When U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan met General Zhang Youxia in Beijing in August 2024, the contrast was striking. The American envoy appeared weary; the veteran Chinese general, relaxed and confident. Zhang, then the most powerful uniformed officer in the People’s Liberation Army and a lifelong confidant of President Xi Jinping, spoke warmly about the importance of military dialogue between the two rivals.
That meeting was meant to steady a dangerous relationship. Washington hoped sustained contact with the PLA could reduce the risk of miscalculation an accidental clash in the air or at sea, a cyber incident spiralling out of control, or a misunderstood missile test. Today, that fragile effort looks close to collapse.
In January, while global attention was fixed elsewhere, Chinese state media quietly announced Zhang’s removal. His dismissal capped a sweeping purge that has hollowed out the PLA’s top leadership and raised urgent questions about China’s readiness for war, its internal stability, and the future of U.S.–China military dialogue.
The Scope of the Purge
Zhang’s fall was not an isolated event. Over the past two years, dozens possibly hundreds of senior officers have been removed, many from strategically vital areas. Analysts note a disproportionate number of purged commanders came from China’s nuclear forces, the Eastern Theatre Command responsible for Taiwan, and elite units based in Beijing itself.
The normally seven-member Central Military Commission has been reduced to little more than Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin, the head of the military’s discipline apparatus. The result is a striking imbalance: political enforcers remain, while professional commanders have largely vanished.
The timing is critical. Xi has reportedly ordered the PLA to be capable of winning a Taiwan conflict by 2027, accelerating goals once set for 2035. With that deadline looming, the purge suggests deep dissatisfaction and possibly distrust at the very top.
Corruption, Control and Credibility
Official explanations focus on corruption. PLA publications have accused senior officers of looting defence budgets and allowing rot to spread through the ranks. One article went further, branding China’s own military a “paper tiger,” language almost unthinkable for a force Beijing has spent years portraying as modern, disciplined and unstoppable.
Whether this rhetoric reflects genuine alarm or calculated messaging is unclear. On one hand, it may signal Xi’s belief that corruption has fatally weakened the PLA. On the other, it could be a deliberate attempt to mask real capabilities, projecting weakness while maintaining strength a classic strategic deception.
Either interpretation carries risks. Declaring your military unreliable undermines deterrence. Pretending it is unreliable while preparing for conflict invites catastrophic miscalculation.
Taiwan, Timing and Strategic Uncertainty
For years, analysts have debated when or whether Beijing might move against Taiwan. Some feared a near-term strike, especially as U.S. and Taiwanese defences improved. More recently, opinion in Washington has tilted toward a longer timeline, with Beijing potentially waiting for Taiwan’s 2028 election or the next U.S. presidential race.
The purge complicates every assumption. Removing experienced commanders responsible for Taiwan operations hardly looks like preparation for imminent war. Yet it also concentrates decision-making power ever more tightly around Xi, reducing institutional checks and increasing the risk of impulsive choices.
At the same time, China’s massive nuclear expansion continues. Reports of shoddy construction and mismanagement in missile fields may be exaggerated, but their circulation inside China suggests an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. Even alleged contacts with U.S. counterparts are now framed as criminal betrayals.
The Collapse of Military Dialogue
Perhaps the most immediate consequence is the near-death of U.S.–China military engagement. Contacts that once involved senior generals have dwindled to formalities. Meetings painstakingly rebuilt after the 2022 Pelosi visit to Taiwan now look wasted. Commanders Washington hoped to engage including those overseeing Taiwan and the South China Sea appear to have been purged themselves.
If communication with the West is now seen as dangerous or disloyal within the PLA, future dialogue may be impossible. That leaves intelligence agencies, not conversations, as the primary source of insight a far more brittle foundation for managing rivalry between nuclear-armed powers.
Personal Analysis
What makes this moment so unsettling is not just the scale of the purge, but what it reveals about governance under Xi Jinping. This is less a routine anti-corruption drive than a radical act of consolidation, driven by insecurity as much as strength. By sidelining professional military voices, Xi may believe he is eliminating risk. In reality, he may be amplifying it.
History suggests that highly centralised systems, stripped of trusted intermediaries, are prone to strategic shock. Decisions become opaque, feedback disappears, and leaders start mistaking loyalty for competence. Whether China is moving toward restraint or confrontation is harder than ever to judge and that uncertainty itself is dangerous.
The greatest risk may not be that China is preparing for war tomorrow, but that it is entering a phase where misjudgement becomes easier and correction harder. For the world, and especially for Taiwan, that silence from Beijing’s generals may prove more alarming than their threats ever were.
With information from Reuters.
