The present confrontation, marked by air strikes, and political tensions among EU states about the nature of their strategic alliances, must be seen against the backdrop of decades of estrangement between the United States and Iran, as well as periodic attempts at rapprochement. This history, one might argue, puts the present tensions into context, at least for the Europeans.
One interesting perspective on the present tensions might be found in the 2013 geopolitical book: “Iran-Etats-Unis : Les amis de demain ou l’après-Ahmadinejad”[1], a geopolitical analysis that captured a brief moment of promise for the relations between the United States and Iran following the diplomatic thaw of the Obama era. In his book, Ardavan Amir-Aslani describes how the attempts at rapprochement undertaken by the Obama administration to reopen the dialogue with Iran, following years of estrangement, were not merely tactical maneuvers, but rather the expression of the hope that the prejudices between the two nations might be transcended and a new balance of power created following the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
These initial overtures, however, were tenuous and rested on certain assumptions regarding the internal dynamics of Iran, the balance of power in the region, and the strategic interests of the West. These assumptions have been constantly reevaluated and proven wrong by each successive administration. The optimism reflected in the title of the book, regarding the prospects of the US and Iran becoming “friends of tomorrow,” appears quaint in light of the fresh escalations in the conflict.
The current conundrum in which Europe finds itself – torn between its loyalty to traditional security alliances and maintaining stability in the wider geopolitics of the region – is a direct consequence of the unfinished agenda reflected in this book. The inability to sustain diplomatic engagement with Iran, the shifting sands of US policy under Obama and Trump, and the entrenched mistrust – all of these have contributed to Brussels’ limited ability to broker a resolution to the conflict.
In other words, the war currently underway is not just an explosion; it is the next chapter in a long and unfolding story of lost diplomatic opportunities and structural misreadings. For Europe, whose foreign policy tradition has often been to favor diplomacy as the default option, the contrast between the idealistic arguments put forth in Iran-Etats-Unis : “Les amis de demain” and the hard reality of crisis management points to a broader strategic conundrum in which the gap between aspiration and influence still appears very wide indeed.
Europe internalised that wager.
Under Barack Obama, nuclear diplomacy became a laboratory of European mediation. Brussels positioned itself as facilitator, guarantor, and normative anchor. The assumption was structural: interdependence and rational interest would eventually temper identity-driven rivalry.
Thirteen years later, in late February 2026, that premise has collided with acceleration.
The rupture: February 2026
What began as a targeted US – Israeli campaign against Iranian missile and nuclear infrastructure expanded within days into a theatre-wide confrontation.
On February 28, 2026, nearly 900 strikes were carried out in the first twelve hours of operations including underground leadership centers associated with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. His reported death marked the most consequential rupture in Iran’s political hierarchy since 1979.
US President Donald Trump described the operation as historic, suggesting it opened the door for the Iranian people to reclaim sovereignty. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu characterised it as a once-in-a-generation opportunity.
Iran retaliated almost immediately. Ballistic missiles struck US-linked facilities across the Gulf. Iranian-made drones – reportedly launched in part by Hezbollah operatives from southern Lebanon – targeted sites beyond Iranian territory, including critical infrastructure. Strikes extended toward Beirut. Western embassies reduced staff or began evacuation procedures. Civilian casualties in Iran, reportedly numbering in the hundreds and including disputed school incidents, further fuel escalation risks and complicate Europe’s normative stance.
The defining feature of this crisis is not only violence – it is tempo.
The interval between mobilisation and mass strikes was nine days. Decision cycles compressed. Diplomatic mediation windows narrowed. What many analysts had expected to remain calibrated deterrence evolved into accelerated escalation.
The structural convergence envisioned in 2013 has been replaced by strategic decapitation and retaliatory networks.
Europe: not a belligerent, but exposed
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has warned that Europe must prepare for “shockwaves” from the Middle East crisis, spanning energy, nuclear stability, transport, migration, and security. She condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes as “reckless and indiscriminate” and stressed that “the stability of the region is of the utmost importance.” In her assessment, “the only lasting solution is a diplomatic one,” calling for urgent de-escalation, a “credible transition” in Iran, and the cessation of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. [2] She cautioned that the situation remains highly volatile.
The Commission has emphasised its immediate priorities: supporting member states and safeguarding EU citizens, tracking energy prices and supplies, and increasing vigilance over internal security risks and migration trends.
Europe is not at war. Yet it is embedded in the consequences.
The Strait of Hormuz – through which roughly one fifth of global oil flows pass daily – immediately became a systemic risk node. Even absent formal closure, security warnings sharply reduced tanker traffic. War risk insurance rates rose. LNG supplies from Qatar are at risk of disruption following the impacts of the drone attacks near the export centers. Gas futures for the region, known as the TTF, rose 30 to 50 percent in early March, the biggest increase since the 2022 Russian-Ukraine crisis.
The European Commission convened emergency coordination meetings. Diversification efforts undertaken after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were cited as evidence of resilience.
But diversification is not autonomy. Europe has shifted from pipeline dependence on Russia to maritime dependence on Gulf stability. The geography of vulnerability has changed; the structural condition of exposure has not. Behind diplomatic language lies strategic anxiety: fragile growth, inflationary pressures, political fragmentation, and renewed migration flows could converge into a compound shock.
The Akrotiri Drone Strike, on March 1-2, 2026, showed the spillover to the territory of Europe. The Iranian-made drone, allegedly deployed from Lebanon via Hezbollah, struck the British Sovereign Base Area on the island of Cyprus. Although the British government claimed limitations on the use of the base, the strike prompted the evacuation of personnel and highlighted the island’s vulnerability to the crisis, reminding that European territory, however remotely, is not immune. Cyprus has criticised the United Kingdom for insufficient communication following a drone strike on the RAF base at Akrotiri, which forced nearby residents to evacuate and led Nicosia to lodge a formal diplomatic protest.[3] A government spokesperson, Letymbiotis, said that Prime Minister Starmer’s statements had failed to clarify that the British bases would only be used for humanitarian purposes, leaving open the possibility of revisiting their legal and operational status. UK officials responded by emphasising that the strike on Akrotiri was unrelated to any recent British decisions, and that U.S. bombers were not operating from the Cypriot bases.
Following the Akrotiri drone strike, France moved swiftly to reinforce regional security, deploying advanced anti-missile and anti-drone systems along with a frigate to Cyprus. The French government cited the need to protect European personnel and infrastructure, signalling both support for Nicosia and a broader commitment to stabilising a rapidly escalating regional conflict.[4]
The language of de-escalation
The EU’s High Representative Kaja Kallas described the reported death of Khamenei as “a defining moment in Iran’s history,” carefully avoiding celebratory rhetoric while acknowledging the magnitude of rupture.[5] European Council President António Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have called for restraint and respect for international law.[6]
The formulation reveals Europe’s dilemma. Brussels cannot endorse regime decapitation as policy without undermining its normative posture. Yet it cannot ignore the potential systemic consequences of leadership collapse in a state of Iran’s scale.
There were many internal coordination challenges to cope with the (un)expected geopolitical situation. Parallel statements or meetings from von der Leyen and Kallas – sometimes subtly divergent in tone or emphasis – illustrate “fragmented sovereignty,” highlighting the difficulties of projecting unified influence while member states weigh divergent exposures.
Complicating the institutional landscape, von der Leyen has also convened the EU Security College[7], a little-known crisis coordination body whose existence is largely opaque to most member states and the wider public. Operating in parallel with Kallas’s formal diplomatic channels, the College probably aims to coordinate rapid responses across EU institutions, from energy monitoring to internal security, but its secrecy reflects both the Commission’s desire for agile action and the fragmented nature of European strategic sovereignty. The dual-track structure – visible public diplomacy through von der Leyen’s statements and Kallas’s operational leadership – highlights the tension between rapid decision-making and transparency in EU crisis management.
Meanwhile, Cyprus is preparing to host an expert-level Integrated Political Crisis Response meeting to assess the rapidly evolving situation and its broader implications for European security and regional stability.
Sanctions are already extensive while military leverage is limited. Diplomatic influence is diluted by differentiated exposure among member states.
Balancing strategic alignment
European reactions to the US-Israeli strikes on Iran reveal a complex and at times contradictory calculus, balancing strategic alignment with Washington against the risks of regional spillover and domestic constraints. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte emphasised that European leaders broadly supported the US campaign, noting that allies were providing “necessary enablement” for military operations while stressing that NATO itself has no plans to intervene directly.[8]
Several EU capitals framed the strikes as potentially decisive. Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani suggested they could eliminate an “existential” nuclear and missile threat to both Middle Eastern and European security.[9] Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni underlined that the operation occurred independently of the EU and that Rome’s priority is now to prevent the crisis from widening.[10] Finland’s Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen argued that weakening Tehran could indirectly strengthen European security and recalibrate Russia’s strategic calculations.[11]
Yet caution and concern were equally visible. French President Emmanuel Macron warned that the campaign risked “instability and possible conflagration at our borders,” [12]while Italy’s Defence Minister Guido Crosetto cautioned that disruptions could drive energy and transport costs up by as much as 40%.[13] Slovakia took a notably critical stance, condemning the strikes as a clear violation of international law and rejecting “double standards” applied to major powers. Belgium emphasised the tension between legality and security, acknowledging the action’s justification for global safety while noting its incompatibility with international norms.[14]
Across Central and Eastern Europe, responses reflected both strategic and domestic anxieties. Croatia and Hungary warned that the conflict could precipitate new migration pressures, with officials stressing that asylum procedures cannot become a backdoor for mass inflows. The Czech government displayed internal divisions, with far-right voices denouncing the attacks as a breach of the international order while more pro-Western figures accepted the rationale behind allied action. Lithuania convened its State Defence Council to assess the impact on Baltic regional security, signalling heightened vigilance in a part of Europe already acutely sensitive to geopolitical instability.[15]
Spain declined to authorise US use of its bases, citing de-escalation and legality. Portugal granted conditional access.[16] Germany affirmed alliance solidarity. Italy and many other European countries were focused on protecting nationals. Denmark signalled support for political transformation but warned of unforeseeable consequences. Poland emphasised preparedness.
These divergences reflect structural asymmetry – energy dependence, migration risk, domestic political constraints – rather than fragmentation. Strategic autonomy, in practice, means managing exposure to escalation cycles initiated elsewhere.
In aggregate, European reactions illustrate the duality of alignment and caution: while most governments recognise the threat posed by Iran, they remain acutely aware of the economic, political, and migratory risks that escalation carries. The responses also expose the EU’s fragmented sovereignty in moments of rapid military escalation-support for Washington is unevenly articulated, legal and normative concerns compete with strategic calculation, and the gap between rhetoric and operational influence remains wide.
Migration and the Turkish axis
The crisis revives Europe’s southern anxiety. Von der Leyen’s March 1 call with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan highlighted fears that widening conflict could trigger displacement flows through Syria and re-activate pressure on EU-Turkey migration arrangements.
Turkey has floated mediation. Critics question Ankara’s credibility. Yet the conversation reflects Europe’s instinctive crisis reflex: preserve channels, prevent spillover, project coherence. Whether coherence translates into leverage is another matter.
Energy, markets, and cascading risk
Markets are reacting faster than diplomacy. And we can certainly see that oil prices have risen. Shipping through the Hormuz route has decreased significantly due to security issues. War risk insurance premiums are increasing in the Gulf region.
For Europe – balancing defence spending commitments, green transition investments, and fiscal constraints – sustained energy shocks would amplify domestic political tensions. In interconnected systems, tactical military strikes generate cascading economic consequences. Acceleration defines contemporary conflict not only militarily but financially.
US-Iran Escalation and Regional Military Developments
President Trump has vowed to intensify strikes on Iran, framing the operation as a campaign to dismantle Tehran’s missile capabilities, neutralize its naval assets, prevent nuclear weapons development, and curb support for proxy forces abroad. He described the campaign as running “ahead of schedule,” expected to last four to five weeks, and promised that the US would do “whatever it takes” to achieve its objectives.[17]
Trump claimed that Iran’s military leadership had been significantly degraded in the initial strikes, raising the estimated number of senior Iranian figures killed to nearly fifty.[18] He characterized Iran’s ballistic missile programme as a “colossal threat” to US forces and a protective shield for nuclear ambitions. While noting that “the big wave” of operations was yet to come, he emphasized that the conflict should not be protracted. He did not rule out the potential deployment of ground troops but suggested they were “probably unnecessary” unless circumstances demanded it.[19]
US defence officials similarly left open the possibility of deploying troops[20], while senior diplomats stressed that the strikes aimed to eliminate Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles, anticipating retaliation against US or allied targets in response to Israeli action[21]. Tehran has rejected proposals for a long-term halt to uranium enrichment, underscoring its continued pursuit of nuclear capabilities.
U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff said that recent nuclear talks with Tehran underscored the deep gulf between Washington’s demands and Iran’s intentions. According to officials involved in negotiations, the United States made it clear that it was seeking a long‑term cessation of uranium enrichment – offering to provide nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes if Iran agreed to a decade‑long halt in indigenous enrichment – but Tehran rebuffed those proposals, signalling that its nuclear ambitions extend beyond civilian power generation.[22]
Vice‑President JD Vance emphasised that preventing Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a central objective of the U.S. campaign, arguing that meaningful change would require a fundamental shift in the regime’s strategic mindset. He said that while previous strikes had significantly set back Iran’s enrichment infrastructure, the overarching goal was to ensure Tehran never rebuilds the capability to pursue a bomb.[23]
Israeli leadership indicated that the strikes would prevent nuclear and missile sites from becoming invulnerable, while also framing the operations as opening a window for potential peace agreements with Arab neighbours following a change in Iran’s leadership.[24]
Military Situation
The conflict has already disrupted key strategic waterways. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has declared the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed, threatening any vessel attempting passage[25]. Maritime traffic has declined sharply following drone attacks on tankers, including the Athena Nova, which was set ablaze.[26] US forces have suffered casualties, including six troops killed in a strike on a command centre in Kuwait, compounded by a friendly-fire incident that downed three US jets.[27] The US has responded with naval strikes, reportedly sinking multiple Iranian vessels in the Gulf of Oman.[28]
Regional militaries are actively engaged. Saudi Arabia has intercepted and destroyed multiple drones¹², Kuwait is responding to missile and drone attacks, and Qatar has downed Iranian military aircraft. The pace and intensity of these operations underscore the rapid escalation of the conflict beyond initial US-Israeli targeting plans.
Regional actors, notably the UAE and Qatar, have lobbied for a diplomatic off-ramp, seeking to prevent the conflict from spiraling further.[29] Analysts warn that Gulf states risk depleting air defence interceptors, leaving critical infrastructure vulnerable to Iranian drones.[30]
In Lebanon, the government has banned Hezbollah’s military activities, demanding immediate enforcement by security forces, a move that Tehran-aligned groups have warned could worsen tensions.[31]
Global leaders are signalling concern and proposing mediation. Russia has offered to help stabilise the region[32], while Turkey has accused the US and Israel of violating international law and pledged to pursue diplomatic contacts at every level until a ceasefire can be established.[33]
The deeper rupture: convergence vs. rivalry
The optimism embedded in Iran-États-Unis : “Les amis de demain” rested on a structural proposition: that interests would eventually moderate identity-driven hostility.
The late February 2026 escalation suggests the opposite dynamic may be stronger: deterrence networks, proxy architectures, and mistrust can override diplomatic scaffolding with startling speed.
The war in Ukraine disrupted Europe’s eastern assumptions. The Middle East crisis now tests its southern flank.
Europe’s normative instinct – diplomacy, de-escalation, multilateral anchoring – remains coherent. What is uncertain is whether it is sufficient in an environment defined by pre-emption, decapitation, and rapid retaliation.
Subject or object?
The ontological question regarding the European Union is now unavoidable. Is Europe a geopolitical subject shaping outcomes? Or is it primarily an object absorbing consequences?
Institutionally, the EU coordinates rapidly. Politically, it projects unity. Economically, it prepares mitigation mechanisms. Strategically, however, escalation thresholds are determined in Washington, Tehran, and Jerusalem.
Europe calls for de-escalation because escalation disproportionately harms its stability. Whether that call influences actors with decisive power remains unclear.
The wager of 2013 assumed structural convergence was possible. The reality of 2026 suggests that structural rivalry retains formidable resilience.
[1]Ardavan Amir-Aslani “ Iran-états-unis les amis de demain ou l’après-Ahmadinejad”, 2013,
Essai, Collection Pamphlet, Pierre-Guillaume de Roux
[2] Joshua Kirby, “Europe Must Brace for Fallout From Middle East Conflict, EU Chief Says”
Von der Leyen condemns Iran’s attacks as ‘reckless and indiscriminate’ available at: https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-must-brace-for-fallout-from-middle-east-conflict-eu-chief-says-e946ef0c?mod=europe_news_article_pos2
[3] Κύπρος: Δυσαρέσκεια Λευκωσίας προς Λονδίνο σχετικά με τις βρετανικές βάσεις
Δευτέρα, 2 Μαρτίου 2026 14:52 REUTERS/Yiannis Kourtoglou available at: https://www.naftemporiki.gr/kosmos/2079606/kypros-dysareskeia-leykosias-pros-londino-schetika-me-tis-vretanikes-vaseis/
[4] Maria Koniotou, “France deploys anti-missile, anti-drone systems and frigate to Cyprus
CNA – available at: https://www.cna.org.cy/politics/article/9912674/oi-bb-stin-kypro-den-chrisimopoioyntai-apo-amerikanika-vomvardistika-anefere-o-starmer
[5] Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on developments in the Middle East, available at:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/01/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-developments-in-the-middle-east
[6] Joint Statement by President Costa and President von der Leyen on developments in Iran
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/president
[7] https://x.com/vonderleyen/status/2027756878575362119
[8] “NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte praises ‘Operation Epic Fury’ strikes on Iran” interview available at:
https://www.foxnews.com/video/6390268301112
[9] “Irael, US operation is for EU’s security too says Tajani” available at:
https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2026/03/02/israel-us-operation-is-for-eus-security-too-says-tajani_0c565b95-bc0c-4202-b4cf-8425b161e656.html
[10] “Meloni sulla crisi in Medio Oriente: «Non dilaghi” available at: https://roma.corriere.it/notizie/politica/26_marzo_02/meloni-sulla-crisi-in-medio-oriente-non-dilaghi-su-trump-e-lite-tajani-conte-24593a74-4984-4d2e-941e-60d64a440xlk.shtml
[11] Minister of Defense Häkkänen: The paralysis of the Iranian regime will also hit Russia, available at:
https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000011848311.html
[12] “Avec la guerre en Iran, Macron évoque un « embrasement possible à nos frontières”” available at: https://www.leparisien.fr/international/direct-dissuasion-nucleaire-francaise-suivez-la-prise-de-parole-demmanuel-macron-a-lile-longue-02-03-2026-OOOBH5NCVRHCBA6ZN5GXQDTJCA.php#b226a67f-c551-4e78-b31c-76fb853fada8
[13] “Iran: Fears of price effects and increased transportation costs up to 40%-Crosetto
Over 30% of global LNG trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz says defence minister” available at: https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2026/03/02/iran-fears-of-price-effects-and-increased-transportation-costs-up-to-40-crosetto_bf5d7934-b2ff-44bc-b667-13baa02d7229.html
[14] “La manière dont l’action américano-israélienne a été menée en Iran ne correspond pas aux standards du droit international ” available at: https://www.lalibre.be/belgique/politique-belge/2026/03/02/la-maniere-dont-laction-americano-israelienne-a-ete-menee-ne-correspond-pas-aux-standards-du-droit-international-que-la-belgique-defend-AVADBDOKYRD53MIQ3FSJHRK2U4/
[15] https://www.lrytas.lt/lietuvosdiena/aktualijos/2026/03/02/news/antradieni-saukiamas-valstybes-gynimo-tarybos-posedis-41522376#google_vignette
[16] Miguel González, “Spain refuses to provide military support for the attack on Iran and distances itself from France, Germany and the United Kingdom” available at: https://elpais.com/espana/2026-03-02/espana-rechaza-prestar-apoyo-militar-al-ataque-a-iran-y-se-desmarca-de-francia-alemania-y-reino-unido.html#?rel=lom
[17] Trump, speech outlining operation objectives, March 1–2, 2026. Available at: https://x.com/VanberghenEU/status/2028555962525647029?s=20
[18] US Defence Department statements on Iranian leadership casualties, March 2026.
[19] Trump interview on CNN and New York Post, March 2, 2026.
[20] Defence Secretary statements regarding potential ground operations, March 2026.
[21] Secretary of State remarks on Iran’s short-range missile threats, March 1–2, 2026.
[22] “US envoy says Iran began nuclear talks insisting on ‘inalienable right’ to enrich” available at:
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202603035282
[23] “Vance: Iran Couldn’t Get Nuke for Years, But Goal Is to Keep Iran from Ever Getting Nuke” available at: https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2026/03/02/vance-iran-couldnt-get-nuke-for-years-but-goal-is-to-keep-iran-from-ever-getting-nuke/
[24] Israeli Prime Minister comments on strategic objectives and regional peace prospects, March 2, 2026.
[25] Iran says will attack any ship trying to pass through Strait of Hormuz
Ebrahim Jabari, a senior adviser to the IRGC’s commander-in-chief, reiterates that the Strait of Hormuz is ‘closed’. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/2/iran-says-will-attack-any-ship-trying-to-pass-through-strait-of-hormuz
[26] “Fuel tanker ablaze in Strait of Hormuz after drone strike,” available at:
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/fuel-tanker-ablaze-strait-hormuz-after-drone-strike-iran-revolutionary-guards-2026-03-02
[27] US military casualty report and friendly-fire incident in Kuwait, March 2, 2026.
[28] US naval strike reports in Gulf of Oman, March 2-3, 2026.
[29] UAE and Qatar diplomatic lobbying for conflict off-ramp, March 2–3, 2026. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-02/uae-and-qatar-urge-allies-to-help-trump-find-off-ramp-on-iran?embedded-checkout=true
[30] “US ‘stonewalling’ requests by Gulf states to replenish interceptors”, available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-stonewalling-requests-gulf-states-replenish-interceptors-sources-say
[31] “Lebanon plunged back into war as Israel targets Iran-backed Hizbollah” available at: https://www.ft.com/content/480ac5f5-ac70-40bd-81a6-f5d3bbabe3a8
[32] “Iran conflict day 3 as it happened: Rubio says US launched war on Iran because Israel planned to attack” available at: https://www.ft.com/content/91cae073-71db-46ea-a950-62b17faf1882
[33] “Turkey’s Erdogan says attacks on Iran are clear violation of international law” available at:
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-attacks-iran-are-clear-violation-international-law-2026-03-02
