The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last bilateral arms control accord between the U.S. and Russia, expired on 5th February 2026. Many arms control advocates have described the treaty’s expiration as a critical and potentially dangerous watershed moment in the two countries’ relations, as well as for the existing international norms governing arms control. However, New START’s impact was largely symbolic rather than a strategic transformation of the nuclear landscape, either on the bilateral or global level.
The treaty was signed in 2010 by U.S. President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev at a time when both countries were seeking to “reset” their strained relations and revive the bilateral arms control process, which had weakened after the expiry of START I in December 2009 and earlier U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, which consequently had led to the Russian decision to withdraw from the unratified START II.
The objectives of New START were to supersede the earlier START I treaty, maintain transparency through inspections and data exchanges, and limit each side to 1550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed delivery vehicles, while establishing verification mechanisms intended to foster predictability and reduce worst-case scenarios. While these limits projected progress in U.S.-Russian bilateral arms control relations, they did little to meaningfully reduce the destructive capacity of their arsenal.
Both sides retained a large enough nuclear arsenal to destroy each other and the rest of the world multiple times over. Consequently, the treaty paved no meaningful route towards abolishing, either completely or partially, the two countries’ massive nuclear arsenal, despite their formal pledge to negotiate nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Notably, the New START also did not impose any limits on tactical nuclear weapons. Although these systems are of limited strategic concern to the mainland U.S. due to its geographical distance, they represent a considerable threat to European security. While the European allies rely vastly on the U.S. strategic arsenal for extended deterrence, exclusion of tactical systems from the treaty left them vulnerable to regional tensions and without a comprehensive deterrence umbrella.
Politically, the agreement was deeply intertwined with the Obama administration’s ambitions of lessening the prominence of nuclear weapons in global politics and advancing its aspirational “Global Zero” agenda. Perhaps, achieving global moral ascendancy by reinforcing the narrative of America’s responsible stewardship of nuclear weapons and leadership role in nuclear disarmament was the administration’s principal motivation, upon which also rested its international reputation, rather than an unpretentious commitment to mitigating the risks of a nuclear arms race.
In the end, the treaty was largely political point scoring, and the numerical adjustments were just an exercise in verifiable accounting rather than sincere arms control measures. No measures were taken to curtail the destructive modernization and innovations in the two countries’ nuclear warheads and delivery vehicle programs. Following the negotiations of New START, President Obama committed an extravagant amount of spending on modernizing America’s nuclear triad over 30 years. This amount was estimated to be around $1 trillion by independent analysts. Albeit the commitment was necessary for securing the U.S. Senate’s ratification of the New START. Regardless, the gap between declared intentions and actual practices was never truly reconciled under the treaty.
Following the treaty’s expiry, U.S. President Donald Trump called New START a “badly negotiated deal” and rejected a Russian proposal to voluntarily extend the treaty for one more year. He instead suggested that the two countries should instruct their technical experts to work on a new, improved, and modernized treaty that can last long into the future. However, the likelihood of a bilateral treaty with Russia remains bleak. This is mainly because the strategic focus of the U.S. is shifting to China, whose military technological advancement has become a significant strategic concern for Washington.
The U.S. is therefore unlikely to commit to any future treaty that excludes China, although this may simply serve as a justification for avoiding tethering to new agreements altogether. Recently, China’s Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, Shen Jian, stated that his country would not participate in negotiations for arms control with the U.S. and Russia at this stage. The U.S. has been fully aware of China’s reluctance. Therefore, President Trump’s proposal is largely superficial and lacks substantive prospects.
The U.S. depiction of itself as a passive victim reacting to military technological changes in China and Russia is not entirely convincing. While Russia maintains a larger nuclear arsenal than the U.S., the difference is insignificant owing to the destructive capacities of their weapons. On the other hand, China has made considerable progress in its nuclear arsenal modernization, particularly in delivery vehicles, but the U.S. holds an arsenal over seven times larger.
The U.S. is, nevertheless, spinning a narrative of a covert Chinese supercritical nuclear test in 2020 to justify the renewal of nuclear testing and innovation in its arsenal. While China has rejected these claims, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) has also stated that it did not detect any event consistent with the characteristics of a nuclear weapon test explosion at that time. Nevertheless, the U.S. persists with this narrative. This is not merely due to the threat perception shaped by the growing geopolitical rivalry with China, but also because of the internal momentum within the U.S. for advancement in the nuclear arsenal.
Resumption of nuclear testing would constitute a profound miscalculation, one that could reignite already entrenched arms rivalries and potentially trigger new ones. Russia, which revoked its ratification of the CTBT in 2023, may well respond in kind should the U.S. or the European powers resume nuclear testing. India could be particularly interested in revalidating its thermonuclear capability, the efficacy of which was questioned by experts in their assessment of the country’s 1998 nuclear tests. Resumption of nuclear testing in South Asia could also impact Pakistan’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. For now, Pakistan holds to its moratorium steadfast despite mischievous claims by the U.S. that “Pakistan has been testing.” Pakistan was not the first to introduce nuclear weapons or initiate nuclear testing in South Asia. Pakistan will also not be the first to resume nuclear testing in the region.
Amid growing global uncertainties, some states have already begun exploring the nuclear option to address regional security concerns. Although German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has rejected the idea of Germany developing its own nuclear weapons, reinforcing his country’s commitment to the NPT, Germany has been in talks with France for a “European nuclear deterrence” to create continental strategic autonomy within NATO’s framework. Thomas Rowekamp, the chairman of the German Bundestag’s defense committee, has also stated that while Germany does not have missiles or warheads, it does have a significant technological advantage that it could contribute to a joint European initiative. Likewise, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk have stated that they have entered discussions with France on strategic nuclear deterrence.
Coinciding with these statements comes President Emmanuel Macron’s recent announcement that the next 50 years will be an era of nuclear weapons. He added that France would be increasing its nuclear warheads and would no longer disclose details of its nuclear stockpile. He also confirmed that ‘eight European countries,’ which include Germany, the UK, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark, had agreed to participate in the new “advanced deterrence” strategy proposed by France.
In the same context, in the Joint Declaration issued on 2 March 2026, France and Germany decided to enter closer cooperation in the field of deterrence, which includes: (i) Establishment of a high-ranking nuclear steering group; (ii) Doctrinal dialogue and consultations for determining coordination of strategic cooperation and the appropriate mix of conventional, missile defense, and French nuclear capabilities; (iii) German conventional participation in French nuclear exercises and joint visits of strategic sites; (iv) Management of escalation beneath the nuclear threshold; (v) Shared understanding that the nuclear dimension of deterrence remains a cornerstone of European security; and (vi) Recognition of the deterrent role of independent strategic nuclear forces of France and the UK.
France and Germany have underscored that their bilateral cooperation on nuclear deterrence will not substitute NATO’s nuclear deterrence and its nuclear sharing arrangements. Although both sides have emphasized continued compliance with the obligations under international law, including the NPT, Germany’s close and unhindered involvement with various dimensions of French nuclear deterrence will set a dangerous precedent. Objectives of the NPT could be further undermined if other nuclear-weapon states followed in the French footsteps by providing a nuclear umbrella to their regional, defense, and strategic partners.
New nuclear tests and frameworks, such as the Franco-European cooperation in the field of nuclear deterrence, would likely exacerbate uncertainties, potentially sparking a new arms race. It would, however, be inaccurate to correlate such an outcome to the demise of New START. It would primarily be the consequence of the ongoing military modernizations and shifting geopolitical realities. Nevertheless, despite offering little beyond the numbers game that shrouded the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals in a semblance of arms limitation, the demise of New START in the prevalent chaotic and uncertain international environment indicates that the era of arms control and disarmament has regrettably drawn to a close. In its place, there is a likelihood of the emergence of a new international security order, marked by expansions in existing nuclear weapons programs and the formation of new alliances structured around the nuclear capabilities of the existing nuclear-weapon states.
