Amidst indecisiveness amongst Western countries to fully exert maximum pressure on Russia after months of failed negotiations, the Kremlin is stepping up hybrid warfare activities and provocations towards NATO members to test the will and coordination amongst the alliance. During September 2025, Russian drones or jets have violated the airspace of Poland, Romania, and Estonia—all within one week.
Seeing a weak posture and discontent in NATO, Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin looks to conduct a psychological operation, both for domestic and foreign consumption. Russia is now testing coordination and response time amongst NATO while simultaneously performing its largest offensive in Ukraine at a time when the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ needs to be more willing to confront Russian aggression than ever.
September Incursions into NATO Airspace
On the night of September 9th into the morning of the 10th, 19 to 23 Russian drones flew over Polish airspace via Belarus. NATO quickly scrambled a quick reaction force, with Dutch F-35s shooting down three to four of the drones, with Italy and Belgium sending an early warning aircraft (AWACS) and a fuel tanker, respectively.
The type of drones Russia used to penetrate Polish airspace was Gerberas, which can conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, implying that the incursion was intentional. One or two drones could be passed off as an “accident,” but nineteen were deliberate, as confirmed by the administrative leadership of Warsaw.
Only a few days previously, Polish President Nawrocki met with U.S. President Trump over renewed American military presence, which would likely be located in Eastern Poland near the Ukrainian and Belarusian border. The Russian military was most likely probing potential sabotage and strike points of new forward positions NATO could take in the country.
Several days later, on September 13th, a Russian Geran drone crossed Romanian airspace, which was intercepted by two F-16s. However, instead of downing the drone, the pilots allowed it to return to Ukraine, where it could’ve potentially damaged infrastructure or caused Ukrainian civilian casualties, as the Geran is created to be a variant of Iran’s deadly Shaheds.
Arguably, the most provocative move by the Kremlin took place on September 19th when three Russian MiG-31s entered Estonian airspace near Vaindloo Island for approximately twelve minutes. According to Estonia’s Ministry of Defense, the three MiG-31s turned off their transponders, made zero contact with air traffic controllers and Tallinn, and had zero flight plans.
Aircraft from the Finnish, Swedish, and Italian air forces were scrambled to intercept and escort the MiGs out of Estonia while Tallinn summoned the Russian ambassador and activated NATO’s Article 4. Estonia remains a potential flashpoint for Russian aggression on NATO due to its large ethnic Russian population in Narva that is sympathetic to Russia and struggles to assimilate into Estonian society.
The Kremlin’s Grey Zone Strategy
Russia’s renewed provocations against various NATO members are both strategic and psychological. As Russia’s summer offensive has produced minimal results, the Kremlin looks to enact other measures both domestically and internationally.
First, by not acting decisively to enforce their own airspace, NATO countries are increasingly giving the Russian government a green light to continue and increase belligerent actions. Similar to Ukraine, the Kremlin seeks to adopt a ‘grey zone’ strategy towards NATO.
In the grey zone strategy, Moscow looks to expand its aerial presence over NATO airspace by utilizing fixed-wing aircraft, drones, and missiles to cross over countries that not only are in proximity to Ukraine but also are hostile to the Russian government. Russia also wants Ukraine to expand its air defense over NATO countries, hoping it leads to discontent and anger, as seen in the 2022 missile shootdownover Poland.
Secondly, the Kremlin deliberately uses flight paths that allow assets to cross back into Ukraine or Russian airspace immediately. Three years into the full-scale war, NATO countries continued to struggle to expand their national security apparatus. Like the current U.S. strategy, Russia hopes that Europe will gradually advocate for limited exports of air defense missiles to Ukraine to address its defense gaps.
Third, Russia seeks to exacerbate vexation within NATO, which has risen amid the Second Trump Administration’s more friendly pivot towards Russia. While Europe expands its defense to combat growing Russian imperial aspirations, the new U.S. national defense strategy prioritizes the homeland, marking a renewal of the Monroe Doctrine.
Lastly, with the rise of populist movements, some of which have received funding from the Kremlin or are friendly with Russia, Putin wants to continue hybrid and informational warfare provocations to help bring Russian-friendly governments into power. With Russia massing its largest grouping in the hope of attacking key points in Ukrainian defenses to capture the rest of Donbas, Putin hopes upcoming Western elections can bring isolationists to power who will cut off Ukrainian aid.
NATO Needs a New Doctrine for Incursions
NATO members currently need to revamp a doctrine to keep up a deterrence threshold by making the Kremlin understand blatant violations of European airspace could lead to the shootdown of Russian aircraft. Establishing more hotlines and diplomatic back channels will be crucial in mitigating incursions.
Additional air defense assets on the eastern flank should be increased dramatically. With Poland recently signing a deal to allow foreign military access on its territory and Romania becoming a major operational hub for NATO, both countries could serve as bases for growing Western assets to combat Russian provocations beyond Ukraine.
The West missed a major window to install a ‘no-fly zone’ over much of Ukraine at the height of Russian aerial bombardment of major cities such as Mariupol, Severodonetsk, Kherson, Avdiivka, and others. However, a potential ‘no-fly zone’ over Western Ukraine can be implemented, but only with will, as Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski stated.
NATO countries implementing blocs to combat Russian incursions in various regions can help grow alliance cohesion and combined aerial patrols. Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway are showing a template of this with the Joint Nordic Air Command.
Lastly, it should be made clear to the Kremlin that a new doctrine of a three-strike rule will be implemented and that after the strikes are used, NATO pilots can be cleared to enact defensive measures at command discretion. In Putin’s doctrine, Russia escalates to weakness but will back off when confronted, as seen with the Turkish downing of the SU-24 and the Battle of Khasham.
Now more than ever, NATO needs to revamp its doctrine on mitigating and combating Russian aerial incursions. However, it should be stated that NATO has the capabilities but currently lacks the will, and until this is realized, Russia will continue pushing red lines until a potential armed clash becomes inevitable.
Russia’s Grey Zone Strategy is Working and NATO Needs to Adapt
Seeing a weak posture and discontent in NATO, Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin looks to conduct a psychological operation, both for domestic and foreign consumption.
