Donald Trump and the EU have been at odds over Ukraine. The EU and Biden administration failed to greenlight the NATO membership action plan and the kind of military support and strategy over targeting Russian assets. There is no concrete EU initiative to end the war that considers the reality on the ground and the need for diplomacy. The EU seems unable to be part of the peace process negotiated. Moreover, Zelenskij’s peace plan never drew a real response from the West while Moscow and Kiev are entrenched in their positions.
While the EU did not match statements with the amount of military support, the US now appears to drop some of the so-called ‘red lines’ and acknowledge the ‘land for peace’ prospect, a formula even President Zelenskij suggested initially. The allies seem to be unsure of what security guarantees to push for. The prospect crucially requires European readiness so far lacking and the war parties’ assent.
The allies should push for a realistic accord by opening communication channels with Moscow, engaging in diplomacy and, upon bona fide and objective assessments, removing some sanctions in exchange for acknowledging Ukraine’s security and inviolability by the accord.
Strategic Ambiguity?
Russia occupies roughly 20% of Ukrainian territory. Given the human losses and critical stockpile depletion, Ukraine cannot sustain a prolonged conflict. Without a European army, a common nuclear arsenal, and divisions and sensibilities, the EU cannot hope to replace the US’ apparent absence of boots on the ground and military support. The Europeans should open diplomatic channels with Moscow and offer to discuss the ‘land for peace’ formula and the gradual removal of some sanctions in exchange for accepting security guarantees. The US pause to intelligence sharing and military aid at the beginning of tentative talks could show Moscow that any future security guarantee is not against it and an incentive for Kiev to genuine peace initiatives.
Beyond Rhetoric
The EU strategy has been linked with the Biden administration’s approach. Both have de facto endorsed the aggressor’s red lines by not enforcing a no-fly zone or part of it, in the first place, and by delaying military support that helped Russia strengthen trenches across the contact line, by demanding Kiev refrain from targeting Russian assets and territory, and by never daring to open at least the NATO membership action plan or shorten the accession. The Europeans have previously timidly suggested what President Trump is negotiating now and portrayed him through the usual cliche of the Russian puppet while ignoring the 2019 US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty following Russian non-compliance, sanctions on Russian ‘Fortuna’ under ‘CAATSA’, and the overall record comprising 52 counteractions against Russia’s Foreign Policy. The Biden administration and Germany have been the chief procrastinators that prolonged the war. The result led to a stalemate that forced Trump to acknowledge Vladimir Putin’s territorial conquests to the detriment of Ukrainian territorial integrity. The mineral deal between Ukraine and the US is, thus, an incentive for tight cooperation and a first security guarantee leading to others and being complemented by the EU.
‘Finlandization’ Of Ukraine?
The allies could propose to Russia the example of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO). serving as a springboard for more collaboration systems among neighbouring partners under the supervision of Western powers and Russia. The lack of legally binding provisions constitutes a risk that should be, at least, mitigated by a collection of power guarantors and an accord with Russia that the EU is adamant to exclude. However, the US and the EU should demand that Russia sign a document recognising Kiev’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (including the partially controlled southern regions of Zaporizhzhia and Kerson) in exchange, at this point, for the Donbas and Crimea and the Ukrainian withdrawal from Kursk. The allies should propose to Kiev a formal agreement where, in case of Russian aggression, ad hoc military support will be provided such as Trump’s Javelin and a new wave of sanctions in case it refuses to cooperate as suggested by Trump himself. Defence cooperation, homegrown military capacity and exercises and drills should be included as a permanent deterrence method and supervised by the guarantors and Russia. Defence initiatives among neighbours should become a norm.
A UNIFIL-Like Scenario?
The allies could demand that Russia and Ukraine formally agree to a solution similar to UNIFIL charged with ensuring security and compliance on a sort of Blue Line. However, even UNIFIL is, by its Rules of Engagement, not tasked with any tangible military support other than mere deterrence. As seen in the case of Israel and Hezbollah, the lack of compliance with the disposition demanding the disbanding of terrorist groups is a limit to its efficacy in terms of ensuring security along the Blue Line. Therefore, a hypothetical Blue Line demarcating the free and the occupied territories would not be immune to clashes and escalation without a concrete ‘land for peace’ political treaty by the two foes. In the hypothetical assent of Russia to it, the latter should agree to a formal peace accord with Kiev not to use its UNSC permanent seat to block or alter the mission mandate and scope. However, even Kiev should be compelled to refrain from provocations. Moreover, support for the Ukrainian army should not decrease or stop to ensure deterrence while agreeing with a two-end monitoring format involving the allies and Russia.
Conclusions
Whether Russia and Ukraine could later reach a kind of Good Friday Agreement, the allies should prompt Russia to first withdraw from the partly occupied Kherson and Zaporozhye much like the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. Ruling out NATO membership is a blow to Kiev, thus the allies should agree on diplomacy, a supported format and start reconstruction, leading implicitly to a security guarantee, along with helping advance the European path. This also requires President Zelensky’s realistic approach to US-Ukrainian relations fostering security, payback similar to EU loans, instead of the ideological posture, and considering leaving the office by appointing an interim president before possible fresh elections.
