In mid-June of this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a significant visit to North Korea where he and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.” Putin highlighted the treaty’s importance as a cornerstone for advancing bilateral relations, emphasizing mutual assistance in the event of aggression by a third party. He also hinted at potential collaboration in military technology. Kim Jong-un, in assessing the treaty’s signing, remarked that it “accelerates the building of a new multi-polar world,” elevating bilateral relations to an alliance level.
Since then, there have been rumors circulating about North Korea potentially deploying troops to the Donetsk region. While there is no confirmed information yet on such rumors, the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. Following the recent treaty between North Korea and Russia, South Korea has signaled serious consideration of directly supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. Despite condemning Russia and participating in sanctions since the Russia-Ukraine conflict began, South Korea generally avoids direct involvement by not supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. Instead, during times of strain in Western military production, the West, led by the United States, often procures military equipment from South Korea for supply to Ukraine. South Korea primarily sells military goods directly to NATO’s Eastern European members like Poland, making it the world’s ninth-largest arms provider.
However, the new North Korea-Russia treaty has unsettled South Korea, heightening its security concerns. This makes developments in defense relations between NATO and South Korea crucial,, which could lead to a scenario where South Korea requests NATO’s engagement in Korean Peninsula matters.
Since the Cold War era, America’s approach to building its East Asian alliance system has diverged significantly from its strategy in Europe. In East Asia, the U.S. has predominantly relied on establishing individual mutual defense relationships with each ally through bilateral treaties, rather than adopting a collective security treaty mechanism like NATO. This is partly because East Asia historically was not a central focus of America’s global strategy, unlike Europe. Moreover, deep-rooted historical and territorial disputes among America’s Asian allies, such as those between Japan and South Korea, combined with substantial ideological differences, have hindered the feasibility of a collective security treaty.
However, recent developments, including the escalating Russia-Ukraine conflict and the strengthening military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, have sparked profound changes in Northeast Asia’s security landscape. Given North Korea’s isolation and its need for advanced military capabilities for self-defense and potential leverage against the West, these developments understandably heighten concerns in South Korea.
Several trends could take place in the future NATO-South Korea defense cooperation. Firstly, a notable development will be NATO’s increasing focus on the Asia-Pacific region. Previously, senior NATO officials had explicitly stated that there was no need for NATO to shift its attention to the Asia-Pacific. However, the deepening military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, coupled with the prolonged conflict between Russia and Ukraine, has prompted a reevaluation. There is now a shared goal among South Korea and NATO to integrate NATO more deeply into Northeast Asia to enhance regional security and counterbalance the influence of North Korea and Russia. Japan’s ongoing integration into NATO’s global defense cooperation system further underscores this trend, and South Korea’s involvement solidifies NATO’s growing “Asia-Pacificization”.
Secondly, the deepening of NATO’s defense cooperation with South Korea is expected to enhance its influence across East Asia. Unlike Japan, which faces stricter international regulations on military development and external military engagements, South Korea aims to expand its potential in defense cooperation and arms exports to Southeast Asian nations once it meets NATO’s standards and adjusts relevant domestic regulations. Moreover, South Korea could make substantial developments in military collaboration and arms sales to Taiwan in the future.
Thirdly, Northeast Asia might see a return to bloc-based confrontations. Under President Joe Biden, China has already been effectively positioned as a common adversary by the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. The deepening military ties between North Korea and Russia, combined with existing collaboration between China and Russia, could realistically lead to a scenario where NATO’s formal intervention on the Korean Peninsula, in response to South Korea’s request, sets up a “China-Russia” versus “U.S.-Japan-South Korea” confrontation. However, China is essentially coerced into this bloc confrontation. The escalation of bloc-based tensions in Northeast Asia will significantly worsen China’s security environment. Furthermore, China’s diplomatic flexibility will be severely constrained by the alignment of North Korea and Russia and increased Western hostility.
If North Korea were to deploy troops to eastern Ukraine or if South Korea were to initiate sales of lethal weapons to Ukraine, despite these scenarios not currently unfolding, both have the potential to escalate tensions significantly. The evolving trajectory of NATO’s defense cooperation with South Korea and its impact on East Asia deserves the world to pay attention to.
