The Indonesia-China conflict in the sea of the Natuna Islands Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which was recently reportedly massively was not new. A similar event had occurred in March 2016, after eight Chinese fishermen were arrested by the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Unit 11 Shark Boat officers. And the response made by the Chinese government at that time was similar. PRC still feels innocent because it considers Natuna sea as a traditional fishing location for a long time.In other words, the land is claimed as part of the U-shaped South China Sea area (known as the Nine-Dash Line). The area was declared by China in 1947. Therefore, the Chinese fishing vessels finally seemed to be shaking in and out even though Indonesia’s claim on the Natuna Islands EEZ was based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Actually, the maritime border agreement which covers continental shelf, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone with neighboring countries and the international community is not yet complete. Indonesia and Malaysia signed the establishment of continental shelf boundaries in November 1969. The approval for the establishment of Indonesian and Vietnamese continental shelf boundaries was signed in June 2013. Indonesia jurisdictional maps issued by the Indonesian Navy Hydrographic and Oceanographic Center shows that the EEZ boundary line (Exclusive Economic Zone) with Vietnam and Malaysia on the Natuna sea border many still need agreement. In EEZ – as the name implies – a country’s sovereign rights are limited and exclusive to economic rights, such as the exploration of marine resources, or oil and gas under the sea. Other countries, even including countries that do not have sea borders (land locked states) have certain access to the EEZ such as the rights of peaceful crossing vessels and flying in the sky above, laying cables and pipes under the sea, with regard to (shall have due regards) rights other countries’ rights
According to the Law of the Sea Convention, in the event of a dispute in EEZ, the settlement is not based on the jurisdiction and legal point of view of the state of EE jurisdiction, but on the principle of equality. This is by taking into account other relevant matters for the parties to the dispute and the international community as a whole. It should be noted in the Law of the Sea Convention that governing EEZ is in Chapter V whose templates constitute the sovereign rights of coastal states, and restrictions on those rights against other countries.
While the rights of an island nation are placed in Chapter IV whose templates include regulating the rights of other countries in waters in an island nation (such as the right to navigate peacefully and to fly, in a designated path). Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and China are coastal countries, while Indonesia is an archipelago. Considering the loosening of these rights, it is very important that a country that has EEZ jurisdiction as Indonesia proves to the international community the EEZ’s tenure and effective management capabilities. This includes maintaining and upholding their rights. It is not enough if a patrol boat or airplane is just circling around.
The problem, Natuna Island is not directly connected to China Sea. That’s why Indonesia is not the first and direct actor in South China Sea dispute. It is understandable that the act of China which claims to have the right or even territory over the territory in the South China Sea has long infuriated ASEAN countries, but not for Natuna. Malaysia brought violations and unilateral Chinese claims to the South China Sea to the United Nations. The proposal was submitted by the Malaysian government in mid-December. Earlier, in 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) under the auspices of the United Nations won the Philippines against China’s unilateral claim to the South China sea area. But China never show even just a little bit of respect to Philippines in South China Sea
The PCA court, which based its decision on the 1982 UNCLOS, ruled China had violated Philippine sovereign rights. The Nine Dash Line used as the reason for China were declared not to meet international legal requirements, and there is no historical evidence that China controls and controls resources in the South China Sea. However, the Chinese government did not accept the ruling. Another ASEAN country, Vietnam, is also involved in regional conflicts with China in the South China Sea.
Apart from the legal aspects of the South China Sea and Natuna ZEE, the real theft of fish by Chinese vessels has been going on for a long time but only now has wide attention. China really acts like a legal master of Natuna Sea and in many times show the bullying moves. That’s why the government of Indonesia needs new ways to improve the management of marine resources while improving the capabilities of maritime operations. The country’s geostrategic complexity, which consists of thousands of islands and comprises three Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes areas and is open to international parties, requires the reliability of military operations. Especially those related to maritime interception operations. The operation must be carried out in any waters, both in the Republic of Indonesia and outside.
Maritime operations require the reliability of the maritime security infrastructure and renewal of sea defense doctrine that puts forward intelligence and technology aspects. The maritime intelligence field must be improved so as to achieve strong surveillance capabilities. The world situation demands Indonesia be able to realize its sophisticated maritime intelligence capabilities. Maritime intelligence is a part of strategic intelligence in an effort to ensure national stability and efforts for sensing the strategic environment both at home and abroad.
Maritime intelligence focuses on its activities related to the maritime field or that influences the maritime capabilities of foreign countries and the country itself. National intelligence capacity and posture should be directed to strengthen maritime intelligence capabilities. No more sectarian intelligence operations, that is, those that limit the security and sectoral dimensions. For example, the Navy (Navy) no longer limits to naval intelligence, but more broadly namely maritime intelligence that is able to provide strategic information to national maritime institutions. Such as the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Environment, Customs and Police.
For this reason, the urgency of building a number of base infrastructure and facilities for maintaining warships is inevitable. The infrastructure is primarily to support the effectiveness of the third Fleet Command Headquarters located in Sorong, West Papua. During this time the Navy’s combat strength still relies on two regional fleets, namely west (Armabar), and east (Armatim). The number of warships owned by the Indonesian Navy is only 151 units (on the process of increasing). In fact, the number of Indonesian warships in the 1960s amounted to 162 ships.
The fleet command system tasked with fostering the ability of the Integrated Armed Weapon System (IAWS) consisting of warships, aircraft, marines and bases should be more synergized with other agencies that also manage the sea area. The capabilities of marine warfare and the readiness of marine operations at this time should be able to turn into non-war operations that support the enforcement of sovereignty and law at sea, and secure economic potential at sea.
The next important task is to form a reliable national system of marine inspectors with three important aspects. First, the informative aspect. The system must provide complete information about national marine conditions, both in terms of marine resources, water conditions, weather, important events at sea (accidents and incidents), signs of sea navigation that are very helpful for sailing ships, and all information about the sea the other. Second, integrative aspects. The overlapping of infrastructure procurement and installation of supervision equipment between departments can be overcome, so that there are savings in the state budget.
Because the amount of equipment or systems built do not collide in terms of coverage in an area or system and its functions. In addition, with interoperability solutions, the problem of intermittent owner of equipment along the critical strait, such as the Malacca Strait can be integrated. Third, is the collaborative aspect. This is more focused on the status of data exchanged. For example, data to eradicate Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing Fishing such as fishing vessel lines (position, speed, heading), including Owner, Company Identity, Ship size, fishing gear type, permit expiration date, then log book database (fish species, location), marine biology parameter data (chlorophyll, upwelling), and boundary data. So in short, permanent strategic synergy is needed between the three institutions that have been the main managers of the national marine system, namely the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Navy, and the Director General of Sea Transportation of the Ministry of Transportation.
