Over the past few years, states have increased their use of satellite technology in the military sphere, as it has high strategic value in protecting national security and winning an armed conflict. Threat perceptions vary. However, there are three principal forms to consider. First, hostility between space-based assets. Second, attacks from space on terrestrial targets. Third, attacks from Earth towards space assets. Some strategies include the use of orbital or sub-orbital platforms to collide or intercept the operations of rival satellites, the use of ground-based anti-satellite direct-ascent (ASAT) systems, including electronic warfare techniques such as signal jamming, and the use of non-kinetic weapons such as cyberattacks.
In addition, the dual nature of space activities, aggravated by the above-described situation, occurs within an international legal framework. This shows pitfalls which have been the theme of much discussion and legal regulation, with those introduced within the United Nations. Conventional guidelines governing States’ activities in outer space are enshrined in five United Nations agreements adopted between 1967 and 1979. The “Outer Space Treaty” of 1967 and the “Moon Agreement” of 1979 are the two key legal instruments that have explicit requirements to limit the usage of outer space for armed determinations. The “Outer Space Treaty” complements the (PTBT) “Partial Test Ban Treaty” of 1963, which bans nuclear experimentation in space.
The UN General Assembly, since 1981, has been continuously playing its role through the initiative of (PAROS) to limit the arms race in outer space. This initiative has now developed into an organized process that engages member states regularly in deliberations to mitigate the potential militarization of outer space. Over the years, the PAROS process has been the subject of much debate, resulting in the adoption of UN resolutions and the negotiation of a series of legal instruments. This includes the Draft Treaty of “Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Space” (PPWT), which was proposed by Russia and China together, aims to ban all types of arms in outer space and limits defensive arrangements. Moreover, the Draft “International Code of Conduct” for Outer Space activities by the European Union is a non-binding code of conduct that is meant to promote best practices, transparency, and reduce the risk of misunderstanding. One of the most important initiatives that has had a positive result has been the creation of a Group of Govt Experts for Outer Space’s Transparency and Confidence-building Measures (TCBMs). This Establishment of the United Nations Secretary General has resulted in an agreement on (TCBMs) in outer space. This was approved under Resolution 68/50 of 5 December 2013 by consensus at the UN General Assembly.
Development of space arms control has been slow and has often been hampered by political dissension. Since 2017, the United Nations initiatives (with the formation of two open-ended working groups) have heralded a new pledge to address the issue of the militarization of outer space. In January 2022, the United States in January 2022 announced an independent suspension of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests, thus reiterating a voluntary strategy that was first articulated in 2008. Later the UN General Assembly in November 2022, adopted Resolution 77/41 through 155 votes in favor, and 9 in abstention and against. The resolution urged for a moratorium on destructive ASAT tests, which was opposed by India, China, and Russia, while 37 countries supported the moratorium.
Subsequently, the United States and Japan, in April 2024, put forward draft resolution S/2024/302, aimed at bringing space security to the Council’s agenda for the first time. Despite the fact that the draft received the support of 65 States, it was eventually vetoed by Russia, thus highlighting the continued polarization over outer space weaponization.
Discussion on the mitigation of the arms race in outer space since June 2025 has been held mainly in the UN, through the “Open-Ended Working Group” (OEWG) on the “Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS), whose second substantive session took place in Geneva in July 2025. States held discussions on both legal and practical options to mitigate threats to space, and a significant number of them emphasized the necessity to protect space infrastructure and prevent the destabilization of military competition. However, conflicting views have remained. Some states support negotiating a legally binding treaty, while others support voluntary norms and transparency programs due to verification challenges.
These differences were also seen in the 2025 session of the “First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly” where various resolutions associated with the “Prevention of Armed Race in Outer Space” (PAROS), transparency, and responsible behavior in space were passed. Although there was wide agreement on the need to avoid conflict in space, geopolitical frictions and controversies over legally binding duties continued to trouble the consensus, underscoring the gulf between political pledges and legally binding arms-control limits.
Recent discussions on the issue of PAROS reveal several differences regarding key legal aspects. PAROS has remained a topic of intense discussion at the international level, with the aim of advancing the development of regulatory mechanisms to address the challenges posed by outer space weaponization. This initiative highlights the need to adopt a more inclusive and harmonized process, under which some states, especially Russia and China, insist on the cooperation of a binding treaty, “Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty” (PPWT), whilst other states favor the use of processes to produce instruments of non-binding nature that capture principles of responsible action as the primary step to a binding treaty.
