Authors: Prof. Bawa Singh and Jay Koche (Ph.D*
The Afghan Taliban has remained a key part of its Pakistan “strategic depth” doctrine at one point in time. However, in the post-US withdrawal of 2021, the strong relations have gotten worse due to some drivers and dynamics. The Taliban’s refusal to rein in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), attacks from Afghan sanctuaries, disputes over the Durand Line, and Afghan refugee expulsions have become some irritants. By May 2025, China mediated to iron out the irritants between Pakistan and the Taliban through reconciliation by a Beijing trilateral meeting, pushing anti-TTP and ETIM security pacts and CPEC expansion. China’s diplomacy seeks stability, though TTP ties and border disputes challenge progress. However, given vested national and regional interests, the mediation may appear fragile. The deep-rooted animosity and conflicting priorities of both countries make sustainable peace an unlikely outcome.
In August 2021, the Taliban swiftly overran Afghanistan by capturing Kabul by August 15. Exploiting the prevailing situation, such as government corruption, weakening security forces, and public discontent on account of various socio-economic challenges, the Taliban faced minimal resistance on the part of the incumbent government and the people. The Taliban established the Islamic Emirate by imposing the strict Sharia law and dissolving the republic’s democratic institutions. They consolidated the political power through the tribal alliances and ideological cohesion, despite global isolation and internal economic challenges.
Meanwhile, the Taliban, who have remained as a strategic tool of Pakistan’s strategic depth policy towards Afghanistan, turned hostile. For several decades, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) helped the Afghan Taliban by providing them safe havens to stay in and military training along with financial resources to fight against India’s presence in Afghanistan. The former PM, Imran Khan, has praised the Taliban’s takeover in 2021 by stating that they are “breaking the shackles of slavery.” Soon after the taking over of the regime, relations started getting worse day by day. Pakistan’s diplomatic breakdown and strategic divergences with the Taliban due to their non-cooperation in stopping the TTP. The TTP has killed more than 2,800 Pakistanis since 2021. It is reported that the TTP used to operate from the safe havens in Afghanistan along with several attacks and killings in Pakistan.
The year 2025 is marked by cautious return to normalcy. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Kabul and argued the Taliban not to interfere with each other’s affairs. He also advised working together for economic engagements in general and trade in particular. This engagement was further taken by a meeting in Beijing on May 21 with China and the Taliban on board. The three countries promised to move together to fight against terrorism in general and particularly the TTP and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
Why China is mediating becomes an important question to contextualize here. Notwithstanding mediating, China has n’t formally legitimized and recognized the Taliban government. This is limiting the depth of diplomatic engagement while it signals that its involvement is driven more by strategic interests than political endorsement.
This Chinese mediation in 2025 between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban is driven by strategic imperatives, particularly to safeguard the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investment. This project is being threatened by the TTP, which has killed 20 Chinese citizens since 2021. Concomitantly, China is also countering the ETIM in Xinjiang. Beijing also wants to control Afghanistan’s $1 trillion mineral reserves for its BRI’s expansion. In the Beijing Trilateral Meeting (May 21, 2025), the three countries pledged to combat the TTP and ETIM. Also, Pakistan is going to accept a Taliban envoy in Islamabad; it is a signal of the formalizing of ties. Pakistan will get relief from TTP terror activities. Although Pakistan takes China’s mediation as a potential lever to control the cross-border militancy, the Taliban’s strategic doubt about the TTP and Pakistan’s weakened influence may limit the effectiveness of such mediation efforts. Whereas on the other hand, the Taliban is in dire need of humanitarian aid amidst the sanctions. Although the Taliban would get economic incentives, at the same time, it remains apprehensive to rein in the TTP due to a lack of Taliban central authority, TTP ideological ties, organizational overlap, and defection to the Islamic State-Khorasan. This, China’s economic clout, makes this mediation a viable option for both countries.
Does the mediation resolve the bilateral issues/irritants? The first issue that would impact the mediation is the Taliban’s reluctance to accept the Durand Line. The disputed border is threatening Pakistan’s independence. This argument was further strengthened as the TTP and the Taliban have similar ideas due to working together against U.S. soldiers. This contentious point makes it unlikely for the Taliban to crack down on the TTP, given the apprehension that TTP fighters could join the Islamic State-Khorasan. On the other hand, Pakistan’s decision to send around one million Afghan refugees in 2024 further exacerbated the arch-enmity and made relations much worse. Moreover, the Taliban’s recent diplomatic maneuverings toward India may not be a signal of a strategic divergence from Pakistan, but rather they reflect a tactical maneuver to enhance its bargaining chip as a part of its broader balancing strategy amid shifting regional dynamics. These dynamics make the issues and bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan more complicated for Pakistan in the region.
At last, one can argue that these complicated issues, such as the TTP and border conflicts, if they are not dealt with diplomatic acumen, this reconciliation will remain shaky. This critical situation would lead to starting another cycle of betrayal and violence.
*Jay Koche (Ph.D. Research Scholar), Department of South and Central Asian Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda (India)