After Taiwan’s Great Recall vote, the Financial Times explained to Western readers “Why Taiwanese fear China could take over from within.” This article’s misreading—or deliberate misreading—of Taiwan’s internal affairs is a common theme in Western media. For Taiwanese people, such framing deviates from actual public sentiment.
The Great Recall vote has not yet concluded. July 26 was merely the first round, targeting 24 opposition lawmakers and one opposition local leader. A second round is scheduled for August 23, targeting another seven opposition lawmakers. On the same day, the opposition also initiated a referendum to restart a nuclear power plant.
It is widely expected that the opposition will triumph in the second round as well, cementing the ruling party’s minority status in the legislature.
How should the West accurately interpret Taiwan’s public opinion regarding the ruling party’s recall vote and its outcome? The Financial Times adopted the perspective of the recall groups, either out of ignorance of Taiwan’s internal affairs or deliberately presenting a skewed narrative to Western readers.
What is the truth? Simply put, the notion of “China taking over Taiwan from within” is a consistent electoral strategy and governing theme of Taiwan’s ruling party.The recall group is a loose organization covertly funded by the ruling party to get rid of the embarrassment of having a small number of seats. The Taiwanese voters know this very well, and have rejected the ruling party’s intentions with their votes.
Moreover, neither of Taiwan’s two main opposition parties is pro-China; they are, relatively speaking, pro-U.S. parties, just more flexible on China-related issues compared to the ruling party. Taiwanese voters understand this, which is why they dismissed the recall groups’ political appeals.
More crucially, the ruling party and its supporters have gone too far in their anti-China stance, veering toward extremism and beginning to harass ordinary citizens, resulting in widespread resentment.
The current atmosphere in Taiwanese society resembles that of Ukraine under Viktor Yushchenko’s government from 2005 to 2010, which sought to sever ties with its “motherland” in language, culture, history, and policy, while taking bold steps toward the West, thereby raising Russia’s alarm.
Voters overwhelmingly rejected this attempt to seize legislative seats. Of the 24 recalled lawmakers, eight received more votes than in their original elections, and the recalled local leader also garnered more votes than during their election. This clearly shows the ruling party’s move lacked public support, and voters did not buy into the recall groups’ narrative—that pro-China parties are paralyzing Taiwanese politics or aiding China in sparking internal chaos as a pretext for takeover.
Admittedly, a retired Chinese diplomat has publicly expressed hopes for internal chaos in Taiwan to provide China with a legitimate excuse to take over, but this is an isolated case. Beijing does not entertain fantasies of a modern-day “Xi’an Incident” to shift the Taiwan Strait dynamics.
In 1936, Nationalist generals captured Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek, forcing him to resist Japanese aggression and end the civil war against the Communists. This event, known as the Xi’an Incident, was a critical starting point leading to Chiang’s eventual defeat by the Communists and retreat to Taiwan.
Taiwan has practiced Western-style democracy for over 25 years. Despite its flaws, the system’s greatest strength is preventing internal chaos. On the other hand, since Chiang Kai-shek relocated the government to Taiwan 75 years ago, his most significant institutional design was to prevent military coups, as his greatest personal failure was the Xi’an Incident.
Considering these internal factors, unless external interference occurs, Taiwan will not descend into chaos. Beijing’s real dilemma is whether a fully Nazified Taiwanese democracy or a scenario like South Korea’s former President Yoon Suk-yeol imposing martial law would constitute the conditions for a takeover of Taiwan.
In fact, one recall group leader publicly claimed that a successful recall would help President Lai Ching-te impose martial law. The same leader privately admitted to studying how the Nazis manipulated crowds to oppose communism, and after this was exposed, the leader issued a public apology. The German Institute Taipei also issued a condemnation following public questioning by Taiwanese voters.
Many Taiwanese voters do not believe this is an isolated incident, as Taiwan’s ruling party was the only political party worldwide to publicly support South Korea’s Yoon Suk-yeol when he declared martial law. This has fueled suspicions that President Lai has motives to impose martial law, especially since his current predicament mirrors Yoon’s—being in a legislative minority and struggling to advance policies.
For Beijing, while it welcomes widespread Taiwanese opposition to the pro-independence ruling party, it does not wish to see Taiwan’s politics veer toward extremism, leading to chaos or a return to martial law, which could force China to act and take over Taiwan.
Beijing is not in a rush to reclaim Taiwan. Xi Jinping believes that instigating a Taiwan Strait war is a trap set by the U.S., modeled on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, to exhaust China in a broader civil war.
Chiang Kai-shek and his son imposed martial law in Taiwan for 38 years to counter communism. Martial law centralized resources and controlled the populace to confront the main enemy. Of course, it also served external forces—primarily the U.S. and Japan—opposing China. In Taiwan’s case, martial law would force Beijing to accelerate addressing the Taiwan issue, diverting resources from resolving internal Chinese problems.
Thus, the recall’s outcome has undoubtedly relieved Beijing—not because “pro-China parties” won, but because the likelihood of chaos or martial law in Taiwan has significantly decreased. This buys China time to address internal issues and reduces a variable in the U.S.-China geopolitical game.
Contrary to many Western media narratives, China prefers to “temporarily maintain the status quo” on the Taiwan issue rather than take over or “invade” Taiwan. For Xi Jinping, the safest approach is a “gray zone” strategy—gradually asserting control over Taiwan’s surrounding waters militarily, preparing for potential conflict, while using soft policies to reduce the emotional aversion of Taiwanese people toward mainland China.
The U.S. welcomes a Taiwanese ruling party opposing China holding a legislative majority, as it reduces the cost of manipulating Taiwan. However, Washington would not publicly support the ruling party seizing a majority through near-coup tactics, as the risks are too high and could inadvertently benefit Beijing.
In essence, Taiwan’s two main opposition parties also follow pro-U.S. lines and would not obstruct America’s core agenda. The current situation remains generally favorable to Washington, which does not need to resort to extreme measures that could introduce uncertainties.
In reality, the Financial Times is well-informed about Taiwan’s internal affairs and unlikely to be unaware that “China’s takeover” is a false narrative. Thus, the article “Why Taiwanese fear China could take over from within” is more likely a sponsored PR campaign by Taiwan’s ruling party, a tactic not uncommon in similar cases.
Regardless, the failure of the ruling party’s recall effort does not indicate a pro-China shift in Taiwanese society but shows that extremism lacks a market in Taiwan. Maintaining the status quo is the mainstream public sentiment, which currently aligns with Beijing’s stance.
The U.S.’s real challenge lies in its tariff-oriented trade policies, which effectively “take over Taiwan’s wealth” and will significantly reduce Taiwanese goodwill and trust toward the U.S.—a development Beijing welcomes.
Beijing will diplomatically signal to Washington its intent to “maintain the Taiwan Strait status quo” while demonstrating its military capability to take over Taiwan through exercises and a grand military parade on September 3. It will not pin hopes on Taiwanese internal chaos.
As for the voice inside China that “encourages civil unrest in Taiwan in order to facilitate the takeover of Taiwan”, it is more likely to be a big internal propaganda activity tacitly endorsed by Beijing in order to lower the voice of the people in Mainland China in favor of the takeover of Taiwan by force.
Both China and the United States believe that the current “Deadlock” is the best scenario, while Lai Ching-te’s attempt to take risky moves to break the Deadlock could disrupt this balance, raising caution in both Beijing and Washington. This is the truth aligned with the status quo.
