On May 13, 2025, in a surprise announcement during his first post-inauguration Gulf tour, President Donald Trump declared that he will be “ordering the cessation of sanctions against Syria in order to give them a chance at greatness.” The venue — the Saudi–U.S. Investment Forum in Riyadh — was as symbolic as the timing.
Framed by the signing of a $600 billion Saudi investment package, the move was not merely diplomatic theater. It reflected deep coordination with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had been pressing Washington to end Syria’s isolation in favor of economic reintegration and strategic recalibration.
For Trump, it was a transactional masterstroke — offering American firms access to a $400 billion reconstruction market, creating a pretext to pull out the last 900 U.S. troops, and undercutting Chinese and Russian influence in the Levant.
But while the announcement signaled a bold shift, it also ushered in a fraught and uncertain transition— one where entrenched corruption, unresolved sanctions layers, and fragmented security institutions could just as easily unravel the promise of reintegration.
Gulf-Backed Realignment: The Path to the Pivot
Trump’s reversal on Syria was not made in a vacuum. It aligned with a growing regional consensus, particularly among America’s Gulf allies. All six Gulf states see themselves as key stakeholders in Syria’s future, united in their call to lift U.S. and European sanctions that have crippled the country’s economy and blocked vital foreign investment. Preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and restoring stability remain central to their vision, driven by concerns over power vacuums that could be exploited by extremist groups like the Islamic State. For Gulf leaders, reintegration and reconstruction are not just strategic priorities — they are regional imperatives.
Trump embraced the moment. His administration, already attuned to economic opportunities and weary of protracted military engagements, saw strategic dividends on multiple fronts: a boost for U.S. energy and construction firms, the revival of dollar-clearing and access to frozen assets, and a potential exit from an unpopular war zone—all while preempting deeper entrenchment by adversaries. The decision also fit neatly into Trump’s broader foreign policy doctrine of disrupting multilateral norms, rewriting the rules of engagement, and delivering headline wins.
European calls for a policy shift further reinforced the move. In February, the European Council announced it would lift sectoral sanctions on Syria’s energy and transport sectors, delist four Syrian banks, and ease restrictions on the Syrian central bank. The United Kingdom followed suit weeks later, lifting sanctions on the central bank and 23 other entities. Earlier this month, French President Emmanuel Macron urged Washington to do the same after hosting Syrian President al-Sharaa on his first visit to Europe.
Turkey had laid the groundwork for months. In December, Ankara called for sanctions to be lifted “as soon as possible,” a message it amplified in March when urging the EU to end restrictions ahead of a Brussels aid conference. Erdoğan reiterated this position during his April meeting with al-Sharaa, emphasizing the need to revive commercial ties and pledging continued diplomatic efforts to end Syria’s isolation.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, praising the announcement as one that “opens a new page toward growth and prosperity,” underscored how Washington’s pivot reflected the convergence of Gulf, Turkish, and now European priorities.
Winners, Risks, and Regional Recalibrations
Traveling to Qatar on Air Force One, Trump shared with reporters his impression of al-Sharaa, referring to him as a “young, attractive guy. Tough guy. Strong past. Very strong past. Fighter … He’s got a real shot at holding it together.”
For Damascus, the lifting of sanctions represented a lifeline. The new technocratic government under al-Sharaa inherited a shattered economy and currency; the promise of access to hundreds of millions of dollars in frozen assets, combined with Gulf pledges of infrastructure aid, offers a rare chance to stabilize the pound, restore public services, and rebuild legitimacy.
Yet these benefits come with strings. International donors will demand procurement transparency, anti-corruption safeguards, and sectoral reforms — from central bank modernization to digitalizing state finance. Without strict oversight, funds risk being siphoned by elites rather than reaching displaced populations or shattered communities. IMF involvement, if it materializes, will bring fiscal discipline but also difficult trade-offs.
For regional powers, the calculus is equally layered. The Gulf states have seized the opening to shape Syria’s economic rebirth, aligning it with their Vision 2030 agendas. Turkey views the shift as critical to refugee returns and cross-border trade. Erdoğan has proposed joint ventures in Idlib and the revival of the M4 highway linking Raqqa to Turkish territory — plans that now hinge on regulatory clarity and stable governance in Syria.
The historic disbanding and ending of the PKK insurgency indirectly bolsters Turkey’s support for lifting sanctions by removing a major security threat and weakening Kurdish militias in Syria, which Ankara views as terrorist proxies. This security improvement enables Turkey to engage more constructively with Damascus and align with Gulf states and the U.S. in supporting Syria’s reintegration.
Israel, meanwhile, has responded with caution, fearing that new capital inflows could embolden jihadist factions or Iranian proxies along its northern border. In response, it has pressed Washington to retain carve-outs for counter-terrorism and ramped up intelligence cooperation with Jordan to monitor reconstruction zones.
The biggest strategic losers, at least initially, are Moscow and Beijing. Russia’s privileged access to Syria — cemented during the war — faces erosion. Although it retains military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim, Russia now competes with Western and Gulf-backed consortia for reconstruction contracts. China, for its part, must recalibrate. Having quietly maintained Belt and Road corridors and humanitarian projects in Syria, Beijing had perhaps anticipated a vacuum it could fill. Instead, it faces a reopened market shaped by stricter Western compliance rules and competitive bids from Arab-funded ventures.
Obstacles to Reintegration: Corruption, Compliance, and Fragile Security
If the May 13 announcement marked a new beginning for Syria’s international reintegration, it also underscored the immense obstacles ahead. For one, U.S. sanctions were only part of the web; EU and UN restrictions remain in place, each with separate delisting mechanisms. Caesar Act prohibitions on dual-use goods and the continued terrorism designations for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham further complicate matters. Despite recent easing of some sanctions and limited delisting of Syrian banks, many financial institutions remain cautious and reluctant to engage with Syrian banks due to compliance risks, US sanctions, and Syria’s gray-listing by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
More troubling is the domestic terrain. Syria ranks among the most corrupt nations in the world, and without enforceable procurement standards or civil society oversight, reconstruction funds could be captured by the same war-era networks that devastated the country. International aid risks being misappropriated unless conditioned on stringent audit mechanisms, judicial reforms, and performance-based disbursements.
Security, too, is fragile. Al-Sharaa’s coalition must disarm militias, absorb former insurgents into a coherent national army, and impose central authority in a landscape still fractured by war. Without credible security sector reform, local flare-ups could stall investment, derail refugee returns, and reopen old fault lines. Compounding this is political uncertainty in Washington. Trump’s decision, hailed by some as pragmatic, is decried by others as appeasement. A future administration could reverse course, reinstating sanctions and unraveling hard-won progress.
Conclusion: A Precarious First Step, Not a Final Act
President Trump’s Riyadh declaration may go down as a turning point in Syria’s post-war recovery, but it is no silver bullet. The lifting of U.S. sanctions realigns Washington with Gulf and Turkish interests, opens new doors for American business, and signals a recalibrated approach to Syria’s strategic significance. It also offers Syria’s new leadership the chance to stabilize a devastated economy and pursue reconstruction on credible terms. Yet success is far from guaranteed.
Endemic corruption, legal ambiguity, overlapping sanctions regimes, and fragile institutions could choke off momentum before it takes root. The path ahead demands more than symbolic diplomacy. It will require sustained coordination among donors, clear conditionality tied to reform benchmarks, and unwavering political will — both in Washington and Damascus. For all its surprise, the May 13 announcement is less a culmination than the opening move in what may prove to be the most complex phase of Syria’s modern reconstruction.
