A Series of Unfortunate Events: Greenland in the Davos Spotlight

The article on “Europe’s Arctic Moment: Greenland, NATO, and the Strategic Imperative at Davos”, published two days ago on Substack and today in Modern Diplomacy, was written prior to the start of the World Economic Forum. Yet, in light of the developments over the past forty-eight hours, it is evident that the piece was not only relevant but, more strikingly, prescient. The Greenland issue has escalated into an open geopolitical confrontation exactly as anticipated, underscoring the accuracy of the analysis.

Yesterday, I met with a seasoned EEAS leader specializing in Arctic issues and EU politics. He asked me, a simple question: “Why Greenland?” I explained that I do not consider myself an Arctic expert – many others have far greater technical knowledge – but I have been following Greenland’s strategic role in NATO for nearly two decades. That long-term perspective, I argued, allows one to identify patterns and stakes that are often overlooked in the immediacy of daily politics.

My interlocutor agreed, noting that this perspective is precisely what is often missing. Mobilizing democratic institutions, including the European Parliament, on issues that are neither “urgent,” highly visible, nor electorally salient is exceptionally difficult. By the time such matters reach the political agenda, the strategic margin for manoeuvre may already be significantly constrained.

This context makes the Greenland debate at Davos not just a policy question, but a case study in the tension between long-term strategic foresight and short-term political responsiveness. My latest piece on Greenland, now live on Substack, explores this dynamic in detail.

A Series of Unfortunate Events: Greenland in the Davos Spotlight

Like a real-world chapter from “A Series of Unfortunate Events”, the Greenland crisis has progressed through a cascade of miscalculations, and escalating tensions. What started as a quiet matter of Arctic strategy approached for decade in NATO has escalated into a public spectacle of threats, political posturing, and high-stakes negotiation. And that’s just the beginning. What had long lingered as a provocative but largely symbolic idea is now being articulated as a matter of hard national interest, backed by the language of coercion.

Like a real-world chapter out of “A Series of Unfortunate Events”, by Lemony Snicket,  the Greenland situation has been progressing in a manner that is best described as one miscalculation piling upon another, until the situation has reached its current level of public display, complete with threats, politicking, and last-minute diplomacy. But this is only the beginning.

President Trump declared that he was confident a deal over Greenland would be reached that would leave both the United States and NATO “very happy.”[2] Yet this assurance was immediately undercut by his refusal to rule out coercive measures. Repeating that the United States “needs Greenland for world security,” he warned reporters, “You’ll find out,” when pressed on how far he was willing to go. [3] The formulation was deliberate: reassurance paired with menace. It signalled that diplomacy remains the preferred façade, but not the binding constraint.

Trump dismissed suggestions that the European Union could retaliate by withholding investment or cooperation, stating bluntly: “They need that agreement very badly with us.”[4]

The remark was revealing: it reframes what should be a multilateral security challenge as a transactional power relationship, grounded in economic interdependence. What was once a shared asset now appears as a vulnerability, echoing, in a different context, the EU dependence on Russia.

This posture hardened further in his depiction of NATO. Trump portrayed the Alliance as structurally dependent on the United States, claiming he had done more for it “than any other person alive or dead.” He warned that NATO “has to treat us fairly,” and openly questioned whether European allies would come to America’s defense: “I know we’ll come to their rescue, but I really do question whether or not they’ll come to ours.” Asked whether he remained committed to NATO, he replied that the Alliance was “not very strong” without the U.S. and was “only as good as we are.”[5]

This was not merely rhetorical bravado. It amounted to a conditional redefinition of collective defense: solidarity recast as a revocable favor, contingent on political loyalty and strategic concessions. In that frame, Greenland becomes not just a territory, but a loyalty test for allies – and a demonstration case for how far Washington is prepared to go to assert primacy within its own alliance system. The personal dimension of transatlantic relations also deteriorated in full public view. Trump told President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer to “straighten out their countries,” suggesting Macron “won’t be around much longer anyway,” and doubled down on criticism of the UK’s Chagos Islands agreement, arguing that Britain should keep the territory.  This statement represents a fresh challenge to the delicate balance between statecraft and personal antagonism, subtly undermining the informal trust on which alliance diplomacy relies.

Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent also reinforced the administration’s hard line, explicitly framing Greenland as a non-negotiable national-security asset. “The president believes that we should not outsource our national security,” he said, reiterating Trump’s demand to annex Greenland while warning the EU not to respond hastily to tariff threats.[6] Although Bessent struck a conciliatory tone by predicting the dispute would end “in a very good place for all,” the substance of his remarks underscored Washington’s readiness to fuse geopolitical pressure with economic coercion.

Taken together, these statements mark a qualitative escalation. The Greenland issue is no longer being floated as an eccentric proposal or a speculative real-estate deal between states; It is clear that if Greenland is now a bargaining chip, the transatlantic relations is no longer based on the respect of sovereignty but rather a temporary protection based on coercion. The episode exposes a deeper transformation in U.S. foreign policy: from leadership through consent to leadership through leverage. What is unfolding at Davos is a stress test of the postwar Atlantic order itself. The question is no longer whether Washington can persuade its allies. It is whether it intends to.

Europe’s Counter-Signal: Autonomy, Law, and Red Lines

In Davos, European leaders have reacted to Greenland crisis with a stronger collective voice, indicating that the unfortunate sequence of events does not have to render Europe impotent. Just as the heroes of Lemony Snicket’s series must confront dangerous situations with foresight and resourcefulness, Europe is seeking to turn reactive prudence into proactive policy, establishing the norms of law, strategic red lines, and possible joint actions against U.S. pressure.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described a “seismic change” in the global order and called for a “new form of European independence.” [7] She warned that any new U.S. tariffs would trigger an “unflinching” EU response and insisted that “a deal is a deal,” referring to tariff arrangements concluded last summer. Greenland was positioned at the center of a renewed EU Arctic strategy, with von der Leyen proposing that increased European defense spending be invested in Greenland’s economy, infrastructure, and security capabilities—turning a site of potential U.S. leverage into a locus of European strategic autonomy.

Von der Leyen also cautioned that plunging transatlantic relations into a “dangerous downward spiral” would serve Europe’s strategic adversaries. While some commentators framed her speech as revealing Europe’s vulnerability to what one German outlet termed Trump’s “naked imperialism,”[8] a more critical reading sees it as a deliberate assertion of limits and a pushback against both U.S. protectionism and territorial ambition.

High Representative Kaja Kallas drew a sharp legal and normative line: “No country has the right to take over the territory of another – not in Ukraine, not in Greenland.” Stressing that the EU does not seek confrontation with Washington, she nonetheless clarified: “We draw a line here,” expressing the EU’s readiness to enforce international norms.[9]

Also, France, under President Macron, moved decisively. Macron denounced “bullies” at Davos and called for adherence to “the rule of law rather than brutality,” rejecting tariff threats as “unacceptable.”[10] He warned against a “world without rules” and accused the U.S. of seeking to weaken and subordinate Europe through trade coercion. Backed by Berlin, Paris is now pressing the Commission to explore activating the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), with Sweden, Poland, and Portugal showing openness to its deployment.[11]

The European Parliament has escalated further, agreeing to suspend ratification of the EU-U.S. trade agreement in response to Trump’s tariff threats – a move criticized by some conservative leaders as emotional and counterproductive, but widely regarded as a watershed moment in EU-U.S. relations.

In doing so, Europe is exerting autonomy, legal norms, and strategic red lines-turning what was a reactive posture into a proactive, principled one in the face of coercion. As Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever framed this existential shift: “Being a happy vassal is one thing, being a miserable slave is something else,” and Europe should not back down now because “you’re going to lose your dignity,” implying that red lines have been crossed and self-respect needs to replace accommodation.[12]

Meanwhile, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney framed the moment as one bigger than a regional dispute-it was part of a systemic rupture in the global order. Great powers increasingly use “economic integration as coercion,” he said. The middle powers must avoid negotiating “from weakness,” instead forging a “third path with impact” based on legitimacy, integrity, and collective strength.

Taken together, these measures have further strengthened the message that the Europe response is one of strategic adjustment, one that repudiates the idea of subordination and instead holds fast to the sovereignty, dignity, and cooperation of like-minded countries as the basis for a strong world order. It is in this context that the strategic choices of Denmark and Greenland have to be understood.

Denmark and Greenland

Denmark’s Greenland strategy is therefore in itself a form of delicate balance between deterrence, diplomacy, and domestic politics. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s statement that a U.S. trade war would be a “bad idea’ expresses this sensitivity and awareness of one’s relative position: Denmark simply does not match the U.S. position. Mette Frederiksen’s suggestion that there should be a permanent NATO military presence in Greenland, as in the Baltic states, is therefore in itself a statement of strategy that Denmark wants to internationalize the defense of Greenland in order to secure its own sovereignty.

Copenhagen’s absence in Davos indicates a deliberate choice to exercise “soft” power over showy diplomacy. Frederiksen’s statement that “Denmark will work more effectively… in more direct bilaterals and in the European sphere” implies that the Danish government is aware that multilateral settings may necessarily accentuate U.S. influence and not limit it in the process. [13]Internally, the discussion around the suspension or renegotiation of the U.S.–Denmark Defense Agreement reflects a realistic recognition of the imperatives of power relations focused on both simultaneous visibility and calculated preparation. It is significant that Foreign Minister Vivian Motzfeldt’s recent return from her visit to Washington[14] was greeted with great approval, reflecting the value of symbolic action of the assertion of the importance of Greenland as a partner and not a mere object for negotiation between Europe and the US.

In conclusion, Denmark and Greenland can be seen to represent the relationship between sovereignty and structural power. Frederiksen’s coalition government, along with those in Greenland, is working to set the terms of engagement, embedding international structures, and sending a message about smaller nations’ capabilities to provide agency with legal, political, and security instruments are aligned. One thing has certainly been learned: sovereignty is more than mere endurance but is an art that turns weakness into resilience.

Toward the Militarization of the Arctic

The Greenland crisis is developing through a series of escalating and often unpredictable events. The security component is escalating very quickly, and this suggests that a former subordinated issue within the Arctic region has now become a primary issue within Europe and the transatlantic community. Like the unfortunate heroes within a Lemony Snicket series, the leadership within Europe finds itself facing a series of threats, miscalculations, and strategic challenges where every step has its corresponding disproportionate outcomes.
A NATO exercise proposed by France^[15] will take place in Greenland, and Denmark will deploy 1,000 combat troops by 2026. ^[16] It will add further pressure to the military capabilities of the country, taking into account the current operations being carried out.

Amongst other European leaders, the President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda, emphasized the need for a joint security format of the US and the EU in the Arctic and North Atlantic, given the possible impact of individual territorial claims on security and the strength of alliances in the concerned regions.[17]

This reflects a growing recognition that Greenland is not an isolated territorial concern but part of a broader geostrategic architecture in which small missteps can have wide reverberations across NATO and EU security planning.

A Change in Structure, Not a Disagreement Over Tactics

Davos has made clear that for the Arctic and for Europe, Greenland is not a remote Arctic issue, but now a structural test for the Atlantic alliance, European sovereignty, and the transatlantic order. President Trump’s articulation of the geostrategic imperative of Greenland’s acquisition, his perceptions about the uncertainty and unreliability of the Atlantic alliance’s commitments, and his blending of territorial and tariff threats represent now a clear departure from the customary tenets of alliance politics.

The message that is going out with this stance of Europe, beginning with President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen’s appeal for a strategy of independence and extending through the suspension of the trade agreement between the EU and the US, is a both a strategic line and a clash with respect to underlying principles of the West itself. Greenland will demonstrate how new alliances, founded on shared values and collective security, can endure in a changing international environment, and how the Arctic is no longer a frozen hinterland but has become a living frontline, testing just how resilient the Western order truly is.

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[1] Cristina Vanberghen, “Europe’s Arctic Moment: Greenland, NATO, and the Strategic Imperative at Davos” available at: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/01/21/europes-arctic-moment-greenland-nato-and-the-strategic-imperative-at-davos/

[2] “Trump says ‘you’ll find out’ how far he’ll go to seize Greenland ahead of departure for Davos” available at: https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/21/trump-says-youll-find-out-how-far-hell-go-to-seize-greenland-ahead-of-departure-for-davos

[3] Trump-Davos latest: UK ‘letting us down’, US says – ahead of Trump speech after Greenland warning available at: https://news.sky.com/story/flatplan-13489831

[4] “Trump denies Greenland threats could risk Nato alliance, claiming ‘things are going to work out very well’ – as it happened” available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/jan/20/europe-greenland-donald-trump-davos-europe-live-latest-updates

[5] “Trump speaks at the White House” available at: https://www.thetimes.com/us/news-today/article/trump-chagos-islands-deal-latest-news-563v023st

[6] “Bessent: ‘The national emergency is avoiding a national emergency’” available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/18/bessent-national-emergency-tarriffs-00735660

[7] Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/da/speech_26_150

[8] Carsten Volkery, “Von der Leyen suffers from an unrealistic nostalgia for the USA.The Commission President is calling for a new independence for Europe, yet she still refers to the USA as “our friends.” This is out of touch with reality in the Greenland dispute” available in https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/kommentare/kommentar-von-der-leyen-leidet-unter-einer-wirklichkeitsfremden-usa-nostalgie/100193160.html

[9] ‘Sovereignty is not for trade’: EU foreign policy chief says no country can seize another’s territory, available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/sovereignty-is-not-for-trade-eu-foreign-policy-chief-says-no-country-can-seize-anothers-territory/3805319

[10] ‘Prefer rule of law to brutality’: Macron humiliates ‘bully’ Trump over Greenland tariffs at WEF available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SqUqEsbhFQ

[11] https://x.com/euronews/status/2013278425813856549?s=20

[12] “The Latest: Greenland and threat of Trump tariffs loom over Davos” available at:

https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/world/article/the-latest-word-economic-forum-opens-in-davos-21304250.php

[13] ‘Europe will not be blackmailed:’ Denmark embraces allies’ support on Greenland” available at:

https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-will-not-be-blackmailed-danish-prime-minister-welcomes-allies-support-mette-frederiksen

[14] “Vivian får varm modtagelse efter USA-rejse” available at: https://www.sermitsiaq.ag/samfund/vivian-far-varm-modtagelse-efter-usa-rejse/2333166

[15] Groenland : la France demande «un exercice de l’Otan», se dit «prête à y contribuer» available at:

https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/groenland-la-france-demande-un-exercice-de-l-otan-se-dit-prete-a-y-contribuer-20260121

[16] “Kampen om Grønland – følg med direkte her”

https://www.berlingske.dk/indland/kampen-om-groenland–foelg-med-direkte-her-1?directpost=10885795

[17] “Nausėda: ginčą dėl Grenlandijos galima išspręsti susitarus dėl saugumo”, available at: https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/pasaulyje/6/2812419/nauseda-ginca-del-grenlandijos-galima-isspresti-susitarus-del-saugumo