From Budapest to Donbas: Why Trump’s Peace Plan Is a Broken Legal Obligation

As Donald Trump re-entered the White House, securing a majority in the 2024 election, he tried to implement his campaign promise to stop the war in Ukraine within 24 hours.

As Donald Trump re-entered the White House, securing a majority in the 2024 election, he tried to implement his campaign promise to stop the war in Ukraine within 24 hours. This motto was more PR than a genuine political goal, lacking any mature understanding of the roots of the conflict. This is the main reason why it ultimately failed. At the same time, the Zelensky Peace Plan disappeared from the mass media and from official statements by both Ukraine and Western authorities.

In contrast, Trump held the first phone conversation with Putin since the full-scale invasion to discuss the war in Ukraine. Subsequently, the United States aligned with Russia in a UN vote against a European-sponsored resolution. This culminated in an Oval Office meeting where Zelensky was verbally attacked by Trump and Vance, after which US military aid and intelligence support to Ukraine were suspended for about a week. Trump shifted US policy from full support of Ukraine to partial alignment with the Kremlin, particularly regarding territorial concessions and restrictions on NATO membership.

In this new reality, Ukraine set aside the Zelensky Peace Plan and focused on aligning with the new US administration to keep American support. Furthermore, Ukraine agreed to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire, which resulted in the restoration of US intelligence and military aid. However, the Kremlin refused to reciprocate, insisting on territorial concessions in Donbas. Russia’s territorial demands are widely considered the main reason for the failure of the Trump–Putin meeting at the Alaska summit on 15 August 2025. Subsequently, on 22 October 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned Rosneft, Lukoil, and other entities over Russia’s refusal to end hostilities in Ukraine. The sanctions were effective: India and China, major buyers of their oil, eventually halted purchases to avoid secondary sanctions.

However, surprisingly, the Trump administration proposed a 28-point peace plan said to be drafted by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev. According to official sources, this plan simply repeated Trump’s earliest narratives in office, namely that Ukraine should give up its eastern territories. Trump reinforced this by setting a deadline, demanding that Ukraine accept his peace plan by 27 November 2025. Zelensky’s reaction is balanced: he refused to give up his country’s interests while working with the White House to offer alternative solutions to the 28-point plan. European authorities opposed the peace plan, arguing that it threatens to destabilise the security architecture of the European continent by encouraging the aggressor, and, in my view, its long-term implications could be devastating.

The timing is also confusing, as the Trump administration announced this plan barely a month after sanctions against the two major Russian oil giants had taken full effect. Trump, as usual, justified his decision by saying he wanted to stop the killings in the Ukraine war. His tactic is simple: apply maximum pressure on Ukraine and force it to accept his terms. He did the same when he pushed Ukraine into accepting a 30-day unconditional ceasefire. However, Ukraine did not agree to surrender its territories in Donbas. Subsequently, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine would give up the Donbas territories it currently controls. Moreover, the plan’s demand that Ukraine refuse NATO membership is controversial, as the country has always been sensitive about its independence and its sovereign right to decide which organisations it joins.

On the other hand, Putin has also taken a hardline stance on Donbas. He is thinking in a Cold War–era KGB mindset and sees the White House’s stance, along with its repeated calls for Ukraine to give up territory in the East, as an ideal opportunity created by Trump. As a result, he is exploiting this opportunity, ignoring heavy casualties on the front and the damage caused by sanctions in order to pursue his territorial ambitions. Otherwise, he would be more realistic about territorial concessions, given the heavy price this war has imposed on his country. In addition, point 14 of the leaked peace plan looks like a bargain that financially rewards the Trump administration through reparations and Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction schemes.

In such a complex confrontation, Trump would be more effective if he repeatedly highlighted Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memorandum instead of blaming the Biden administration for the war in Ukraine in most of his speeches. For maximum effect, he could have simply printed out the agreement and held up Russia’s signature. This is artistic diplomacy, but it has been used effectively before:
· Adlai Stevenson waving satellite photos of Soviet missiles at the UN (1962)
· Churchill reading Hitler’s broken promises aloud
· Reagan holding up Soviet agreements during speeches

All of these were symbolic, theatrical moments designed to influence psychology and global opinion. So if any Western leader walked into the next press conference, held up the original 1994 document, and read Russia’s own words—its guarantee of Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders in exchange for the surrender of the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal—the psychological impact would be devastating. For the Global South, still wavering on whose narrative to trust, it would provide instant visual clarity: this war is not about NATO expansion but about a nuclear superpower breaking its word. It would reframe the war not as ‘Russian security concerns’, but as a broken legal obligation. These are, in fact, the deeper roots of the conflict and the reason Ukraine is resisting so fiercely.

Putin must understand that Russia broke its promise and that this war is illegitimate. Subsequently, all of Russia’s claims towards Ukraine are unjust, as is its current occupation of Ukrainian territory. In my view, Zelensky’s Peace Plan consists of clauses that clearly embody a just cessation of hostilities. These include the restoration of territorial integrity, the complete withdrawal of Russian forces and the return of full Ukrainian control over its state border, the provision of long-term and effective security guarantees for Ukraine, and a formal agreement once security, justice, and territorial integrity have been fully restored. Zelensky’s Peace Plan should serve as the core basis for negotiations to end the Russia–Ukraine war.

Zhadyger Abdrakhman
Zhadyger Abdrakhman
Zhadyger Abdrakhman is an independent researcher specializing in geopolitics and energy security. He has professional experience in oil and gas procurement and supply-chain management, providing practical insight into the intersection of resources, trade, and strategic planning. He is a graduate of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University with a degree in International Relations.