China initiated the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2022, a comprehensive framework designed to strengthen cooperation and promote collaborative approaches to both bilateral and multilateral security with all states (Xu et al., 2024:65). Through the GSI, China pledges openness and inclusivity, particularly toward developing countries in the Global South, deeming their participation essential for the future of global peace and prosperity. The initiative rests on six core principles: 1) a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; 2) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; 3) adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; 4) serious attention to every country’s legitimate security concerns; 5) the peaceful resolution of differences and disputes through dialogue and consultation; and 6) the maintenance of security across both traditional and non-traditional domains (Sumadinata, 2023:3).
ASEAN has become one of the primary targets of this security initiative. Through the GSI, China seeks to integrate and reinforce ASEAN by accommodating the interests of all parties (Javid, 2022:11). Responses among ASEAN Member States have been markedly diverse: Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand have embraced the GSI as an opportunity to secure additional infrastructure investment and advance their development strategies, thereby deepening economic ties with Beijing, whereas the Philippines and Vietnam have voiced concerns that China’s ascendancy may exacerbate regional security risks (Yuliantoro, 2024:297). This divergence of responses indicates that the GSI operates as an external input, introducing a new layer of complexity into ASEAN’s security architecture. An organization that has traditionally navigated a multipolar environment now finds itself split between those who view the GSI as a catalyst for resource mobilization and those who perceive it as a strategic threat. Consequently, this study aims to critically examine how the GSI, as a novel external factor, shapes the evolving complexity of ASEAN security.
Regional Security Complex Theory
To address this question, the essay adopts Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), which emphasizes the high degree of security interdependence among geographically proximate states sharing similar threat perceptions, while external actors are treated as largely neutral influencers (Sukaedi & Yogaswara, 2024:106). RSCT identifies ASEAN as a regional security complex due to its distinctive internal dynamics anchored in the principle of non-intervention, and it highlights ASEAN’s longstanding multipolar engagement strategy with external powers. In this case study, I argue that the shifts in ASEAN’s security dynamics induced by the GSI stem from varying levels of securitization by individual member states across different sectors. These securitization processes have driven a transformation of ASEAN’s polarity from a multipolar framework to a bipolar one. Accordingly, this analysis employs the RSCT variables of securitization sector and polarity to examine how each ASEAN member state’s securitizing moves in response to the GSI have reshaped the region’s security polarity (Farzayee, 2023:166).
ASEAN States’ Securitization of the GSI
Military/Maritime Sector
The “Golden Dragon 2025” exercise, which formed one of the GSI agendas at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, brought in approximately 2,000 PLA troops, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and a newly constructed Chinese-built pier. This exercise was swiftly met with a response from the Philippines, which stated that the drills disrupted stability in the South China Sea. In his speech, the Philippine Secretary of Defense described the presence of China’s joint exercises at Ream Naval Base as a “serious disruption to regional stability” (Zhuo, 2025). This framing was followed by President Marcos Jr.’s decision to expand EDCA (the Philippines-U.S. defense cooperation) by opening four new bases for U.S. forces (Martina & Brunnstrom, 2024). Vietnam also engaged in securitization within the military sector by issuing a diplomatic protest note. On 3 May 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hanoi sent a formal note of protest to Beijing, arguing that China had infringed upon Vietnam’s sovereignty over the disputed reefs (Reuters, 2025). That public declaration functioned as a speech act, elevating the on-site activities to the level of an existential threat against Vietnam’s territorial integrity. By issuing this protest note, Vietnam aimed both at its domestic audience and the international community, thereby underscoring its role as an enforcer of maritime legal consistency rather than merely a balancer against China.
In contrast to the Philippine framing, Cambodia characterized the Golden Dragon exercise at Ream Naval Base as a humanitarian training facility. Prime Minister Hun Manet introduced it as an open-access humanitarian training center for all friendly navies. To bolster this narrative, Cambodia promptly invited a Japanese minesweeper to visit from 19-22 April 2025 and a Vietnamese patrol vessel on 27 April 2025, both of which docked at the southern pier, while two Chinese corvettes remained moored at the main northern pier (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2025).
Political Sector
As previously noted, the GSI emphasizes the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and respect for the UN Charter. This rhetoric has been immediately seized upon by actors most sensitive to human‑rights scrutiny in Southeast Asia. For instance, Myanmar’s military junta swiftly declared its support for the GSI, a move widely perceived as an attempt to invoke the initiative’s provisions to deflect criticism of the 2021 coup by arguing that any external sanctions or mediation would contravene the spirit of the GSI (Freeman et al., 2024:13). While, Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam interpret the principle of non-intervention as potentially constituting a new legal shield for authoritarian regimes, raising concerns that it could undermine ASEAN’s capacity to enforce the Five‑Point Consensus on resolving the Myanmar crisis post‑coup or be leveraged by China to block international censure of its actions in the South China Sea (Haenle & Thu, 2023).
Non-Traditional Security Sector
Policy-makers in Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos regard the practical benefits of the GSI, such as digital forensics training, firewall assistance, and cybersecurity scholarships, as a rapid means of aiding ASEAN states that lack the resources to address these non-traditional security challenges. Consequently, these countries have expressed their support for the GSI in its efforts to combat non-traditional security crimes in the region (Freeman et al., 2024:13). In contrast, Vietnam has voiced skepticism toward China’s cybersecurity assistance under the GSI, linking the technical aid to the implementation of China’s own data governance standards, including centralized surveillance and mandatory server localization, which could displace ASEAN’s norms of openness. Experts interviewed for this report emphasize that, if technological dependence extends into the defense domain, smaller states will find it increasingly difficult to disentangle domestic capacity issues from the geopolitics of the South China Sea. Moreover, such security dependence risks obscuring focus on Mandarin-speaking criminal networks trafficking online gambling, narcotics, and humans along the Mekong (Freeman et al., 2024:14).
Tendencies of Polarity Shifts within ASEAN’s Security Complexity
Based on the internal security dynamics of ASEAN described above, the author understands that each ASEAN state frames the GSI around different issues, resulting in asymmetric securitization processes. However, a clear pattern of securitization emerges due to the GSI: mainland ASEAN countries (except Vietnam), such as Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, tend to desecuritize the GSI dimension. These three countries view the training packages, cyber assistance, and other GSI projects in ASEAN as economic opportunities and guarantees of internal stability. Conversely, maritime states, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, securitize the GSI in the military-maritime sector. The Golden Dragon 2025 exercises at Ream are regarded by the Philippines and Vietnam as an escalation of threats in the South China Sea.
These internal security dynamics have the potential to move ASEAN’s polarity toward bipolar fragmentation, with mainland states pivoting toward China and maritime states aligning with Western partnerships or remaining neutral. This tendency may indicate that ASEAN is facing the risk of an overlay of great-power competition within its own security complex. RSCT explains that regional security complexity can experience overlay when a superpower rivalry is so dominant that it alters patterns of interaction within the region. The US-China rivalry now pushes some ASEAN countries into ever-closer affiliation with one of the two powers, eroding the neutrality that ASEAN has historically maintained. Efforts by member states to continue hedging become increasingly difficult as pressure to choose sides intensifies.
The penetration of the GSI into ASEAN, particularly in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, illustrates the nascent politics of domination by China, wrapped in the rhetoric of cooperation. The expansion of Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, financed by Beijing, added docks and berths exclusively for the PLA in the Gulf of Thailand. In Laos, the March 2025 GSI MoU included provisions for establishing a joint data center and expanded law-enforcement measures, as well as transferring Vientiane’s digital security “root key” to Beijing. Meanwhile, Thailand, through its online anti-fraud coordination center, adopted Chinese surveillance equipment. Collectively, these patterns show that the GSI deliberately creates conditional dependencies and security entanglements with ASEAN states by financing infrastructure and bilateral cooperation. However, if this pattern continues, ASEAN member-state autonomy will further diminish even as China’s capacity for intervention strengthens. Thus, the cooperative rhetoric of the GSI in fact constructs a new hierarchy within ASEAN that undermines the autonomy of its member states.
