The United States is currently facing one of the most sensitive junctures in its bilateral relationship with Iran over the past four decades. The path ahead may either lead to a continued cycle of hostility and distrust or open a window of opportunity for transformative engagement, de-escalation, and step-by-step cooperation. However, Washington’s current policies suggest that ideology continues to override geopolitical realism, a preference that not only undermines the logic of diplomacy but is also closing the already narrow window for resolving nuclear and regional issues with Tehran through diplomatic means. What remains is a prolonged state of hostility and maximum pressure with no significant or tangible results.
This ideological preference manifests in a contradictory mix of “maximum pressure” alongside “calls for negotiation.” This dual approach, previously pursued during Donald Trump’s first term, effectively destroys mutual trust and makes any real compromise extremely difficult. Even when the Biden administration showed greater openness toward reaching a deal with Tehran, the wall of mistrust remained too high to achieve a sustainable and lasting agreement. Yet, the experience of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) clearly demonstrated that when both sides operate under a framework of “sanctions relief in exchange for transparent and verifiable limitations,” a durable agreement is indeed possible. But now, with a return to coercive policies, increased sanctions, and even limited military actions, Tehran is being pushed more than ever toward adopting defensive and radical positions.
A clear example of this trend is the U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in June 2025, an event that carried a strong message: as Barbara Slavin noted, Washington sees Iran not as a potential partner for regional security but as an existential threat. This absolutist mindset, which only accepts the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program, leaves virtually no space for diplomacy. Meanwhile, the on-the-ground reality shows that after two decades of pressure and threats, Iran’s nuclear program is now deeply rooted as a deterrent and a pillar of its national security. Any effort that focuses solely on “total elimination” of this capability is bound to produce only one outcome: the failure of diplomacy and an acceleration toward confrontation.
A more realistic approach would involve the creation of a robust, multilayered, and reversible verification regime, one that addresses U.S. and allied concerns while remaining acceptable to Iran, as a country with the right to peaceful nuclear energy. Such a framework can not only prevent any possible diversion of Iran’s nuclear program but also enable gradual trust-building.
Now is the ideal moment to shift toward a multi-step approach that begins with resolving the nuclear issue, expands to mutual economic ties and investment, and ultimately leads to normalized diplomatic relations. While this sequence may seem ambitious, it is essential—not just to prevent military conflict but also as a tool to redefine the regional security architecture in a way that ensures long-term U.S. interests. The U.S. experience with Vietnam—transitioning from bloody conflict to robust economic and security cooperation—demonstrates that even deep-rooted hostilities can be transformed into strategic partnerships through political will and careful planning. Notably, given the personalized nature of Iran’s political system, the eventual death of the country’s Supreme Leader could pave the way for even greater openness to the West and could help consolidate a more synergistic U.S. strategy toward Iran.
Conversely, continuing or intensifying the policy of maximum pressure will have the opposite effect: weakening the position of engagement-friendly and pro-Western currents within Iran, and empowering factions that consider any deal with the U.S. as inherently doomed. Such a strategy practically restricts the Iranian government’s room to maneuver toward rapprochement with Washington, instead pushing decision-makers toward closer strategic ties with China and Russia—paths that directly conflict with America’s long-term regional interests. The more pressure increases without offering a diplomatic horizon, the more power shifts to hardline groups who portray Iran not as a civil state but as an Islamic revolutionary movement. These factions—who are already furious with the reformist-leaning Pezeshkian administration amid growing talks of U.S.-Iran negotiations—understand that a meaningful agreement with the U.S. could consign them to the dustbin of history.
Crucially, contrary to prevailing assumptions in some U.S. policy circles, maximum pressure has never produced sustained behavioral change from Iran. On the contrary, it has often intensified Tehran’s determination to enhance its deterrent capabilities and raised the cost of returning to the negotiating table. Moreover, in the current context—where Iran is increasingly anxious about repeated attacks on its territory—there is a greater willingness than before to enter talks that can ensure its national security. This moment represents a rare “strategic opportunity” that, if lost, may not return for years.
Washington must come to terms with the fact that Iran—regardless of its internal political system—is a firmly established regional power. Attempts to marginalize or eliminate it completely are not only impractical but also costly. Accepting this reality and designing a gradual pathway toward coexistence—starting with a nuclear agreement and expanding to economic and diplomatic engagement—could lay the foundation for a more stable Middle East that also serves U.S. interests. This path requires a paradigm shift in Washington: moving away from the ideological framework of “behavioral change or regime change” toward a realism rooted in managing differences and expanding areas of cooperation.
The choice facing the United States is clear: it can continue on the current path, clinging to the false hope that increased pressure will force Iran into submission—a strategy that has failed repeatedly and only deepened crises. Or it can seize the narrow window now available and, through a step-by-step approach, turn chronic hostility into conditional and managed cooperation. This second option is not a sign of weakness; rather, it marks a return to diplomacy as the primary tool of U.S. foreign policy—a tool that, if not employed now, may no longer be available tomorrow.
