On October 4th, 2023, during the 1st Meeting of AJMAF (ASEAN-Japan Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry) in Malaysia, Japan adopted MIDORI, a cooperation plan with ASEAN intended to create a productive and sustainable food system. The program—whose name meant “green” in Japanese—targeted zero carbon dioxide emissions in the AFF (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) sectors by 2050, along with a 50% reduction in chemical pesticides, 30% reduction in chemical fertilizers, and 25% increase in organic farming. MIDORI aimed for two main outputs: smart agriculture technologies (such as drones, weed control robots, and supply and demand forecasting with AI) and programs for human resource development, including training sessions and pilot projects. A scarcity of adequate start-up models, investments, patents, and registration applications in the agricultural sector provided an impetus for the launching of the program (Morrison, 2024). This concern, paired with Japan’s looming problem of an aging population, highlights the shortages in skilled human resources.
MIDORI is a significant step in human security efforts in SEA (Southeast Asia), considering the region’s high dependence on agriculture. In 2020, agriculture constituted around 11% of ASEAN’s GDP, with some countries, like Cambodia and Myanmar, relying on it for over 20% of their GDP (Sundram, 2023). MIDORI, then, aims to leverage cooperation, embrace digital agriculture, and push research and development activities towards agricultural sustainability and productivity. Yet, MIDORI’s ambition for bountiful dining tables remains crippled in some aspects: doubt pertains to whether it is truly what ASEAN needs.
Assessing Drawbacks in the MIDORI Cooperation Plan
It is undetermined whether MIDORI represents change in Japan’s foreign policy orientation on food security or whether it is simply a continuation of previous programs. Japan’s MAFF (2023) declares that MIDORI was formulated “to realize increases in both productivity and sustainability through innovation.” However, the same document also describes it as a continuation of the AIFS (ASEAN Integrated Food Security) Framework and SPA-FS (Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security), both formulated in 2009.
Being supported by the JAIF (Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund), a funding scheme released in 2006 that shares striking similarities with its predecessor, ODA (Official Development Assistance)—which was created to provide aid to developing countries—the implementation of MIDORI implies that Japan has not fully forsaken its former stance towards ASEAN. Previously, through efforts like the ODA, Japan’s relations with ASEAN have operated on a one-way street (Tan & Wihardja, 2024). Despite calling itself a “cooperation plan,” MIDORI’s projects are executed in only the partner country while receiving funding from Japan’s government or private companies. MIDORI may unknowingly exacerbate the “donor-recipient” mindset and impede the nurturing of a reciprocal Japan-ASEAN relationship.
Another blunder is the MAFF’s claim that MIDORI can assist ASEAN because of its similarities in weather and agricultural production conditions with Japan, quote, “high humidity and temperature, abundance of paddy fields, and small and medium-sized farmers.” MIDORI’s partiality to technological innovations also sidelines the importance of human resource development. Currently, 11 programs under MIDORI fall under the technology category, while only 6 of them fall under the human resource category, according to the 2023 MAFF document. Even out of 22 future programs mentioned in the document’s Second Annex, only 3 fall under the human resource development category. Calling MIDORI an “innovation” thus narrows down the meaning of the word to technological improvements alone, reflecting Japan’s bias as a highly industrialized nation.
There is a vast gap between ASEAN member states’ socio-economic development and access to technology. Ahmed and Krishnasamy (2013) discovered that SEA countries had a lower technological change index of 1.023 as compared to the overall Asian frontier, which scored 1.535. This inequality becomes evident when the differences between ASEAN member states’ food security policies are taken into account. For less industrialized economies like Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, food security policies have largely been restricted to technical support geared towards helping them cope with economic difficulties first, but for more advanced countries like Singapore, the focus lies on diversifying import sources and boosting agrifood technologies (Rahim, 2008; Thai, 2021). Digital literacy rates also differ vastly; 54.37% of Singapore’s population possessed basic digital literacy skills and critical thinking, while in the Philippines, for example, only 17.42% did (Sochan, 2025). Without proper digital skills, it is doubted whether MIDORI’s technology-based approaches are effective at all.
If there is no common ground regarding its objective, and human security is not placed as a priority issue, then is MIDORI truly what ASEAN needs? The GHI (Growth Hunger Index) scores in countries like Indonesia, Laos, and Myanmar actually fell significantly until 2016, when they started stagnating (GHI, 2024). Consequently, it can be inferred that SEA exhibits an overall low level of hunger, and perhaps the true problems are the massive disparities between ASEAN member states, low adaptability to sudden crises, and stagnation of progress in food security efforts. These all stem from one major problem: a lack of consolidated identity regarding food security (and human security on the larger scale).
Does Food Security Mean Anything to Japan and ASEAN at All?
FAO details that food security means access to safe and nutritious food for normal development. On the other hand, WHO declares three main requirements for food security: availability and sufficiency, accessibility, and good use (knowledge of basic nutrition). The debatable definition of food security leads to an inconsistency in policies, especially in ASEAN, where there is no single pattern on the production of foodstuffs, especially rice as a staple. The region comprises rice exporters (Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia) but also importers (Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines), and at the same time, countries that constantly switch between being both, such as Indonesia (Freedman, 2013).
Without a regional “hegemon,” ASEAN requires strong leadership in its food security regime. ASEAN may benefit from external assistance because membership expansion may be too costly and will only exacerbate disparities between its original members (Jürgen, 2000). Japan is considered the perfect partner in the Indo-Pacific for this: the U.S.A. may be powerful, but it is not even part of APT (ASEAN Plus Three), while China and South Korea, despite being closer in proximity and being members of APT, have shown no initiatives on food security leadership. Japan’s sense of leadership was demonstrated through the EAERR (East Asian Emergency Rice Reserve), a 3-year pilot project established in 2004, in which it was the sole investor, expending $4.5 million. It is argued that without Japan, ASEAN would be much weaker in food security because EAERR laid the groundwork for APT’s Emergency Rice Reserve (Sundram, 2023).
Nevertheless, Japan may not truly consider food security a pressing issue. Japan’s human security diplomacy towards ASEAN brims with self-interest factors, namely the urge to appear pacifist in alignment with the Fukuda Doctrine in order to be more well-received (Er, 2006; Soeya, 2005). Initially, Japan’s definition of human security, as stated by PM Obuchi in the APT Meeting in December 1998, encompassed mainly economic security issues like poverty eradication. This mindset became prominent because the meeting took place after the 1998 financial crisis showcased the negative effects of economic globalization. As a result, Japan’s stance on human security emphasized one-way developmental aid and not issues like food security, which were deemed non-competitive and unprofitable for business groups (Soeya, 2005).
Similar to Japan, ASEAN may not consider food security an urgent issue either. The Political-Security Community’s agenda, despite addressing cybercrime, people smuggling and trafficking in persons, terrorism, and money laundering as significant nontraditional security issues, does not jot food security down on the list (ASEAN, 2024). Similarly, in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, the food security agenda is only subsumed under the general umbrella of rural development and poverty eradication in alignment with SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) numbers 2 (Zero Hunger) and 3 (Good Health and Well-being) and not treated as a separate issue requiring special care (ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, 2024). Likewise, food security is not mentioned in the six main priority areas of the ASEAN SOMRDPE (Senior Officials Meeting on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication).
Rethinking ASEAN Identity in the Food Security Context
An over-emphasis on “smart agriculture” and an absence of distinct innovation in comparison to previous programs reveal a general lack of common understanding about the very nature of food security and human security, either in Japan or ASEAN. Therefore, before digital technologies are implemented, a consolidated understanding of ASEAN identity is required so that food security partnerships allow Japan and ASEAN to “think regionally and act locally.”
The lack of a common ground between Japan and ASEAN regarding the nature of food security can be solved by tracing back to the constructivist notion of ASEAN identity. Food security should rely not only on high-tech devices but also on a sense of awareness and collective agreement on the significance of food security. Hence, the first step towards a more reciprocal Japan-ASEAN food security partnership is theoretical: a critical study of human security, mixing material and ideational factors. Reflecting on the lack of consensus regarding MIDORI, Japan-ASEAN partnerships need to rethink the notions, priorities, and approaches about human security itself. The reason for this is that even though it requires specific and locally tailored approaches, food security should be seen as part of a larger human welfare issue.
Identity-building efforts in this context may be a subject of debate because it involves Japan, an “outsider.” Yet, identities, being dynamic concepts, can be formed and renewed as responses to external actors. By placing other actors beside ASEAN, common goals and fears between its member states may become more apparent. In other words, the presence of an “Other” strengthens the “we feeling.” Involving Japan in discussions about food security as an equal dialogue partner and supporter of flagship programs, as well as increasing the frequency of Japan-ASEAN forums, may make it clearer for ASEAN member states what they want and do not want from Japan. Japan’s previous similar experiences—such as its decision to release its WTO rice stocks to thwart global rice prices after the 2008 financial crisis—may provide guidance on how to develop ASEAN policies. In relation to this, more grassroots communities should be involved. This is especially true in the human security context because human welfare issues are typically treated as domestic issues that require no external intervention. An example of this is the JCIE (Japanese Center for Intellectual Exchange), a dialogue involving NGOs, academics, journalists, politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders.
Since social, economic, and cultural contexts are different across countries, human security policies must emphasize local realities (Neack, 2017). This is so that a “new” regionalism based on meaningful engagement and cultural relativism may be fulfilled. The truth is that ASEAN is so culturally and politically diverse; in foreign policy contexts, each member state has its own principle: Indonesia with its “bebas-aktif” and Vietnam with its “cooperation and struggl”e, while some states like Thailand are “bamboos in the win”d, relying on adaptability with no fixed stance at all. It is necessary for ASEAN to hold a forum to unite these thoughts, “pool sovereignty,” adapt them to the Japan-ASEAN partnership context, and later localize them once more. In the food security context, this means adjusting the general stance based on each country’s climate, soil conditions, humidity, and other factors. By upholding common denominators while also appreciating local contexts, ASEAN member states can empower even more people because of a strong sense of who they are and where they are going. The socialized identity is then institutionalized once more through a renewed MIDORI framework. Through this effort, ASEAN will become a true community that operates bottom-up, not top-down, shedding its elite-driven agenda and involving identity amongst people and not just states (Acharya, 2017).
