As tensions escalate between Iran and its Western adversaries, the Iranian government is now considering one of the most consequential diplomatic withdrawals in contemporary arms control history: the potential abandonment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This decision, should it materialize, would not merely represent a legal realignment of Iran’s international obligations but would constitute a seismic strategic maneuver—disrupting the global nonproliferation architecture, reshaping diplomatic alliances, and accelerating the regional arms race in a Middle East already teetering under the weight of protracted conflict and fractured diplomacy.
Established in 1970, the NPT rests on three foundational pillars: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and promoting disarmament. Iran’s current commitment to the treaty has remained, at least in formal terms, one of the last remaining legal barriers preventing its open development of nuclear weapons. As of 2025, 191 states remain parties to the NPT, making it the most widely adopted arms control agreement in human history. However, should Iran exit, the symbolic and material damage to this institutional cornerstone may extend well beyond the region.
From a strategic standpoint, Iran’s withdrawal would signal a clear departure from what Jacques E.C. Hymans in Achieving Nuclear Ambitions (2017) characterizes as “nuclear latency”—the state of possessing technological capability without crossing the threshold. Until now, Iran has carefully danced on the periphery of weapons capability, maintaining plausible deniability while accumulating enriched uranium and advanced centrifuge design. Abandoning the NPT, however, would mark an irreversible step from latency to overt preparation, thereby dismantling the carefully curated ambiguity that has served as both shield and sword in Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy.
The political ramifications of this decision are likely to be equally profound. In Nuclear Politics (2017) by Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro, the authors argue that nuclear proliferation is inherently political—tied not only to the technological constraints of a state but also to its perception of existential threat and diplomatic isolation. With the recent U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, Tehran’s calculus has dramatically shifted. The strikes may have paradoxically accelerated the very outcome they purported to prevent, legitimizing within Iran a discourse of resistance that views nuclear armament not as an offensive ambition, but as a necessary deterrent in an anarchic international system.
On the diplomatic front, Iran’s departure would further erode the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization charged with verification and monitoring under the NPT. As explained in Maria Rost Rublee’s Nonproliferation Norms (2017), much of the success of nonproliferation hinges on normative adherence, not merely technical inspections. Should Iran expel inspectors and cease all cooperation with the IAEA—as is anticipated in the wake of withdrawal—other states disillusioned with Western double standards may reconsider the utility of remaining bound by a treaty perceived as discriminatory and selectively enforced.
The security implications are perhaps most destabilizing. Mark Fitzpatrick, a noted arms control expert, argues that such a move would remove Iran’s final legal constraints and free it to pursue weaponization openly. Already, Iran is believed to possess over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity, technically just short of the 90% required for a weapon. With the infrastructure for advanced enrichment in place and a cadre of nuclear scientists—despite the assassination of several key figures by Israeli operations—still intact, Fitzpatrick warns that Iran could feasibly complete a weapons program within a year. This timeline finds corroboration in Jeffrey Lewis’ The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States (2018), which, while fictionalized, illustrates how rapidly a state with the technical base and political will can escalate from enrichment to deployment.
Moreover, Iran’s exit from the NPT would not exist in isolation. The regional fallout, especially in terms of proliferation contagion, cannot be overstated. As noted in Shashank Joshi’s The Future of Nuclear Deterrence (2020), the exit of one state from the global arms control regime often triggers anxieties in others, particularly those with existing rivalries. Saudi Arabia has already pledged to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities should it proceed toward weaponization, and Egypt, long aggrieved by Israel’s undeclared arsenal and exemption from NPT scrutiny, may see an opportunity to challenge the status quo. The fragile balance of deterrence across the Middle East could thus collapse into a cascade of armament and instability.
The global normative order also stands at risk. If the U.S.—itself a founding signatory of the NPT—can target another signatory’s nuclear infrastructure without consequence, and if the IAEA proves unable to enforce compliance or prevent escalation, then the treaty’s legitimacy may begin to unravel. As articulated in Fiona Cunningham’s Nuclear Norms in East Asia (2021), international regimes rely not merely on legal instruments but on perceived fairness and reciprocity. The perception that the NPT regime disproportionately penalizes non-Western states while tolerating exceptions for allies—such as Israel or India—could hasten a broader exodus from the treaty.
Russia’s role as a potential counterbalance on the diplomatic chessboard must also be considered. While Moscow remains a signatory of the NPT and is unlikely to openly assist Iran in developing a nuclear weapon, its alignment with Tehran in international forums—especially at the United Nations Security Council—could serve as a strategic shield against renewed sanctions or enforcement actions. This maneuvering resembles the patterns described in Andrew Futter’s Hacking the Bomb (2018), which explores how nuclear power is now shaped as much by information warfare and diplomatic alliance as by kilotons and centrifuges.
Finally, there is the matter of strategic miscalculation. Should Iran proceed with weaponization and Israel respond with preemptive strikes—potentially supported again by U.S. tactical operations—the possibility of a full-scale regional war would no longer be hypothetical. As Caitlin Talmadge notes in The Dictator’s Army (2017), nuclear breakout scenarios often escalate not through deliberate choice, but through misinterpretation, miscommunication, and the psychology of brinkmanship. Each step away from treaty obligations narrows the window for de-escalation and expands the risk of unintended catastrophe.
In conclusion, Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the NPT represents not merely a response to recent attacks but a profound inflection point in international security architecture. The unraveling of treaty commitments, the weakening of normative frameworks, and the potential for cascading proliferation across the Middle East suggest that the cost of unilateral coercive diplomacy may be greater than the strategic benefits it purports to yield. The global community stands at a precipice, where the pursuit of short-term tactical gains may irreparably fracture the long-standing scaffolding of nuclear restraint.
