Due to the stalemate on the Korean peninsula, it is time to find alternate policies to deal with North Korea. Past inter-Korean history has indicated that a long term multilateral approach is the way to go compared to a short term based crisis diplomacy. The process of bringing North Korea to the negotiating table requires the support of diverse actors especially when regular channels of communication have been blocked. To this end, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) as an organization and its member states have the capacity to take a larger role in inter-Korean affairs in providing a structured process for regional confidence building and security cooperation. Past history of ASEAN indicates the organization has the capacity to facilitate engagement of North Korea through its many institutionalised frameworks, especially between South Korea and the United States.
ASEAN, formed in 1967 has embraced dynamic East Asian countries as dialogue partners. Its member states are deeply aware that security incidents triggered by North Korea will significantly affect Southeast Asia’s own development. Basically, any whiff of instability in East Asia will spell trouble for ASEAN’s economic growth which is interlinked greatly with the Japanese, South Korean and Chinese economies. A stable East Asia is crucial as ASEAN is also the main driver of initiatives such as the East Asian Community, East Asian Summit, ASEAN Plus Three and so on and not forgetting the newly minted Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
Despite’s ASEAN’s regional importance, it is intriguing that the role of ASEAN in inter-Korean peace and security issues has not been explored to its fullest. Though the East Asian region is commonly associated with dynamic economic growth, nonetheless, North Korea is the only country in East Asia that has a reputation for reclusiveness. Despite a number of inter-Korean summits and US-North Korea meetings in Singapore and Hanoi between 2018 and 2019, North Korea has disengaged itself from all forms of diplomacy beginning 2019. Against this backdrop,i n the absence of sustained official dialogue between the U.S. South and North Korea as well as the collapse of the Six Party Talks, ASEAN is capable of engaging North Korea, with the condition, its presence is supported by major players.
For decades, ASEAN has faithfully supported Seoul’s position towards North Korean denuclearisation. This is due to North Korea’s intermediate range ballistic missiles, which are capable of reaching Southeast Asia. In addition, historically, ASEAN believes in the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) which disallows its members to acquire or produce nuclear weapons. For these reasons, ASEAN has continued its support for North Korean denuclearisation.
In promoting New Southern Policy to all 10 ASEAN Member States (AMS), President Moon Jae In of South Korea repeatedly urged regional governments to get involved in the Korean Peninsula peace process as well as integrate North Korea into regional affairs. To date, however, besides asking for support, there has not been a concrete South Korean proposal to institutionalize ASEAN as a serious player in inter-Korean affairs. Therefore ASEAN remains secondary to the involvement of bigger powers on the Korean peninsula.
There are multiple channels where ASEAN and its member states can engage North Korea in a more meaningful manner and at the same time integrate Pyongyang into the ASEAN community processes which includes the security, economic and social communities. The ‘ASEAN Way,’ a non-confrontational approach to diplomacy which relies on building trust through regular consultations allows for the organization to be a facilitator or a mediator between the two Koreas and become an additional platform for the United States and other major powers in engaging Pyongyang.
Though North Korea has embraced multilateralism in the past, Pyongyang has been more successful in interacting bilaterally with ASEAN member states. Due to historical and ideological linkages, ASEAN member states have relatively civilised relations with North Korea. Pyongyang has established diplomatic relations with every ASEAN country, and has embassies in every country in the region except for the Philippines and Brunei. In addition, Thailand, as host of the ASEAN meetings in 2000, took the initiative to invite the North to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It has to be noted that Cambodia assisted Thailand greatly when inviting the North Koreans.
Pyongyang’s interactions with ASEAN is varied. Southeast Asian private and non-governmental firms have also been allowed to operate in North Korea. For example, while Singaporean household and luxury goods are common, Thailand’s Loxley Pacific built the internet infrastructure in North Korea. In addition, a Singapore based NGO, Choson Exchange, has continued to train young North Koreans in business and entrepreneurship.
Nonetheless, the murder of Kim Jong Un’s half-brother Kim Jong Nam in a Malaysian airport in February 2017 and the discovery of numerous illegal activities in the region did strain relations. Despite this and increased missile and nuclear tests in 2017, ASEAN member states refused to break off diplomatic ties or expel North Korea from the ARF.
Given the fact that Kim Jong-un readily accepted Singapore and Vietnam as summit locations for US- North Korea talks, it is reasonable to argue that not only does he view ASEAN positively but the economic developments of these states is appealing to him. Presumably, Kim Jong Un was assessing if these two Southeast Asian states could be exemplars for achieving economic modernisation of North Korea.
Currently, North Korea’s engagement with ASEAN is limited to the ARF and Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific(CSCAP) at the Track One and Track Two levels. These platforms have been useful for North Korea to interact with other states. Following the breakdown of the Six-Party process in late 2008, the ARF has served as one of the few remaining channels of institutionalized contact on security issues for North Korea. Since the COVID-19 era has severely affected the North Korean economy, the timing is right for ASEAN to amalgamate Pyongyang into the regional economic expansion. Therefore, North Korea should be invited to be part of other ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings with Dialogue Partners. These platforms will provide a range of opportunities for North Korea to extend deeper regional security and economic engagement.
Despite the fact that North Korea had acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), a prerequisite to become a dialogue partner, ASEAN previously rejected North Korea’s request to become a dialogue partner. It can be assumed the rejection was directly related to frequent North Korean missile tests.
In comparison to other regional organisations, ASEAN is better qualified than most to keep North Korea continually engaged as well as in providing a favourable setting for addressing the state’s legitimate concerns. To the North Koreans, ASEAN is seen as being impartial when dealing with Pyongyang. Against this backdrop, there is a diplomatic opportunity for ASEAN to play the role of a mediator in bring together Pyongyang, Seoul and the US.
Since North Korea’s relations with both Seoul and Washington is at an all-time low, ASEAN should reconsider inviting North Korea as a dialogue partner or at least an observer. This will allow ASEAN to gain support from the international community to bring North Korea into the East Asian community vision. Such a move would certainly provide North Korea a strong rationale to participate and become a stakeholder in regional affairs. To avoid being alienated further, participation in ASEAN would give North Korea a chance to highlight its position, perceived threats and other areas of concern. In the long run, it could very well eliminate North Korean perceptions of insecurity and lack of trust towards the global community and might even give it the security guarantee it wants. A platform for active engagement, mediated by a neutral party, offers a slim chance that North Korea might return to the negotiating table as well be prepared to commit to a more staggered approach towards denuclearisation. For ASEAN to have an informed, sustainable and practical North Korea policy, it would require political will and South Korea’s institutionalised participation, which probably can be conducted within the context of the New Southern Policy. As North Korea’s participation grows in ASEAN, more likely than not, the state will be able to take advantage of newer opportunities that may lead it to concentrate more on economic development rather than building its nuclear capabilities further.
