With Donald J. Trump back in the White House, chips are being called over the future of U.S.-China ties. In his first term, Trump took a hardline stance towards Beijing, with tariffs, tech wars, and allegations of strategic opposition becoming recurring themes in rhetoric and policy. After winning a second term, Trump’s pattern of engagement and disengagement with China depends on a blend of pragmatism and ideological positions.
Trump’s likely emphasis on economic protectionism with China means that tariffs will be renewed. His plans to impose a sweeping 60% tariff on Chinese imports could have wide-reaching effects on global trade. While the 2018 first wave of tariffs was set to support U.S. manufacturing, that did little but relocate supply chains globally. U.S. consumers picked up the tab for higher costs by Chinese companies, which sidestepped their tariffs by moving operations to Vietnam and Malaysia, all while doing little to ramp up domestic production. While more tariffs could slow China’s growth by as much as 2.5%, such a reaction would also make for more inflationary pressure at home, damaging the voting bloc Trump claims to represent. However, this round of the trade war will not be the same as the first. When Trump implemented his tariffs in 2018, China’s economy was in a better place. Today, China is reeling from a prominent real estate crisis that has eroded its economic resilience. Trump’s return to the White House at this time presents Beijing with additional challenges: the compounded pressures are likely to hobble Beijing’s fragile economy further.
Simultaneously, Trump will also push the domestic manufacturing ‘Made in America’ initiatives to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains. Revising American industry aligns with his larger economic agenda, but putting it into practice will be extraordinarily challenging. However, past efforts to cut those ties have often left U.S. companies paying more, as the Chinese supply many industries with components and products that aren’t found elsewhere. Touted as part of a strategy to diminish China’s economic leverage, the reshuffling of supply chains during his first term often had goods traveling erratic routes through third countries but ending up on US soil. Chinese bicycle factories, for example, moved the last significant stages of manufacturing and assembly out of China and into Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia, and India, where bicycles were assembled with parts mainly from China and exported to the US, circumventing the 25 percent tariff on Chinese made goods. Although Trump’s rhetoric of self-reliance might resonate with his base, rebuilding robust domestic manufacturing will require investment, policy coordination, and time.
In the realm of technology, we may expect the decoupling from China to accelerate in Trump’s second term. He appeared likely to double down on restricting Chinese companies’ access to cutting-edge technologies like semiconductors and artificial intelligence. It is less ideological and more pragmatic, for this technological rivalry’s stakes dominate future global economies. However, the costs of untying the knots in this arena are high and extract a price because China’s innovation prowess and place in the worldwide supply chain make decoupling difficult.
This disengagement will also happen when China’s domestic policies diverge from U.S. values. Trump is set to keep a sanctions regime over human rights abuses in Xinjiang and further crackdown on Beijing’s tightening grip over Hong Kong. On the one hand, his position is symbolic, but it is also used to provide moral reasons for broader disengagement strategies. While they rarely have tangible fruit, these sanctions and public criticisms are also tools for signaling U.S. opposition to the authoritarian practice. It is unlikely that Trump’s approach will be one characterized by ideological integrity, but the existence of human rights as a rhetorical weapon with which to frame disengagement as an ethical venture will persist.
On the geopolitical front, tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea could escalate more under Trump’s administration. Many of his appointees are hawkish, and they are usually notorious opponents of communism, which can stem hostile rhetoric and militaristic intimidation. Yet, for all his bluster, Trump has a history of shunning war-making in favor of saber-rattling and negotiating. Therefore, Trump’s aversion to outright military escalation can be the expected behavior should tensions rise between the US and China.
Although the chances of cooperation between China and the US seem bleak under Trump’s administration, one cannot deny Trump’s fondness for strongman leadership. Trump’s past relationship with Xi Jinping adds an unpredictable layer to this bilateral relationship, as both leaders had mutual admiration until the pandemic tussle ruined the rapport. Therefore, it is not unwise to expect some possibility of cooperation with the US and China on issues of common interest, including global health issues or the stabilization of financial markets. Trump’s recent statement, “China and the United States can together solve all of the problems of the world if you think about it,” also signals that all hope is not lost as chances of selective engagement exist. Still, Trump’s policies on most scales tilt more towards disengagement.
China’s leadership, however, for the most part, could be undeterred by Trump’s return. Beijing’s volatile relationship with Washington has become school-tested after lessons from his first term. Trump’s transactional ways and isolationist tendencies open up opportunities for Beijing to increase its global influence even while his policies increase economic and strategic tensions. For instance, Trump’s expected withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will likely benefit China in narrative discourse as China is already establishing itself as a guardian for climate-affected states. Moreover, Trump’s America First policies and his historically skeptical view of U.S. alliances could prompt key partners such as Germany and South Korea to hedge their bets by redoubling connections to China. Meanwhile, Beijing’s mantra of ‘win-win cooperation’ has put it in a position to be a viable alternative for many nations who seek economic growth amid the U.S.’ unpredictability.
It could be argued that Trump’s ultimate strategy for China will likely be swinging between confrontation and selective engagement. He will play his cards to come out strong and go for the economic gains while trying to maintain his base. However, Beijing’s capacity to adapt to challenges over the years and its already in-place long-term plans will help it to emerge as a stable global counterweight to Washington despite Trump’s policies’ likelihood of hampering China’s drive. In this context, Trump’s legacy and, respectively, his presidency lie in his careful high-wire act of seeking both disengagement and engagement with China while trying to square domestic political imperatives with global realpolitik.