The reopening of the Rafah crossing marks an important step in Trump’s plan for Gaza, relating specifically to the plan’s ceasefire and humanitarian access provisions. The initiative is not without challenge though, it relies on Hamas’ disarmament, extremely ambiguous international oversight (including from the nascent ‘Board of Peace’), and arguably impractical reconstruction blueprints which risk cementing a “frozen conflict” and disempowering Palestinians. Short-term de-escalations, like the re-opened crossing, may mask inherent long-run instability in the region.
Rafah Re-opened: a Step Forward or a Facade?
An optimistic assessment of the re-opening highlights serious humanitarian significance. Palestinians being able to seek medical aid from neighbours, like Egypt (which has staff and supplies ready for arrivals), and to access the rest of the world may mark – as Ali Shaath puts it – a “genuine window of hope”. This development may show international pressure, International Criminal Court/ International Court of Justice deliberation and expanded Western support for Palestine are truly effective measures. Looking to history, the fall of the South African apartheid regime suggests that global normative pressures can contribute towards peaceful transitions.
Strategically, the re-opening may set helpful precedents for future peace negotiations, improve overseas confidence as Israeli border activity can be externally observed, and even help lay groundwork for economic recovery as porous borders enhance commercial and labour mobility as well as channels for future reconstruction. However, border openness at this stage is limited; the lack of free movement may herald intensified control since aid flows through Rafah can become conditional on compliance with Israeli demands and the symbolic efficacy of the border’s openness may reduce international pressures on Israel to end occupation. Furthermore, openness risks entrenching Palestinian reliance on external actors rather than fostering domestic autonomy.
A realistic assessment cannot ignore the short-comings of the re-opening. While Palestinians can now ostensibly access external medical aid, less than twenty people, only seven of whom were medical patients, have actually made it past Israeli border patrols at the crossing so far. Before its closure in May 2024, the crossing was vital for food aid, humanitarian relief and refugee exits. The extremely limited re-opening may suggest the move is to appease international condemnation, not an actual attempt at peaceful relations. If medical exits are so tightly restricted and humanitarian functions have not been re-instated, re-opening begins to seem rather insignificant. Considering the fact over 500 Palestinians have allegedly been murdered by the Israeli occupying forces since the ‘ceasefire’ 16 weeks ago, re-opening may shift from a hollow symbol to an outright facade. Limited numbers may be allowed to trickle through a now marginally more porous border, but there is still no end in sight to the larger settler colonial project – this procedural milestone leaves the real political questions of sovereignty, autonomy and freedom unanswered.
The Disarmament Deadlock: Can the Plan Survive Without It?
The re-opening of the Rafah crossing comes in response to the final Israeli hostage’s corpse being recovered – a key stipulation in the peace deal. The pivotal element of Trump’s peace plan, however, the complete disarmament and removal from power of Hamas, has not been met. Netanyahu confirmed on February 4th that any reconstruction of Gaza must be preceded by Hamas’ disarmament and the permanent demilitarisation of Gaza. The war aims of Israel remain unchanged, and the resistance of Hamas is similarly entrenched – does this combination make peace unattainable?
Senior Hamas official, Abu Marzouk, has made it clear that the group, while open to partial arms reductions, never agreed to full disarmament. Hamas’ motivations are clear: end Israeli occupation, claim the role of defender of Palestinian rights and achieve political legitimacy in Gaza. These goals’ incompatibility with complete disarmament suggest peace may be a long way off. Looking at Hamas’ actual capabilities suggests the same thing. Though in no way an equal peer to the well-funded, highly-organised IDF, Hamas benefits from relatively advanced weaponry, internal governing apparatus in Gaza and well-established information networks. Hamas certainly has the resources to continue the fight. In their minds, agreeing to full disarmament when Netanyahu firmly asserts that the Zionist project is still the final aim is likely akin to the chickens sitting down placidly while the fox enters the coop.
Hamas are not the only actors within the Palestinian community. The Palestinian Authority and PLO aim for advanced Palestinian statehood, improved stability and economic conditions and reduced violence on both sides so as to maintain international support. While they too mainly seek to end Israel’s occupation, the route they take is diplomatic and two-state-solution oriented, rather than an armed struggle. In terms of the peace plan, a few options are in play in the absence of Hamas’ disarmament. The first is the possibility of anti/non-Hamas actors making increased efforts to work with the Israeli regime. They may interpret the border opening, however lacklustre, as a sign of renewed negotiation opportunities, reducing Hamas’ influence and taking steps toward peace at the same time. Slightly more pessimistically, in light of Netanyahu declaring that the Palestinian Authority will play no role whatsoever in postwar Gazan governance, non-Hamas actors could begin to look more favourably toward their militarised countrymen. Compromise seems increasingly unlikely in the combined absences of Hamas’ disarmament, the Palestinian Authority’s role in the future and citizens’ autonomy.
The ‘New Gaza’ Vision: Blueprint or Blindspot?
The Kushner-backed reconstruction plan is phased and multifaceted. Its ambitious aim is to turn Gaza into a modern economic hub with new cities, infrastructure, business districts, digital sectors and coastal development. Funding would require an initial investment of more than $25 billion. Kushner stresses that the focus would be on job creation, public service provision, vocational training and commercial stimulation. For neoliberal economists, this plan sounds inviting. New cities attract tourists, business districts bring foreign investment, quaternary sector development helps ensure long-term growth and infrastructural expansion tends to the citizens’ needs. In terms of security, the initiative would be monitored by the Board of Peace, and would be entirely contingent on complete Palestinian disarmament and demilitarisation.
The ‘New Gaza’ vision, in reality, has a variety of possible disadvantages and dysfunctional consequences – most of which concern who stands to benefit from this manner of reconstruction and who stands to lose out. Investor-driven development may appear to take precedence over local needs, as mega-projects are tailored to attract FDI, not serve the long-suffering Palestinian people. Moreover, the lack of property rights and compensation frameworks mean there could be an effective ‘Scramble for Palestine’: large development zones driven purely by external profit pursuits risk marginalising existing land claims and ignoring the needs of families whose homes, lands and livelihoods have been wiped out, and which are not part of the Western ‘vision’ for the region.
There is also the issue of Palestinian autonomy. Planning has been top-down, and has involved insufficient local consultation, meaning community needs can be overridden by technocratic ambitions. Authority over reconstruction also largely sits with external overseers, causing a serious lack of accountability and representation within planning priorities. As mentioned, reconstruction and humanitarian access are contingent on complete demilitarisation, so any future armed Palestinian desire for true emancipation could lead to effective mass punishment of recovering civilians – the Palestinian future rests on its present total surrender. The ‘New Gaza’ begins to look more like a commercial investment play than a serious bid for long-term stability. Heeding the lessons that post-invasion Iraq has taught us, externally-managed reconstruction while domestic legitimacy deficts, social fragmentation and neighbour-state conflicts are in play can end up fostering violence and instability in the long-term.
Notably, the plan is intended to be first implemented in Rafah, then expanded across the territory if security conditions are met. This detail casts the recent re-opening in an interesting light. Perhaps the border has been opened just enough to enable prospective investors to assess their future holdings. Rafah may serve as an entry point for reconstruction materials and a dissemination point for US-Israeli economic ambitions. The limited number of allowed Palestinian exits at Rafah also begs the question of who exactly will be on the ground and doing the building of the ‘New Gaza’.
Uncertain Guardians: The Void in Governance and Security
As of this year, Gaza’s transition and reconstruction will likely be overseen by Trump’s new Board of Peace – endorsed in this role by a United Nations Security Council resolution as part of the larger peace plan. Membership on the Board requires invitation, and a reported initial contribution of $1 billion for permanent membership. Aside from the US, no other of the five permanent UN Security Council member countries have deigned to join. The nations involved thus far include Israel, Hungary and Argentina – all of which face international concerns about the legitimacy of their democratic processes and structures, as does the US. Cementing concerns regarding Palestinian disempowerment, there is no Palestinian Authority presence on the Board.
Looking at the Executive Board of the organisation, the group of individuals who will have the most influence internationally over what the future of Palestine entails, we find a relatively surprising cohort. Sir Tony Blair, notorious for his alleged war crimes in Iraq, dismissal of UN Security Council resolutions and oversight of civilian torture in Abu Ghraib prison, will play a central role in both the Board and the Gaza Executive Board (responsible for on-the-ground activity). Blair’s last foray into the Middle East resulted in around 200,000 Iraqi deaths and bloody sectarian conflicts which still affect the region today. The Board also houses US Secretary of State Marco ‘Narco’ Rubio, well-known for alleged corruption scandals, overthrowing democratic governments in Latin America and receiving massive campaign donations from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Steve Witkoff also has a place on the Board, he not only has extensive business ties and investments in the Middle East (perhaps a conflict of interest) but also a record of close ties to the Kremlin. On the whole, the presence of several controversial figures paired with the absence of an advocate for the Palestinians casts a rather negative light on the potential of this committee to lead positive change and stable governance in the region.
Conclusion
Like all conflicts, the Israel-Hamas dispute is historically layered and constantly shifting. Like all conflict resolution plans, Trump’s is not perfect. Far from it, the plan may create serious doubts in the minds of observers: in catering to Israel’s demands it risks cementing a state of managed and perpetual conflict. In erasing Palestinian voices, it may endorse what some have deemed to be genocidal ethnic cleansing and settler colonialism. As Egypt awaits Palestinian medical evacuees with aid, and neighbouring states remain cautiously uninvolved, the conflict only becomes more multifaceted. Following the creation of the Board of Peace and the conception of the ‘New Gaza’ plan, however, the potential resolution of this conflict seems increasingly profit-driven, Western-centric and sinisterly unilateral.
