According to an exclusive report by The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), the leaders of China and the United States are considering a “birthday summit” in June. WSJ noted that the birthdays of the two leaders are just one day apart, though neither Beijing nor Washington has officially commented on the matter.
Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to hold a summit with Chinese leadership, but Beijing has yet to provide a clear response. This hesitation is directly tied to “trust.” During Trump’s first term, Xi Jinping had an unpleasant experience, and China views Trump’s unpredictable personality as a risk to the prestige of its leadership. Beijing is unwilling to meet again unless it can be assured that the U.S. won’t stab it in the back.
Furthermore, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent experience at the White House has made China particularly cautious about a leader’s visit to the U.S. For Beijing, the prospect of Xi being drawn into a public spat is unthinkable. Thus, even if the birthday summit is held as scheduled, it is more likely to be held in Beijing.
More critically, Xi has no interest in meeting Trump under the latter’s strategy of maximum pressure. Tariffs are a secondary obstacle; the real stumbling block is Taiwan. Earlier, the U.S. State Department removed the phrase “does not support Taiwan independence” from its website and lifted restrictions on security assistance to Taiwan. Without goodwill from the U.S. on the Taiwan issue, I am afraid there will be no “birthday summit.”
However, the Trump administration shows no sign of softening its stance on Taiwan—or, more precisely, Trump believes that projecting both toughness and friendliness simultaneously is the right approach, as it expands U.S. negotiating leverage.
On the other hand, considering the negative impact of tariffs on U.S. stock markets and the stalled Russia-Ukraine ceasefire talks, Trump faces thorny issues both domestically and internationally. By contrast, China has long prepared for a trade war, sustaining minimal damage while methodically countering the U.S. Beijing is in no rush to help Trump resolve problems of his own making.
Washington has used official channels and media to signal that “Trump isn’t eager to meet Xi,” aiming to avoid a weaker position in future negotiations. In terms of media maneuvering, whenever the source is an anonymous official or a so-called “person in the know,” it often means that Washington is building momentum for a political goal, as exemplified by this WSJ scoop, which is aimed at urging the Chinese side to sit down at the negotiating table sooner rather than later.
Another key indicator is Taiwan. Historically, when Taiwan’s leadership makes provocative statements or actions that irk China, it often suggests U.S. encouragement behind the scenes, enabling Washington to force Beijing into concessions on critical issues.
Beijing’s most glaring vulnerability remains its desire to avoid unrest across the Taiwan Strait. This is because until China is determined to take action to resolve the Taiwan issue, the intensification of the cross-strait issue will fuel nationalist sentiments within its ranks, which will not be conducive to Beijing’s efforts to advance its more important agenda.
On March 13, 2025—the eve of the 20th anniversary of China’s Anti-Secession Law—Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te broke months of low-key governance with a bold move: announcing 17 specific countermeasures against Chinese infiltration. For the first time, he designated China as a “foreign hostile force” and reinstated the military court system to harshly punish improper exchanges between the military, civil servants, and private groups with China.
Labeling “China” as a “foreign hostile force” contradicts Taiwan’s constitution, which regards both Taiwan and the mainland as parts of one China. Legally and historically, the correct target would be the “Chinese Communist Party,” but Lai’s move underscores a political ideology of Taiwan and China as separate nations—a surefire way to provoke Beijing.
Without Washington’s tacit approval, Taipei wouldn’t dare intentionally anger Beijing, as it wouldn’t align with U.S. interests.
Ironically, 12 years ago, it was the current ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and particularly current Defense Minister Koo, Li-Hsiung, that pushed to abolish the military court system. That effort stemmed from a violent incident within the military, where Koo, representing the victim as a lawyer, collaborated with the DPP to discredit the system. The case quickly became politicized, damaging the Ma Ying-jeou administration and paving the way for the DPP’s rise to power.
The DPP has contradicted its past stance, highlighting on one hand the current U.S. administration’s desire to strengthen Taiwan’s military capabilities, while on the other hand making it easier for the Trump administration to press Xi Jinping to come to the negotiating table. In other words, until Beijing agrees to hold a U.S.-China leaders’ summit, tensions in the Taiwan Strait will gradually escalate. This game is neither the first nor the last of its kind.
Beijing is well aware of Washington’s true intent in playing the “Taiwan card” but feels powerless to act decisively on Taiwan, effectively encouraging the U.S. to keep using it—a collateral cost Xi must endure.
Lai’s actions stunned Taiwan’s populace, resembling war preparations or a form of phased martial law, yet few Taiwanese connect this to the “birthday summit.”
Despite Taipei’s stone-throwing at Beijing, Xi didn’t seize the opportunity of the Anti-Secession Law’s 20th anniversary the next day to deliver a strong rebuttal. Instead, Beijing held a low-key symposium, with Xi absent. This suggests Beijing refuses to dance to Trump’s tune, though it also emboldens Lai to throw another stone with U.S. backing.
On March 14, a judicial search was conducted at the residence of the leader of the opposition party in Taiwan’s parliament, who was accused of assault in violation of the “anti-infiltration law.” This evokes parallels with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s use of martial law to suppress opposition or Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s alignment with the International Criminal Court to arrest predecessor Rodrigo Duterte. Lai, too, is weakening political rivals in his own way. And all three were among the most pro-American political leaders in East Asia, both strongholds of the First Island Chain, and all of them flaunted democracy.
Taiwan’s opposition parties are Beijing’s proxies to curb independence movements; though both major opposition groups distance themselves from China, the ruling DPP has long branded them pro-China. One opposition leader is already imprisoned, and the parliamentary leader of another may be next.
Lai is using the recall system to try to reverse the disadvantage of a minority in Congress; the Trump administration’s acquiescence in allowing Taiwan’s ruling party to infuriate Beijing helps Lai get rid of the dilemma of having a “double-minority president”—with” less than half of the presidential votes and a minority of the congressional seats.
So, what is the U.S.’s current “Taiwan policy”? Has Beijing discerned Trump’s bottom line and potential strategies? Is China forced to choose between the birthday summit and war?
The canary in the coal mine is Elbridge Colby, Trump’s nominee for Deputy Secretary of Defense, who offered answers on the “China-Taiwan” issue during his confirmation hearing.
Colby argued:
a) Washington has significant national security interests in Taiwan, but the island’s status isn’t an “existential interest” for the U.S.
b) Taiwan must raise military spending to 10% of GDP to make direct U.S. defense viable.
c) Most Americans have little interest in “fighting for Taiwan.”
d) The U.S. goal should be “denying China regional hegemony.”
Given Colby’s past advocacy for shifting from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” on defending Taiwan, Republican hawks at the hearing pressed him on whether he’d abandoned his hawkish stance.
The answer is yes, much like Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s realist pivot on Ukraine, Colby now embraces “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan; it shows the obvious “restraint” characteristics of Trump’s foreign policy: Any country that wants security protection from the U.S. will have to increase its military spending dramatically and to a point where it is financially unaffordable.
Taiwan’s annual budget is roughly 12% of GDP, making Colby’s 10% military spending demand unfeasible. By setting this as a prerequisite for U.S. defense, he effectively signals to Taipei that America won’t defend it.
Post-election, a “new abandonment of Taiwan” narrative has emerged within the Republican Party, asserting that “losing Taiwan would have limited impact on the U.S.” and that “denying China’s regional hegemony” doesn’t equate to “fighting to defend Taiwan”—a departure from the party’s hawkish norm. Colby is seen as a figure in the MAGA world who “clipped the wings” of the hawks in the Republican Party.
South Korean geopolitical observers have noted that U.S. handling of Taiwan is a canary in the coal mine for the Korean Peninsula; they worry that the existential interest of the U.S. in the Korean Peninsula is “China check” rather than “Korea defense.”
On March 13, 2025, Trump expressed intent to rebuild ties with Kim Jong Un.
Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that the bottom line of the U.S. on sensitive geopolitical issues is “peace,” the strategy is “negotiation,” and its tactic is “carrot and stick”—a pattern evident in Ukraine.
If Beijing grasps Trump’s strategic axis, it won’t overreact to the “Taiwan card” but will maintain “measured vigilance.” After all, both nations share similar bottom lines and strategies, though their tactics differ. In short, Xi won’t follow Trump’s rhythm but will “change lanes,” meeting the U.S. at the negotiating table on China’s terms.
China has a lot of options, but they are limited to “stance comparison”—e.g” ., legally branding “Taiwan independence” as terrorism domestically to unlock more military tools and undermine the legitimacy of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, without resorting to a blockade or small-scale conflict.
Alternatively, Beijing could refuse to bargain with Washington over Taiwan, using “quarantine-style” paramilitary actions to establish new navigation norms in the Taiwan Strait, reinforcing its sovereignty claims and leaving Washington with few hardline responses beyond negotiation.
Recently, Foreign Minister Wang Yi publicly confined Taiwan’s international status to the UN definition of “Taiwan Province of China”—a tougher stance than Beijing’s past rhetoric. This preempts potential U.S. attempts to revisit UN Resolution 2758.
The path to meeting Xi will be winding. Trump’s maximum pressure tactics may falter, but his tactical flexibility—via figures like Colby—preserves room for restrained diplomacy. Thus, the Taiwan Strait may heat up, but both sides will control the temperature, avoiding war to reach the negotiating table.
Realizing the “birthday summit” won’t be easy, but Trump could pressure Taiwan militarily or otherwise create an impression of U.S. disengagement, aligning with American interests while signaling goodwill to Beijing, nudging both toward talks.
For now, Taiwan isn’t a problem Sino-U.S. relations urgently need to resolve, but it’s the best fulcrum for building smooth communication. Hopefully, Trump is shrewd enough to find the shortest path to the table.
