Authors: Adala Anvith Reddy, Huda Abdul Hameed*
On December 8th, 2024, the fall of Bashar Al Assad’s regime marked a watershed moment in the Syrian civil war. After over a decade of brutal conflict, international sanctions, and internal instability, Assad’s grip on power finally collapsed. The final blow came in the form of a well-coordinated offensive by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), swiftly seizing control of key cities, including Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs. The fall of Damascus, long the political and symbolic heart of Assad’s rule, shattered what remained of the regime’s authority.
Turkey is the most important supporter of HTS, geographically. It is near the Syrian rebel territory in the northwest; Erdogan’s government supports the 2011 Arab Spring uprising against Syrian President Bashar Al Assad’s regime. When needed, Turkey also backed various Islamist groups during the Civil War. The biggest rebel group, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), is the former offspring of Al Nusra Front, a rebel organization that fought the Islamic state (ISIS). It renamed itself and claimed that it does not support the more conservative and extreme position that ISIS and the various other Islamic groups held in the region. HTS also said that it has become more respectful of the minorities and has taken on some responsibility to safeguard the minorities and protect them from persecution.
While there are some signs showing that HTS gained Turkish help in the form of arms prior to the coup initiated to overthrow Assad’s government. Turkey’s main aim and most trusted ally among the rebel groups present in Syria is the Syrian National Army (SNA), a Turkish-supported rebel group. Since the defeat of ISIS in Syria the Turks are concerned with the new emergence of the Syrian Kurdish group in northern Syria led by the Syrian Democratic Force, the SDF through a series of organizational assets rooted in the Turkish Kurdish insurgency.
A major factor in this outcome was the slow but steady retreat of Iran, Assad’s most crucial international ally. Since 2005, Tehran had been the backbone of the Syrian government survival, providing military and financial support to keep Assad in power. However, over the years, Iran’s priority shifted; an economic challenge at home, coupled with new regional dynamics forced it to scale back its involvement. This created an opportunity for other players to step in, most notably Turkey, which had long maintained an interest in shaping Syria’s future. Turkey’s support for HTS both in terms of funding and military backing, played a decisive role in the group’s ability to topple the Assad regime.
For Iran Assad’s fall is more than just the loss of an ally; it represents a major blow to its bordered regional strategy. Since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Tehran has worked to expand its influence across the Middle East, positioning itself as a leader of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” against Western power and Israel. Syria was a crucial part of this network, serving as a bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon and providing Iran with strategic debt in the region. Now with Assad gone, Iran faces a challenge of maintaining its influence in Syria without a reliable partner in Damascus.
This shift has deepened internal divisions within Iranian leadership. The reformist faction, which has long advocated for diplomatic engagement with the West, says this crisis is an opportunity to push for renewed negotiation, particularly over Iran’s nuclear program and economic sanctions that have crippled its economy. However, these calls for diplomacy face strong opposition from the hardliners who view Western power as untrustworthy, especially after the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. With their credibility damaged, Iran’s reformists are struggling to make a case for diplomacy at a time when hardliners are advocating for a more aggressive regional posture.
In response to its growing regional vulnerability, Iran appears to be hardening its nuclear stance. This move serves a dual purpose: asserting strength on the global stage while increasing its revenue leverage in future negotiations. With Assad’s fall exposing the limits of Tehran’s influence, Iran is looking for ways to reinforce its strategic position. However, this approach carries significant risk. If the US and its allies refused to engage diplomatically, Iran could find itself further isolated with fewer options to navigate the crisis.
The situation Iran faces now It is complex, involving geopolitical, economic, domestic, and nuclear dimensions. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether Tehran can adapt to this new reality or if its regional influence will continue to decline. The fall of Assad has not only reshaped Syria’s future but has also triggered a border power shift across the Middle East, one that will test Iran’s ability to retain its standing in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.
The fall of Assad’s regime marks a shift. In the Middle East geopolitical landscape, this overthrow is a result of internal struggles, foreign intervention, and a change of regional balance of power. Even with its shift, the stability of the region is still very fragile in nature and has many challenges. The Saud’s regime’s downfall does not mean the end of threats and hostilities. Syria remains divided with the existence of many rebel groups, foreign power, and secretarial tension within Syria. The withdrawal of the Assad regime is not an end but the new angle in the civil war, which has various interests and geopolitical ambitions. Iran is likely to suffer a massive political and social setback to its position with Syria and the Middle East making it rethink its strategies considering the Change in the power dynamics: in short, the collapse of the Assad regime and the emergence of its government is a turning point that does not mean an end to the conflict. It brings in now a regional imbalance that will impact the Middle East. Turkey’s backing of groups like HTS poses a direct challenge to Iranian interests. These actions are done to establish a counterbalance in the region. Turkey also wants to establish its own hegemony in the region, like that of Iran.
*Huda Abdul Hameed, Undergraduate Student, Department of International Relations Peace Studies, Public Policy, St Joseph’s University, Bengaluru,560027, Karnataka, India.
