Iran’s regional power position prominently declined after structural devastations to its proxies, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, and the subsequent fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Besides, Tehran’s nuclear sites were destroyed by American and Israeli missile attacks, although the level of destruction remained unknown. This palpable weakness paired with Iran’s economic predicaments, such as high inflation and corruption, paved the way for mass protests. The protests have sapped Tehran’s strength further. Leveraged by the country’s substantial decline in power position, the US started building up its military presence in the Middle East, and US President Donald Trump threatened further strikes against Iran if a deal to curb its nuclear program could not be reached. In this larger context, Iran reportedly expressed its readiness to consider compromises, which included dilution of its 60%-enriched uranium to reach a nuclear deal with the US if the latter was willing to discuss lifting sanctions. However, the evolution of these events as they did does not indicate that the Iranian regime would collapse if a nuclear deal cannot be forged with the US. Iran’s shrewd cultivation of ties with various militant groups has been reaping desired benefits, albeit severe blows to Hamas and Hezbollah. The Taliban’s spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, has reportedly remarked that the group will aid and assist the Islamic Republic of Iran if the US strikes the country. On the other side, Hamas and Hezbollah are not completely destroyed; they may still prove to be valuable assets for Iran. On top of all these, the regime is not internally ready either for a democratic takeover or a coup that the US can take advantage of.
It is well-known how a formidable alliance among leftists, nationalists, secularists, and Islamists in 1979 toppled the monarchy. However, the Islamic Republic has been able to drive a wedge between various opposition groups to attain a formidable level of unity even though the opposition groups remained cautious and lamented about the fact that the clerical establishment centralized power and unleashed violence against innocent people and violated rights ranging from those of minorities to those of women.
Divisions within the Ruling Elites
There is a clear division between the older and younger generations of the Iranian state apparatus. It was believed that pressures from the old guard would make the regime more theocratic internally but less ambitious externally, while the younger officials would try to make Iran less religious but more assertive at the international level. But none of them could exercise overriding influence over the Iranian state.
Iran’s elite hardly demonstrated any fractures when the reformists and hardline leaders acted in unison to suppress the protests. The regime circulated narratives that deliberately looked over the violence perpetrated against innocent civilians.
The regime has been able to withstand years of wars, protests, and high inflation without demonstrating major fractures. It nurtured a powerful security apparatus that has been able to suppress the mass protests as well. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been the most powerful branch of the Iranian military and serves as the principal guardian of the theocratic system, and it benefited the most from the system as well.
The Iranian regime makes necessary purges whenever it doubts loyalty among the regime’s elite backers. For instance, it made necessary purges after it realized that it had long prioritized loyalists over moderate voices, but there were some pseudo hardliners who might have collaborated with the Americans whose credibility began to be questioned after the American and Israeli missile strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.
Fractures Within the Opposition Camp
Despite the Iranian regime’s years of economic mismanagement and rising popular discontent, together with external pressures from the US, the Islamic Republic has benefited from the fractures in the opposition camps comprising students, ethnic minorities, women’s rights champions, labor organizations, and monarchists. The opposition lacks a unifying leader as well as infrastructure. Despite several economic predicaments plaguing the country, such as inflation, inequality, and issues of corruption, working-class people have been unable to pursue their agenda with other opposition groups. The minorities, including Kurdish, Baluchi, Ahwazi Arab, and Azerbaijani groups, despite their common demands for more autonomy and linguistic and cultural rights, remain cautious about the future equations in each other’s influence following the regime’s debacle and desist from coordinating their actions.
Apart from this, opposition groups accuse each other of collaboration with either the regime or with external powers such as Russia, Turkey, the US, and Gulf countries. Those opposition figures who have sought to unify the opposition groups under the banner of peaceful democratic transition, rule of law, and political pluralism are arrested and put behind bars.
The influence of supporters of Reza Pahlavi has grown considerably outside of the country. They believe that monarchy needs to replace the current regime. But these supporters have alienated other opposition groups by criticizing them. Israel’s support for Pahlavi has also caused friction. Ethnic minorities fear that Pahlavi would centralize power and would be authoritarian, just like the current regime. For the opposition groups operating from outside of Iran, media, social media, and various online platforms have been the sites of contestations, while at the domestic level, the narrative of the government suppresses other narratives.
