratic resistance” depend on vested ethnic groups that have far more in common with the drug trade and Chinese interests than with federal democracy.
The PDF’s core human resource should be familiar to Americans from the Indochina wars: disillusioned peasants, enraged by government inefficiency and crop failures, banding together in gangs led by political commissars. The PDF’s methods are akin to those of the Khmer Rouge and the Red Guards: in all cases, agrarian vigilantes carried out mass terror under the guise of political slogans. There’s a huge difference between an uneducated peasant under a red PDF flag and a Type 81 assault rifle in the depths of Sagaing Province and a Myanmar opposition activist in Los Angeles, comfortable in the company of fellow Free Palestine and LGBTQ+ activists.
Recently, misunderstandings have been growing between the exiled NUG leadership and the disparate PDF militias in Myanmar. This is due to conflicts over the division of financial resources (including from the US), the ambitions of warlords, and the refusal of ethnic armed organizations to grant strategic autonomy to the “Bamar supremacists.”
The surrender of Bamar National Revolutionary Army (BNRA) commander Bo Naga to the Tatmadaw on February 18, 2026, caused a sensation. Bo Naga, a well-known field commander who had previously caused considerable trouble for the Tatmadaw in Pale township, Sagaing province, decided to surrender to the army after the PDF effectively declared war on him. Such conflicts within the “resistance” and defections to the Tatmadaw will continue to multiply.
Despite the formation of the Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA) in November 2025, which united smaller Bamar and ethnic rebel groups, primarily in Anyar, Myanmar’s heartland, the so-called “resistance” remains loose and disorganized. Furthermore, it is highly significant that the SRA, which opposition media portray as a new stage in the unification of revolutionary forces, has refused to submit to the NUG. This speaks to the profound crisis engulfing the Myanmar opposition abroad. A crisis that this opposition itself is trying to alleviate by lobbying its proposals in the institutions of superpower No. 1.
The turmoil within Myanmar’s opposition has led to a rise in popularity not so much for “democratic” groups but also for purely communist ones, such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Bamar People Liberation Army (BPLA), whose roots lie in the communist insurgency of the 1940s-1980s. Their more centralized and ideologically ingrained constitution makes it easier to endure a protracted war, which, after five years of the “imminent collapse of the junta,” has become tiresome for many PDF members. A powerful propaganda campaign has been launched by the Anti-Fascist International Front (AIF), founded by an “internationalist fighter” of Kurdish descent from the United States named Azad. The AIF makes no secret of its view of the civil war in Myanmar as part of the global struggle for anarcho-communist revolution. Following the designation of Antifa as a terrorist organization during Trump’s first term, some members of this movement are grateful to gain combat experience in the war against Myanmar. Moreover, the House of Representatives and the Senate suddenly found themselves on the same side with Antifa.
By 2026, it is quite obvious that those forces that position themselves as democratic and pro-Western (pro-American) are incapable of winning the war against the Tatmadaw. Despite a series of heavy defeats at the hands of ethnic groups (including those backed by China), the Tatmadaw has managed to maintain control of the country. However, the role of the PDF and similar groups cannot be underestimated. Deprived of hope of victory, the “democratic resistance” continues to wreak havoc in the country’s densely populated heartland (Mandalay, Sagaing, Magwe, and Bago provinces). While the strategy of the Rakhine or Karen separatists is clear—to achieve independence, if not de jure, then de facto (the Arakan Army is closest to this goal)—the PDF’s prospects lie in an endless, attritional war, similar to the one waged for decades by the Maoists in the Philippines or the Naxalites in India. Chaos, not victory, is the true limit of PDF and NUG capabilities.
It’s possible that the covert strategy developed by American think tanks was originally intended not to promote the restoration of democracy but to create chaos in Myanmar and disrupt the functioning of the CMEC. In that case, it’s not only short-sighted from the perspective of American interests but also immoral.
Conclusion
In summing up, one thing deserves to be noted that goes beyond a utilitarian political analysis. The current military operation in Iran demonstrates how deeply religious beliefs and spiritual commitments are ingrained in modern politics, which one would think should have long ago abandoned them. Israel, founded on the ideals of religious Zionism and inspired by Jewish chosenness, is confronted by Iran, whose leadership believes in the ideals of the Islamic Revolution and the return of a mysterious hidden Imam. Donald Trump’s team, holding collective prayers right in the Oval Office, also fits into this trend toward religiosity.
It’s impossible to understand Myanmar and its rulers without considering the Buddhist religion. It’s not for nothing that this country is called the “Holy Grail of Buddhism.” The foundations of Myanmar’s national identity lie in the anticipation of the coming Buddha Metteyya, whom the noble Buddhist knighthood (Tatmadaw) is called to serve. Burmese generals, usually portrayed as power-hungry tyrants, regardless of outsiders’ feelings toward them, feel like the last warriors of a besieged Buddhist fortress. Perhaps, besides tiny Bhutan in the Himalayas, only Myanmar offers an example of a pure Buddhist civilization. The Western desire to utterly reform or even abolish this ancient civilization wounds the Myanmar people to the core, as was evident in the anti-Myanmar campaign over the Rohingya issue. The new punitive measures will not induce the generals in Naypyitaw to swear allegiance to the White House but will only strengthen their resolve to fiercely resist the West, which has not yet understood and continues to fail to understand the motives of the military regime.
