According to John Mearsheimer’s realist theory, great powers will shape, ignore, or even create new institutions when existing ones fail to serve their strategic interests, reflecting the primacy of power over institutional rules. This could be the underlying idea for how Donald Trump created the Board of Peace to decline membership in the Security Council.
Indonesia’s decision to join the Board of Peace (BoP) has drawn widespread criticism from academics, international relations experts, and civil society. Rather than constituting a breakthrough in peace diplomacy, this membership has raised critical scrutiny about the consistency of Indonesia’s long-standing foreign policy principles, which are grounded in independent, active participation and a firm commitment to support global peace.
The first criticism addresses the fundamental paradox of the BoP itself. As an organization dedicated to the promotion of global peace, the BoP has notably excluded Palestine, an immediate victim of the ongoing conflict, while extending membership to Israel. This is particularly contentious given that Israel is widely accused of human rights violations in the Palestinian territories. This configuration is considered unfair and unequal and undermines the spirit of justice in international conflict resolution. Peace initiatives that exclude the primary victims of conflict risk creating an illusory form of peace rather than an inclusive settlement, which can lead to delivering false peace narratives.
Second, the BoP’s internal discourse and advocacy narratives have shifted attention toward post-conflict reconciliation in Gaza, rather than recognizing Palestine as an independent state. There is no clear commitment to the two-state solution, which has been the international consensus for decades. If the independence of Palestine is not made the primary goal, the BoP risks becoming merely a mechanism for conflict stabilization rather than a serious effort to resolve the root causes.
Third, the absence of countries strongly supporting the two-state solution raises important further questions about the legitimacy of the BoP. Several Western countries traditionally aligned with the United States, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and France, have notably refrained from joining the BoP. This indicates that the BoP is not fully accepted as a credible and inclusive peace forum.
Fourth, the two Islamic countries (Lebanon and Syria) that are geographically and historically close to Palestine have not been invited. The absence of representation from the whole Islamic world further weakens the BoP’s claim to be a just and comprehensive reconciliation mechanism. In the Palestine-Israel conflict, moral and political legitimacy depend heavily on the balance of actors involved.
Fifth, the BoP’s leadership structure raises serious concerns. Donald Trump, as founder and chairman, has exclusive authority to create, modify, or dissolve subsidiary entities of the organization. Only the chairman can appoint a replacement. This leadership model contradicts the principles of democratic and accountable governance of international organizations. Rather than being collective, the BoP appears to be an instrument of the personal political interests of Donald Trump, even though he will not serve as President of the United States of America in the next period. In this regard, BoP belongs to a personal organization instead of a state organization that represents the interests of the international world order.
Sixth, the membership fee requirement reaching US$1 billion has drawn sharp scrutiny. This figure is not only unrealistic but also has the potential to burden the state budget. Amidst domestic economic challenges and national development needs, the financing of international forums whose strategic benefits are unclear deserves critical scrutiny.
Despite the illogical reasons explained, the government asserts that Indonesia’s participation in the BoP is a concrete implementation of its independent and active foreign policy by making it a realistic choice. This principle emphasizes Indonesia’s active involvement in international forums to achieve world peace, as stated in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. Indonesia’s participation is claimed to be urgent in continuing to fight for Palestinian independence and ensuring that this issue is not sidelined in the global peace architecture, especially in the current new world order. President Prabowo Subianto is seen as adopting a hedging approach to foreign policy, striving to remain independent while being active in several strategic forums. Through the BoP, Indonesia is seen as having the opportunity to transform from a mere subject of global policy to a shaper of international norms. Peace is no longer pursued merely through rhetoric but is institutionalized within a concrete diplomatic structure.
Geopolitical dynamics reveal another dimension of complexity for Indonesia. Although the coordinating minister for economic affairs of Indonesia, Airlangga Hartarto, emphasized that BoP membership is not necessarily linked to US trade tariff negotiations, economic pressure remains a crucial factor. Indonesia still faces a 19 percent import tariff from the US, and negotiations have not reached a final decision yet.
Indonesia’s economic dependence on the United States, both in trade, investment, and strategic imports, makes Jakarta’s position less than entirely free. This is reflected in its relatively soft diplomatic stance, including statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that rarely mention Trump directly, instead using the term “United States” generically. This pattern indicates excessive caution in maintaining bilateral relations between the two countries. In this context, Indonesia’s membership in the BoP can be read not merely as a strategic choice but as a form of subtle pressure from the US. Economic and political diplomacy often go hand in hand, and international forums are often used as bargaining tools for major interests. If this is the case, the principle of “bebas aktif” has the potential to be reduced to a response to external forces, rather than a real expression of sovereign policy.
Based on the analysis of realistic options as mentioned by several Indonesian experts, BoP is the only option currently available for the world to pursue Palestinian independence. The Charter’s initiatives, while mentioning the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” (20-Point Roadmap), do not specifically outline a two-state solution. Some analysts suggest that the Charter focuses more on security and broad restructuring, without specifically and formally mentioning a Palestinian state. However, to call for a two-state solution for Palestine, Indonesia must take an active stance in its rational choice, not merely as a follower but also as a policymaker at the BoP.
Following a wave of criticism and intensity, Foreign Minister Sugiono stated that Indonesia could withdraw from the BoP if it proved inconsistent with national interests and detrimental to the country. This statement exposed a lack of strategic coherence in Indonesia’s foreign policy calculus. Membership in an international organization should ideally be based on mature strategic calculation, not a trial and error of political choices or miscalculation leading to a huge mistake. It is related to the important decision of joining an international organization, which could indicate partisanship of an international political coalition.
Conversely, an alternative narrative has emerged suggesting that the decision to join the BoP reflects the president’s preference rather than a national consensus. If substantiated, this poses a serious risk for Indonesian diplomacy, which should be based on long-term national interests, not the personal preferences of leaders. Foreign policy should be an instrument of the state, not an individual project.
Ultimately, Indonesia’s participation in the BoP will continue to spark pros and cons if it is not fully aligned with national interests and the principles of global justice that Indonesia has long championed. The large financial burden, the questionable legitimacy of the forum, and the lack of commitment to Palestinian independence further fuel public doubts. As a country with a tradition of active diplomacy, Indonesia should continue to prioritize an inclusive, multilateral approach based on international law. Active participation should be a means of strengthening global norms, rather than becoming trapped in political structures rife with narrow interests.
A genuinely independent and active foreign policy requires Indonesia to engage boldly and independently on the global stage, yet remain sovereign in determining its direction. While actively building peace, without succumbing to economic or political pressure, it could be named as a realistic choice. International institutional participation should therefore constitute a deliberate strategic choice, not an outcome shaped by asymmetric power relations.
