When U.S. President Donald Trump welcomes Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to the White House this week, the optics will be warm. The two leaders have long emphasized their personal rapport, even when their countries have been at odds. Yet beneath the handshakes and promises of arms and trade deals, the meeting underscores a truth: U.S.–Turkey relations are one of NATO’s most complicated balancing acts, defined by recurring disputes that personal chemistry alone cannot resolve.
Fighter Jet Fallout:
Few issues illustrate the chasm between Washington and Ankara more than the dispute over fighter jets. Turkey invested $1.6 billion into the F-35 program, expecting to co-produce and eventually acquire dozens of the fifth-generation aircraft. But in 2019, Ankara purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems, prompting the U.S. to expel Turkey from the program and impose sanctions on its defense industry.
For Erdogan, the issue is both financial and symbolic. He wants to recover Turkey’s sunk costs and secure the kind of high-tech weaponry that befits NATO’s second-largest army. For Trump, however, lifting sanctions or reopening the F-35 door would mean ignoring bipartisan security concerns in Washington, where lawmakers argue the Russian-made S-400s pose a direct risk to NATO interoperability.
This dispute is unlikely to be resolved in one meeting, but Erdogan will press Trump for concessions. If he cannot get the jets themselves, he may seek alternative weapons systems or broader easing of sanctions. The White House, meanwhile, will weigh these demands against a backdrop of increasing suspicion that Turkey’s balancing act between Moscow and the West could one day tilt too far eastward.
Russia and Strategic Ambiguity:
Turkey’s Russia policy is a permanent irritant in Washington. On the one hand, Ankara condemned the invasion of Ukraine and has supplied Kyiv with drones and military support. On the other, it refuses to participate in Western sanctions against Moscow and continues to deepen its energy and trade ties with Russia.
Erdogan frames this as strategic autonomy, the idea that Turkey can stand independently between blocs and maximize its leverage. Washington sees it as hedging that weakens the collective Western response to Moscow. If Trump pushes for tougher sanctions on Russia in the coming months, Turkey’s ability to straddle the divide will face its sharpest test yet. For now, Erdogan hopes that Trump’s “America First” instincts will translate into leniency. But U.S. patience is wearing thin. The real question is whether Erdogan can continue to be both a NATO ally and one of Russia’s largest economic partners without forcing Trump’s hand.
The Israel Divide:
If Russia is the perennial headache, Israel is the emotional flashpoint. The United States is Israel’s closest ally; Turkey has become one of Israel’s most relentless critics. Erdogan has called Israel’s military campaign in Gaza “genocide,” halted trade, and recalled diplomats. Even more controversial in Washington is Erdogan’s stance on Hamas. Where Trump and Western allies see a terrorist organization, Erdogan insists Hamas is a “resistance movement.” Some members of Hamas’s political wing even operate openly from Turkey, prompting U.S. sanctions.
This clash strikes at core values: American counterterrorism policy versus Turkish claims of defending Palestinian rights. It is unlikely either side will compromise soon. But with Gaza dominating global headlines, the dispute risks overshadowing every other agenda item. Erdogan may frame himself as a regional moral voice, but to Washington, his Hamas outreach undermines counterterrorism efforts and complicates U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East.
Syria: Fragile Alignment:
For over a decade, Syria has been the most contentious issue in U.S.–Turkey relations. Yet in the past year, Ankara and Washington have found surprising alignment. Both back Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, after rebels ousted Bashar al-Assad. Both want to see the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integrated into the central state.
But the old fault lines remain. U.S. forces still operate alongside the SDF in northern Syria. For Turkey, the SDF is indistinguishable from the PKK, a group it considers an existential terrorist threat. Erdogan has repeatedly threatened incursions into northern Syria, raising the risk of Turkish troops clashing directly with U.S. partners, or even with U.S. forces themselves.
Trump may tout the new alignment as progress, but the Syrian file remains volatile. Unless Ankara and Washington find a way to reconcile their approaches to Kurdish forces, the risk of military confrontation between NATO allies will remain uncomfortably high.
Tariffs and the Lira:
Trump’s meeting with Erdogan also comes at a time when economic ties are cautiously improving. During his first term, Trump’s punitive tariffs on Turkish metals coincided with, and arguably exacerbated, Turkey’s worst economic crisis in decades. The lira has since lost nearly 90% of its value against the dollar, fueled not only by U.S. measures but also by Erdogan’s unorthodox monetary policies.
Now, Turkey benefits from relatively mild U.S. tariffs, just 15%, among the lowest levels Trump has imposed. Erdogan recently reciprocated by lifting tariffs on some American imports. Both leaders want to emphasize the positive economic agenda, particularly trade and potential investment. But beneath the surface, Turkey’s fragile economy and dependence on foreign capital make it vulnerable to even minor shifts in U.S. policy.
The Bigger Picture:
Trump and Erdogan will present their White House meeting as a step toward stability. But stability is not the same as resolution. The disputes that define U.S.–Turkey relations, from fighter jets and sanctions to Hamas and Kurdish forces, are structural. They stem from divergent interests, not misunderstandings.
The leaders’ personal rapport may help smooth some frictions in the short term. But the long-term trajectory is clear: as Turkey seeks to position itself as an independent regional power, its interests will repeatedly collide with Washington’s. Whether the alliance can absorb those collisions without rupture will define the U.S.–Turkey relationship in the years ahead.
with information from Reuters
