In recent years, France has suffered significant setbacks to its diplomatic standing and influence in a region where it once maintained a dominant and seemingly unshakable presence for decades. Yet today, France has no ambassadors in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, all of which have now formed their own alliance, the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES). In addition, recent events indicate minimal progress in diplomatic relations for the foreseeable future. This is not sustainable for France, a country that strives to remain a global power and therefore cannot afford to stay at odds with numerous African countries, especially in the context of a rapidly changing world order.
Ever since the military governments seized control of their countries, France has opted for the strong approach to exert pressure on those regimes with limited outcome. Nevertheless, France can strengthen its position through decisive leadership and by prioritizing a recalibration of its relationship with the AES, as well as responding to anti-French sentiment campaigns that impact its reputation in the region. It must consider the strategic importance of these relations instead of adopting a riskier “wait and see” outlook.
Certainly, France has demonstrated its ability to take bold actions in pursuit of both its immediate and long-term interests. Most recently, President Macron invited Syria’s current leader, Al Sharaa, who also leads an unelected government, on an official visit to France to discuss the Middle Eastern country’s transition process, which ultimately led to the lifting of the EU’s economic sanctions towards Syria. This move was not without its criticism, especially on the internal scene. The French government considered this decision as a measure to prevent Syria from returning to instability after more than a decade of conflict, which resulted in significant casualties and massive displacement. France may undertake comparable diplomatic initiatives to engage with the AES. This process may involve several stages, beginning with the assignment of ambassadors to restore formal relations between the capitals while they explore strategies to advance stability in the region. All parties have indeed a shared interest in containing and eliminating terror threats down the line. AES leaders have survived largely on the promise of restoring security to the population, while France does not want to see instability spread to its allies in the region (Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania…).
Another decisive action France should take is supporting the integration of AES and ECOWAS. As a founding member of the European Union, France has long been a driving force in European integration since the union’s beginnings, particularly on security and governance. Drawing on its expertise, France should support AES and ECOWAS in building and expanding military cooperation and joint operations to confront the threat of terrorism. Additionally, following more than ten years of engagement in the Sahel through Operation Barkhane, France does have experience in the region that the three governments should leverage. It would be essential for France to collaborate with its AES and ECOWAS counterparts on defining a strategy that implicates military measures and governance reforms. This new course of action could help improve France’s strained relation with the AES, a bloc now redefining its partnership with the former colonial power.
Furthermore, France should rethink its visa policies: returning to more open policies would extend a hand to AES and help counter the narrative that Paris maintains a hostile stance toward African countries. Facilitating greater student exchanges would help reset cooperation with AES by allowing more young African people to study in France and absorb its values. If it wants a long and stable relationship with the three Sahel states, France should engage with the next generation of future leaders to redefine this partnership.
Of course, France should not expect to make those gestures without any positive normalization signs from the AES. However, its current stance has not yet yielded positive outcomes, and its diplomacy must move away from resentment to propose a shift that will in fact position France as a leader on the African scene. Its recent pivotal actions with Madagascar, Rwanda, or Cameroon illustrate this point.
The coming years will be decisive for France’s involvement in Africa, especially in Francophone Africa, where ties will nevertheless remain because of historical connections and given its sizeable population of African descent residing in France. Current and future presidents must consider the opportunities of maintaining friendly and equal relations with the AES countries by contributing to their security efforts without necessarily assuming the lead and by engaging in policy dialogue with these countries without relying on inefficient diplomatic pressures. Alternatively, French leadership could decide, at his own expense, to observe from the sidelines as the three African countries pursue partnerships with more ambitious global powers. Ultimately, France’s future role in Africa will depend not only on its diplomatic agility but also on its ability to address pressing domestic concerns. A country divided at home cannot lead abroad with credibility. As it redefines its partnerships in the Sahel, France must also invest in rebuilding trust and stability within its own borders.
