Behrooz Ayaz and Dr.Julian Spencer-Churchill
Israel’s June 13 attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and military leadership cannot on its own stop alleged nuclear weaponization should Tehran decide to build, assemble and test a warhead. Even with major resupply of parts and specialized ordinance from the U.S., Israel cannot achieve a high enough rate of destruction versus Tehran’s capacity for dispersal and reconstitution. Israel conducted a successful punitive bombardment of military and civilian targets as part of its War of Attrition against Egypt between 1967 and 1970, but the distances involved were far shorter. Israel was previously deterred from deploying its aerial tankers, necessary for bombardment of Iranian targets, because of Syrian surface to air missiles. Saudi neutrality, Iraqi weakness and Jordanian help, now makes the deployment of aerial tankers over Jordan and Syria safe. Israel’s 1981 bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osiraq was facilitated by having aerial tankers deployed over Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the U.S. is unlikely to be able to provide the number of costly interceptors for Israel’s Iron Dome beyond a month-long attritional exchange with Iran.
Israel’s likely strategy is to either provoke Iran to provoke a U.S. intervention, or to indirectly overthrow the regime. Israel likely does not expect a war to immediately overthrow the illiberal democratic theocracy in Tehran, given that Persian nationalism is quite strong even without state reinforcement. Iran is tempted to strike at U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf, primarily airfields and ports in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Emirates, the UAE, and Oman. Many of these facilities are shared with the Arab host, and Tehran is not likely to want to undo the ceasefire with Saudi Arabia that was mediated by China. So Tehran is mostly likely to strike at U.S. bases in Qatar, which is the largest in the region, and Iraq, which Tehran may hope would mobilize anti-American sentiment in Iraq. The U.S. Persian Gulf bases are quite close to Iran and would therefore be exposed to significant damage for several weeks before the U.S. would be able to begin retaliatory operations against Iranian launchers and airbases. The U.S. is not likely to conduct a build-up in Iraq, which could lead to U.S. expulsion by the Baghdad government. Israel’s campaign planners hope that once the U.S. is enmeshed in an operation against Iran, it would require little political capital to add Iran’s nuclear facilities to its target list.
A second possibility is that Iran imposes a permeable blockade of the Straits of Hormuz, which would have a severe impact on the world economy. Here again, the Israelis have likely calculated that such an operation would compel the U.S. to intervene. Such an Iranian action would have four separate targets. First, Iran would likely entirely block uncooperative members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, in particular the UAE, Kuwait, and Iraq if it remains diplomatically aloof. Second, Iran would block tankers identified as shipping to the heavily-dependent Pacific Rim and, to a lesser extent, European importers of Persian Gulf oil, in order to apply pressure on them to restrain Washington. Iran knows that a combined European flotilla and marines would be unable to forcibly re-open the Straits of Hormuz. During the Cold War, when the risk of European NATO falling under Soviet control was a major power issue, this may have worked, but under the America-First foreign policy of the Donald Trump administration, this may not be viable.
The third target is important neutral states with some influence on the U.S., like India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Lastly, Iran would complicate shipments to China, in an effort to remind Beijing of their mutual interests in the region. Given Beijing’s traditional reluctance to engage in tight alliances, and the high priority the Politburo has placed on resuming exports to the U.S., it will not provide more support that voicing concerns at the United Nations. Russia and Iran have an equally transactional relationship, which will not likely provide arms given its own weapons manufacturing crisis.
An Iranian seizure of the Straits of Hormuz would be a provocation on the scale of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Israel likely hopes that a U.S. military move to open the straits to the Persian Gulf could escalates into a regime change project, similar to Iraq in 2003. The problem is that a combined U.S. air-sea-marine campaign to recapture the Straits of Hormuz, which is in narrow waters surrounded by rugged and mountainous littorals, would require a six-month buildup and be costly to execute. The U.S. would need to make major concessions to countries like Pakistan and Turkey, likely involving putting constraints on Israel. The U.S. actually lacks the resources necessary to conquer Iran, let alone secure the Baloch region of Iran surrounding the Straits. Dealing with sea mines, hidden coastal anti-ship missiles, and damaged and sunken ship hulks in the narrow waters, would be a complex problem.
If China and Russia equip Iran with substantial numbers of shore-based anti-ship missiles and an Iranian Corps formation is deployed to the region around Bandar Abbas, the U.S. may not even be able to conduct an opposed amphibious landing. The U.S. Marine Corps has not conducted a contested beach landing since before the 1950 Inchon landing during the Korean War. It was decided not to conduct a beach landing on the Kuwaiti coast during the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, and the Marines at sea were largely deployed to distract Iraqi shore defenses. A U.S. operation could quickly seize the Persian Gulf Islands of Abu Musa, Sirri, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, even Qeshm island. However, any large commitment of naval assets against Iran may weaken the deterring of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Consequently, both Iran and Israel depend on a diplomatic victory, with the isolated state having to concede and ceasing hostilities. Israel needs to tread carefully. Israel cannot bomb Iran without U.S. weapons and spare parts flying regularly into Nevatim Air Base. The Trump administration is strongly committed to backing Israel’s operations in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria, but is also sensitive to mid-term elections, which may burden his other policy initiatives. Although it defeated Egypt in the 1973 October War, the cost to the U.S. in resupplying Tel Aviv, led the U.S. to pressure both parties to negotiate territorial concessions which involved the U.S. permanently bankrolling the Egyptian military. Israel is largely shielded by the U.S. from the reactions of the rest of the world, such as by the economic consequences of the shutting down of the Suez Canal till 1975, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
A drawn-out disruption of Iran’s non-oil based economy and manufacturing will not be tolerated by its financially misgoverned electorate. So long as Russian President Vladimir Putin is benefitting from Trump’s reluctance to aid Ukraine, Russian spare parts to Iran’s air defense system will be withheld. Besides, Moscow would be the biggest winner from the jump in oil prices resulting from a disrupted supply. Iran may also find that Beijing may draw closer to Washington, given China’s dependence on Saudi oil.
Both Iran and Israel are aware of these possible escalatory paths, as well as the high stakes involved in provoking the U.S. While even a U.S. invasion of Iran is likely insufficient to trigger regime change, a U.S. occupation of Iranian territory at the Straits, even if it is a quagmire for Washington, can last for a decade or more, and would leave Tehran with a bombed out nuclear program. Israel would also likely retain its freedom of action. Given the shared awareness of the hazards of escalation, Israel and Iran are likely to engage in a war of attrition. Even if Israel is able to inflict five to ten times the amount of damage on Iran that it receives, the cost to the U.S. taxpayer for Israel’s Iron Dome defensive missiles and bombing ordinance will be an additional $5bn per year.
There is also a risk that Iran will eventually strike a vital Israeli target, like its energy facilities, airbases, or Dimona reactor complex. The problem for Tel Aviv then becomes one of how to achieve war termination since Israel will never be able to inflict the level of damage it was able to in order to compel Egypt to concede in the 1967-1970 War of Attrition. At that point Israel and Iran may simply end hostilities as they accumulate the ordinance for the next round of barrages.
