A startling moment at a Berlin security conference captured the anxiety now spreading across U.S. alliances. When the U.S. ambassador to NATO suggested Germany should one day take over as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, German officials appeared stunned. For decades, U.S. leadership in NATO has been a given. Now, Washington’s new National Security Strategy signals a shift: a more inward-looking, hard-right “America First” posture that criticises allies and raises doubts about the future of U.S. commitments abroad.
This change is especially consequential for Germany and Japan nations whose post-WWII identities, militaries, and strategic roles were shaped within a U.S.-built order. Both now face uncomfortable questions about defence, deterrence, and what happens if Washington steps back.
U.S. UNDOES THE ORDER IT CREATED
The National Security Strategy marks a break from decades of American foreign policy. Rather than reassuring allies, it underscores grievances, warns European partners to take on more burden, and leans into domestic political priorities rather than global leadership. This shift comes amid rising tensions: China’s verbal threats against Japan after comments on Taiwan, Russian aggression in Europe, and a growing sense that U.S. deterrence cannot be assumed.
While the U.S. eventually sent nuclear-capable bombers to reassure Japan after Chinese radar-lock incidents, the slow response and muted tone of the new strategy left Tokyo questioning how far Washington would go in a crisis.
GERMANY AND JAPAN AT A STRATEGIC CROSSROADS
Germany and Japan share a common dilemma. Both have constitutional, historical, and societal constraints on remilitarisation. Yet both face increasingly hostile neighbours and doubts about U.S. reliability. In Europe, only Germany has the military-industrial capacity to anchor NATO if the U.S. retreats. In Asia, Japan must consider how to respond if China moves on Taiwan especially if American support becomes uncertain.
During the Cold War, both countries rearmed under immense controversy. Today, they face a similar turning point: whether to expand military capabilities, change strategic doctrines, and take on defence roles once unthinkable.
GERMANY’S NEW REALITY
Germany is undergoing the most dramatic military rethink since the 1950s. It is significantly increasing forces in Lithuania, exploring conscription, and boosting defence production so dramatically that it could soon become one of the world’s largest weapons buyers. Classified German planning documents envision Berlin as the logistical and industrial hub of a NATO war effort.
Yet these plans assume U.S. involvement. If Washington steps away, Germany would confront issues it has long avoided — leadership of NATO’s operational command structure and the question of nuclear deterrence. Germany currently relies entirely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The idea of a German nuclear weapons program remains deeply taboo, both socially and politically.
Complicating this further, the U.S. strategy’s open flirtation with Europe’s far right, including America’s apparent support for Germany’s AfD, adds instability to alliance politics and raises concerns about the future coherence of Western strategy.
JAPAN’S CHALLENGES IN A MORE DANGEROUS ASIA
Japan faces an even sharper strategic dilemma. China’s pressure on Taiwan and increasingly aggressive military signalling have heightened Japanese fears of being encircled or blockaded. The U.S.–Japan alliance has long been the cornerstone of Japan’s security planning. Previous American leaders, including Joe Biden, repeatedly stated that the U.S. would defend Taiwan. The new strategy reverts to strategic ambiguity, leaving gaps and doubts.
Japan has responded by deploying missiles near Taiwan and strengthening ties with South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. But without firm U.S. backing, Japan’s capacity to deter or fight China is limited. Any consideration of nuclear weapons remains politically toxic because of the historical trauma of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Still, if the U.S. signals disengagement, political debate in Japan may eventually shift in uncomfortable directions.
A WIDER STRATEGIC QUESTION: WILL THE U.S. FIGHT?
Beijing’s military thinking increasingly views taking Taiwan as a step toward pressuring or isolating Japan. Chinese strategy texts openly discuss blockading Japan once Taiwan is under their control. For Tokyo, the uncertainty of U.S. commitment is now a major strategic risk. And with the new U.S. strategy barely mentioning North Korea, questions extend across the entire Pacific region.
THE END OF THE ‘HOLIDAY FROM HISTORY’
Germany and Japan have spent eighty years operating under the assumption of American strategic stability. That era is ending. Both nations now face a world where they may have to assume responsibilities militarily, politically, and technologically that they once considered impossible. The decisions they make next will shape the balance of power in Europe and Asia for decades.
ANALYSIS
The underlying issue here is not just military capacity; it is psychological and political readiness. Neither Germany nor Japan has fully internalised the possibility of a world where the U.S. no longer serves as the ultimate guarantor of their security. The Trump administration’s strategy forces them to confront that reality sooner than expected.
Germany’s challenge is structural: it has economic weight but lacks the political will and public appetite for truly hard power. Japan’s challenge is existential: geography dictates that any conflict over Taiwan immediately threatens its survival, yet it remains constrained by pacifist norms and deep fear of escalation.
Both countries are haunted by their own historiesbut their future security may depend on overcoming those constraints.
Ultimately, the shifting U.S. posture signals a multipolar world where Washington is no longer the unquestioned centre of Western security. Germany and Japan must decide whether to step into leadership roles they long avoided, or risk being strategically sidelined in a world growing more dangerous by the year.
With information from Reuters.
