The confrontation between the Chinese navy and the Israeli naval commando unit (Shayetet 13) is not a shot for a shot but rather a strategic standoff. China is attempting to protect its economic influence and its allies, such as Iran, while Shayetet 13 in Tel Aviv is working to secure Israeli security interests in areas that may intersect with those Chinese ambitions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. When discussing the roles of the Chinese and Israeli navies in terms of strategic power disparity, the comparison is essentially between a major naval power like China and a naval commando unit like Israel. The Chinese navy is considered the largest in the world in terms of the number of ships (more than 730 vessels), and it possesses aircraft carriers and guided-missile destroyers. Its objective is to dominate the high seas. While Shayetet 13 is considered an elite Israeli commando unit specializing in covert operations such as maritime sabotage and hostage rescue, its primary focus is on intelligence gathering and counterterrorism, particularly in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. In contrast, Chinese operations in the region concentrate on securing trade routes and combating piracy, such as in the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, Shayetet 13 is primarily a surgical force, not a frontline force like the Chinese navy.
The current relationship between the Chinese navy and the Israeli Shayetet 13 in areas of tension (the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea) is characterized by a kind of indirect strategic competition. China seeks to protect its energy supplies and ensure freedom of navigation for its ships, while the Israeli unit is active in special operations missions to disrupt threats associated with Iran and its allies. The most significant points of confrontation between the Chinese and Israeli navies, particularly the Shayetet 13, emerged in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea (following the Iran War). This confrontation stemmed from the Chinese navy’s attempt to challenge the US-Israeli naval blockade against Iran. After the outbreak of military operations against Iran in February 2026, the United States imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz. In this context, Chinese ships defied this blockade, with the Chinese tanker Rich Starry being recorded passing through the strait without obstruction.
This reflects Beijing’s desire to break Western and American hegemony over waterways. Furthermore, the Chinese navy’s role in protecting the security of Chinese vessels has led commercial ships in the region near the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea to begin displaying identification signals indicating “China Crew” to avoid being targeted by regional powers. This grants China an exceptional status as a safe actor amidst the conflict. With the Chinese navy attempting to play a role in military positioning, it regularly participates in the Maritime Security Belt exercises with Russia and Iran to bolster its permanent presence in the Gulf of Oman and move closer to areas of Israeli operations.
Regarding the most prominent geographical points and strategic context of the deployment of the Chinese navy and the Israeli Shayetet 13, despite the absence of direct clashes between them, the two sides are present in geographically close areas, especially after the Gaza War and the Iran War, for different reasons. Chinese naval vessels (the 45th and 46th fleets) have been observed in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the waters off Somalia. Conversely, the Israeli navy, including the Shayetet 13, participates in securing Israeli interests in the Red Sea, particularly with the escalating threats from the Houthis against Tel Aviv. Here, China has attempted to maintain a neutral stance with the Israeli and American navies during the Red Sea crisis following the Gaza War and the Iran-Iraq War, directing its merchant ships to avoid risks and refrain from engaging in confrontations with any party that might jeopardize its interests. However, with a significant Chinese naval presence in the Mediterranean, the Atlit naval base (northern Israel) serves as the permanent headquarters for Shayetet 13. Although China does not have an operational military presence in the Mediterranean that directly overlaps with this Israeli naval base, it does have substantial investments in ports, such as Haifa and Ashdod in Israel, as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.
There may not be a direct military confrontation or declared clash between the Chinese Navy and the Israeli naval commando unit Shayetet 13. Rather, their relationship is complex, ranging from political estrangement to diplomatic protests, stemming from China’s growing role in the Middle East. The details of the current landscape of this relationship, starting in 2025-2026, can be analyzed in several points: Regarding the geographical points of indirect friction between the Chinese Navy and the Israeli Shayetet 13, these are concentrated in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. The Chinese Navy has increased its presence in these areas to protect its trade routes (Belt and Road Initiative) and has strengthened its cooperation with Iran and Russia through Maritime Security Belt exercises. Conversely, the Israeli Shayetet 13 is active in covert operations to disrupt arms smuggling or target assets belonging to the Iranian, Lebanese, and Palestinian resistance axis, thus placing both forces in the same crowded operational theater. The Israeli port of Haifa has also witnessed competition and an undeclared war between the Chinese and Israeli navies. The Chinese operation of the container terminal at Haifa Port has long been a source of security concern in Israel, given its proximity to the Atlit base (the headquarters of the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit).
As for the significance of the Chinese presence near the Atlit base (headquarters of Shayetet 13) in Israel, the Atlit base, located south of Haifa, is considered the secret and heavily fortified center of the Israeli naval commando unit, Shayetet 13. The Chinese presence near it, via the new Haifa port, carries profound strategic implications, the most important of which is providing and supporting intelligence surveillance for China. Here, the Chinese company SIPG operates the container terminal at Haifa port under a 25-year contract. We can analyze that the use of Chinese cranes and technological systems near the Israeli naval base at Atlit and the Israeli submarine base gives Beijing the ability to monitor covert maritime movements and track the entry and exit of elite Israeli vessels. Beyond this, it represents a geopolitical deterrent message for China, as this Chinese naval presence is a thorn in the side of Israeli-American military cooperation. The US Navy has repeatedly expressed its concern about docking in Haifa due to the Chinese presence, which puts pressure on Israel’s security decision-making independence on its own lands. By using investment as a protection tool, through control of logistical hubs near sensitive locations, China ensures that its commercial interests are not harmed should Shayetet 13 or other units carry out operations that could destabilize the maritime security upon which Beijing depends.
China’s stance on the Shayetet 13 operations is characterized by increasingly strong diplomatic condemnations. China has repeatedly condemned Israeli operations involving Shayetet 13 in the Mediterranean and the wider region, describing some attacks as unacceptable and destabilizing to regional stability. While emphasizing its support for freedom of navigation in the Middle East, China has adopted a critical position regarding the Israeli naval blockade, in which the unit participates. Beijing frequently supports, in international forums, the barrier flotillas that might be intercepted by Shayetet 13. Although China and Israel previously adhered to the One China policy and engaged in technological cooperation, American pressure and regional tensions, particularly after the events in Gaza and the 2023-2026 Iran War, have led to a decline in military coordination and a cooling of bilateral relations. In short, the relationship between the Chinese and Israeli navies (the Shayetet 13) is characterized by military distance alongside overlapping economic interests in Middle Eastern ports and straits, perhaps accompanied by undeclared geographical or operational clashes between the two sides, especially after the Iran war.
