In the early hours of Sunday, on December 8th, opposition forces in Syria announced that Damascus had broken free of the control of the Bashar al Assad regime. This declaration marked the conclusion of Assad’s 24-years rule.
A coalition of opposition forces opened up their mission on November 27 to attack Idlib and the 2nd largest city of Syria, Aleppo. Three days later, the opposition forces took control of the Aleppo. Bashar al-Assad tried to control the situation towards the city of Hama.Bashar al-Assad called Iraq’s Prime Minister to express his concern about the rebel army heading towards Hama and targeting Damascus. The Syrian civil defense force stood firm in controlling the situation, but it was too late. The opposition force led by the HTS (Hayat Tahrir Al Sham) captured the city of Hama on 5th December.
Bashar al-Assad called his ally to secure his government, but Russia had nothing to do there, as Russia was in war and had internal problems. Opposition forces launched a massive attack on Damascus, liberating the capital in the early hours of the morning on 8th December.
During the Arab Spring, the revolution reached Syrian territory in 2011, but Bashar al-Assad violently cracked down on demonstrators, sparking a civil war that lasted until Sunday mornings. Bashar al-Assad ‘s administration was fraught with brutality, injustice, and inhuman activity. Saydnaya prison was more like Abu Gharib in Syria, with violence and rampant rape among girls. His regime committed countless crimes during the war.
In the summer of 2015, Bashar al-Assad acknowledged that his government was struggling and on the verge of disintegration. Russia, Assad’s closest friend, is called upon to violently subdued the protester. General Qassem Soleimani visited Moscow on July 15, 2015, and persuaded Putin to step in and defend Asad’s government in Syria. The Russian Federation officially entered the Syrian civil war on September 30, 2015, because of the growing threat to President Bashar al Assad’s government.
Russia’s military, regional, and economic interests are connected to Syria in the Middle East. Russia’s greater military may have been able to change the situation on the ground rather rapidly after entering Syria. The Russian army and its Syrian allies initially targeted members of the moderate opposition supported by the West, who at the time were already dealing with internal divisions and had to fight on two fronts—against Damascus and ISIL—despite the operation’s stated goal of combating “terrorist” groups. Moderate resistance, supported by the West, was virtually eradicated by Russia. Putin cleverly increased Russia’s influence in the Middle East, which it sought to acquire in another way. Tartus provided a conduit for Indian Ocean operations and enabled Russia to conduct prolonged surface and submarine operations in the Mediterranean Sea. It is now much more crucial that Ukraine attack the Russian Black Sea fleet with drones. The Tartus facility is also Russia’s sole maintenance and resupply center in the Mediterranean. The construction of the Khmeimim Air Base close to Latakia improved Russia’s military power in the area. Given the vast amounts of guns and military hardware that Russia exports, which make up a sizable amount of its export revenue, the Russian Military Industrial Complex has an interest in promoting Russian weapons during a war. Additionally, Russia’s mercenary industry, especially the Wagner organization, benefited from the Syrian conflict.
Russia is attempting to reclaim its position as a force projecting global power and as an “unsubstitutable player” in conflicts in the Near East and in resolving international issues. Conflicts in the Near East are extremely significant on a global scale, and the area was once a Cold War battleground for both the USA and the USSR. Russia repelled the west from Syria, and Asad used Russia’s favor to protect and run its government spontaneously.
Russia was taken back by the Syrian Army’s fall because it was powerless to assist the collapsing al-Assad government. At a critical juncture in its conflict in Ukraine, the Kremlin’s inability to stop Bashar al Assad’s quick overthrow revealed Russia’s power limits and damaged its international influence. One distinct and important facet of Russia’s national interest is the cost of conflict. Syria’s military has been weakened by its economic problems, which have been worsened by isolationist foreign sanctions. With only a few forces in Syria, Moscow was unable to prevent the demoralized Syrian army from rapidly collapsing under the weight of the rebel attack.
On Sunday morning, when the opposition groups took over the Syrian capital, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the two military facilities had been put on a state of high alert but played down any immediate risk. “There is currently no serious threat to their security,” the ministry said as it announced Assad’s departure from office and from Syria. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated the same theme on Monday (December 9) regarding the future of Russia’s military bases in Syria. He said that it would be the subject of discussion with the new rulers in Damascus: “This is all a subject for discussion with those who will be in power in Syria.”
Putin granted the Assad and his family sanctuaries in Russia. In an attempt to prolong its presence and secure the safety of its bases, Moscow contacted the recently appointed Syrian government. However, Putin was prepared for a new U.S. government, and what it meant for the war in Ukraine when Assad was overthrown so quickly. This incident makes it abundantly evident that the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East will become increasingly intricate.
