Kashmir has long been one of the most disputed regions in the world, constantly at the center of tensions between India and Pakistan. For more than 70 years, this conflict has led to three full-scale wars between the two nations and numerous skirmishes. Kashmir remains heavily militarized, with over half a million Indian troops stationed there and numerous militias and terrorist groups operating within the region. Despite the heavy military presence, the violence continues to affect the local population, with civilians often caught in the crossfire of these prolonged conflicts. This region is central to a triangular geopolitical struggle where countries’ interests intersect. Hence, in this article, I will explore the historical context of the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, then delve into the consequences of the Pahalgam attack in 2025.
The conflict over Kashmir can be traced back to the partition of British India in 1947. The partition led to the creation of two independent states, India and Pakistan. Since the division was made hastily, with little regard for the ethnic and religious composition of various regions. The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, located in the northwestern part of India, was one of the few states that remained independent. Despite having a Muslim-majority population, the region was ruled by a Hindu monarch, Maharaja Hari Singh. When violence broke out in Kashmir in 1947 and Pakistani tribesmen invaded, the Maharaja sought India’s help. In return, India demanded that Kashmir accede to its territory, which led to the first war between India and Pakistan over the region.
A ceasefire brokered by the United Nations in 1949 resulted in the establishment of the Line of Control (LoC), dividing the region into two parts: one controlled by India and the other by Pakistan. However, the question of Kashmir’s rightful allegiance remained unsolved, and both continued to claim the entire region as their own. In 1965, the second India-Pakistan war broke out after skirmishes along the LoC. The conflict ended in a stalemate, with both sides agreeing to a ceasefire. The third major war occurred in 1971, not over Kashmir but over East Pakistan, now referred to as Bangladesh, where India supported the independence movement. The ongoing occupation of Kashmir by both India and Pakistan resulted in significant militarization of the region. By the late 1980s, Kashmir saw an uprising for independence, with many Kashmiris protesting against the occupation by India. The Indian government responded with military crackdowns, hence leading to death and further fueling anti-India sentiment.
The Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, marked an escalation in the already delicate state of India-Pakistan relations. The incident, which tragically resulted in the deaths of 25 Indian nationals and one Nepali citizen, was attributed by Indian authorities to the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), an organization alleged to have longstanding links with elements in Pakistan. India formally accused Pakistan of complicity in the attack, suggesting that such an operation may not have occurred without state support. In response, Pakistan strongly denied involvement and called for an impartial, international investigation to ascertain the facts surrounding the incident. In the wake of the attack, India launched a series of military operations targeting suspected militant hideouts in Jammu and Kashmir.
Furthermore, India suspended its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty. It is a landmark agreement governing the equitable sharing of river resources between the two nations. This move was perceived as a significant departure from established diplomatic protocols. Then, diplomatic relations deteriorated swiftly. Both countries engaged in reciprocal actions, including the expulsion of diplomatic personnel and the temporary closure of border crossings. India also revoked all visas issued to Pakistani nationals under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) framework, further straining regional engagement. As tensions mounted, there were serious concerns about the possibility of a broader military confrontation, especially considering that both India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed nations.
Both India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed states, and the potential for a nuclear conflict between them remains one of the most pressing security concerns in South Asia. This risk was significantly heightened following their respective nuclear tests in 1998, which transformed the longstanding Kashmir dispute from a regional territorial issue into a potential flashpoint for nuclear war. Notably, India has been pursuing increased integration into global nuclear governance structures. It became a Missile Technology Control Regime member in 2016 and is actively seeking membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). However, it has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India has never officially revealed the size of its nuclear stockpile. Historically, India’s nuclear posture has centered on deterring Pakistan. However, there is growing evidence that India’s strategic calculations are beginning to incorporate China as a primary factor. As a result, its force requirements are likely to expand in order to ensure credible retaliation capabilities against both adversaries.
This strategic shift may also alter India’s deterrence logic vis-à-vis Pakistan. Specifically, the demands of a credible second-strike capability against China could afford India the flexibility to adopt more assertive postures, potentially including consideration of a first-strike option against Pakistan under extreme circumstances. Although India officially upholds a No First Use (NFU) policy, statements made by Indian senior officials in August 2019 have raised questions about whether this policy remains immutable. India possesses a complete nuclear triad, which enables delivery of nuclear weapons via land-based missiles, aircraft, and sea-based platforms. Moreover, it is currently engaged in modernizing its nuclear forces, signaling its intent to maintain a robust and flexible deterrent posture.
In contrast, Pakistan became the seventh country to officially join the ranks of nuclear-armed states. The yield of its current nuclear arsenal is similarly uncertain, though estimates generally range from 5 to 12 kilotons for most weapons, with some longer-range ballistic missiles potentially reaching 40 kilotons. Unlike India, Pakistan has not declared a formal nuclear doctrine. However, it appears to adhere to a policy of “minimum credible deterrence,” aimed at countering India’s nuclear capabilities and its superior conventional forces. Pakistan has also adopted a No First Use posture, though this is explicitly limited to non-nuclear weapon states, leaving ambiguity in the context of India. As of recent assessments, Pakistan is believed to possess approximately 160 nuclear warheads, giving it the sixth-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. This number could rise significantly, potentially placing Pakistan as the fifth-largest nuclear power by 2025, with an estimated 220 to 250 warheads.
This expansion reflects Pakistan’s ongoing efforts to enhance the survivability and reach of its nuclear deterrent. Of particular importance is Pakistan’s progress toward establishing a sea-based nuclear capability. It successfully tested a nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) from submerged platforms in January 2017 and March 2018. Once fully operational aboard a submarine, this development would complete Pakistan’s nuclear triad and provide greater second-strike assurance. Pakistan relies on dual-capable platforms such as the F-16 fighter aircraft and select Mirage III and V jets in the air domain. The air component of its nuclear force is estimated to include approximately 36 warheads. Specifically, the F-16 A/B variant has about 24 launch-capable aircraft with a range of 1,600 kilometers, while the Mirage series contributes roughly 12 launchers with a more extended range of up to 2,100 kilometers.
The United States and China play crucial roles as the intrusive system in the conflict between India and Pakistan. The U.S. has historically supported India, especially in terms of military and diplomatic assistance, while Pakistan has traditionally had close ties with China. Both countries are wary of the other’s nuclear capabilities, and any escalation in Kashmir could involve these external powers, either through direct intervention or by providing military support to their respective allies. Given this discussion, there is a clear need to strengthen direct lines of communication between India and Pakistan, particularly through institutionalized crisis mechanisms such as military hotlines and third-party-supported de-escalation efforts. These tools can play a crucial role in managing tensions and preventing misunderstandings during moments of heightened conflict.
It is also essential to safeguard key agreements such as the Indus Waters Treaty from being used as political leverage, ensuring that essential cooperation continues even during periods of diplomatic strain. Reviving Track II diplomacy could help rebuild trust and open space for more constructive engagement. In addition, involving neutral regional or international actors in confidence-building measures may provide a more balanced platform for dialogue. Establishing a multilateral investigative process for cross-border incidents could further help avoid rushed blame and allow time for verified assessments before either side takes retaliatory action. Finally, as both countries continue to evolve their nuclear strategies, integrating crisis management with a clear and transparent doctrine is essential to avoid misleading and reduce the risk of unintended escalation in an already volatile environment.
