Large-scale airstrikes from America and Israel continue in Iran, with civilian death tolls surpassing 700 in only a few days. The Nataanz military facility has reportedly been hit, as has a girls’ primary school (where around 150 were killed). Pivotally, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, among other top officials, has also been killed – and his death has been celebrated by many Iranians, especially those in the wider diaspora. Iran has been targeting many US military bases around the region (Abu Dhabi and Dubai among others) as well as many areas in Israel. Four of the six US personnel killed have been named by the Pentagon thus far.
Goals and Motivations of the Attackers
America and Israel have stated plainly that they aim for regime change in Iran, a goal which has long been on the USA’s agenda. The Islamic Republic’s brutal regime has a violent history of civilian murder (upwards of 36,000 deaths in the 2025-26 protests), political executions, systemic abuse of women and the persecution of minorities. These misdeeds, often characterised as humanitarian crimes, are certainly a valid casus belli – perhaps the time has finally come for the Iranians to be freed from their leaders’ tyranny. Importantly, though, Iran’s ‘liberator’, the USA, isn’t necessarily a bastion of democracy at the moment. Since Trump’s inauguration, we have seen significant democratic erosion, a lack of checks and balances, a litany of unconstitutional actions, the mass kidnapping and detention of American citizens and a broad crisis of legitimacy. The other half of the ‘liberation’ force, Israel, is widely thought to be a genocidal apartheid state, and the nation’s leader (Benjamin Netanyahu) is facing an arrest warrant in the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Americans themselves may have noticed this hypocrisy, explaining the general unpopularity of America’s attack. They may also see the worrying historical parallels of this attack, both in the (arguably illegal) 2003 invasion of Iraq and in prior ‘interventions’ for regime change purposes. In the past, these US interventions have actually been for economic gain and hegemon-status consolidation, not humanitarian concern. If liberation is the USA’s prime motivation, one wonders why they have waited until now to attack the Islamic Republic, rather than months ago when Iranians were in an active uprising and the US promised ‘help’ was on the way. Considering that humanitarianism and democracy are seemingly so high on the American agenda, one further wonders why they remain closely allied with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Rwanda, and so on, where human rights and democratic values are frequently violated. Interestingly, this attack has only come onto the agenda since the USA’s successful capture of Venezuelan oil.
America and Israel have also stated that they intend to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. In another startling parallel to 2003 Iraq, Iran currently has no nuclear weapon. While it has nuclear materials and possible potential, an actual nuclear weapon is still entirely hypothetical. Iraq unfortunately showed us that claims of WMD can act as a facade for regional power pursuits, the securing of profitable post-war reconstruction contracts and less restricted oil access. Given the existing divisions in Iran, it is not unlikely that a similar war will result in the same ongoing sectarian conflict and massive displacement still plaguing Iraq. Moreover, just like in 2003, America and Israel are choosing to target the state (key infrastructure), not just the government alone.
Instead of a relatively clean regime replacement, America and Israel are tactically destroying the state of Iran – a stable democracy is unlikely to emerge from the rubble. While the ‘liberators’ maintain that Iran posed an imminent threat to their regimes, and that a ‘pre-emptive’ strike was therefore legitimate, one must keep in mind that Iran had no explicit intent to attack either state. Of course, there were no pretenses of friendly allyship, but it would have been incredibly foolish of the Islamic Republic to target America or its satellite. Would Iran ever be seen as legitimate in launching a ‘pre-emptive’ strike on the US, especially considering the US has openly called for regime change for decades?
Iran’s Positioning and Capacity for Endurance
The Islamic Republic is notably in power, at least in part, as a result of previous US machinations. Iran’s democratically-elected Mohammad Mossadegh (who nationalised the Iranian oil industry) was murdered in the CIA and British intelligence’s Operation Ajax. The authoritarian monarchy was then restored and the US was its primary supporter. When the Iranian Revolution peaked in 1979 and the clerical forces (led by Khomeini) took power, democracy came to be seen as untenable (as Western forces would simply intervene), radical religious fanaticism was legitimised and anti-US sentiment was cemented. All this is to say that the Islamic Republic is an unusually entrenched and resilient regime: it has been specifically designed to resist external interference, it centres anti-foreign ideology, its opposition is fragmented, it has strong coercive capacity and it controls large and pivotal parts of the economy. It is also highly prepared for this war, its assets and weapons are well-secured and prepared for attack – and that’s only the ones we know about.
The Iranian elite groups (the IRGC, the Aghazadeh) are staunchly anti-America and anti-Israel, they are extremely ideological and are massively attached to the current regime as they are its main beneficiaries. Thus, those with the most power in the country likely have little desire to alter its current makeup. The installation of a puppet leader (the general historical next move after an American intervention) is also relatively unlikely in this case; successors for most top government positions have already been named, and the reinstatement of Reza Pahlavi will potentially be met with serious backlash from the Iranian citizenry.
For now, Iran is retaliating, not significantly escalating. Whether this is because of limited capacity for counterattack or a sign of resource conservation for an ongoing, protracted war is unknown. The Islamic Republic has shown no signs of surrender following the Ayatollah’s death, suggesting the regime was not necessarily dependent on him and that the machine is entrenched enough to sustain itself.
The regime, of course, is widely detested by the Iranian populace, who have suffered its violent repression and morality policing for decades. Many Iranians are celebrating the intervention of the US and Israel, in an eerie parallel to the Iraqis who took to the streets in celebration after Bush’s invasion. What is unclear is how long this support will last. In the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel (2025), many Iranians were initially pleased at the attack but, as the civilian death toll crept up, some began to side with the regime again. The Islamic Republic may be brutally repressive, but was not bombing citizens en masse. A prolonged attack in this new war may run the risk of fostering Iranian nationalism if the ‘liberators’ stop being viewed as such – especially as the politicised Iranian youth are far more aware of the imperialist overtones of many of America’s global actions.
Israel and America’s Positioning and Capacity for Endurance
Israel may seem well positioned to continue this offensive on Iran. They are the only nuclear power in the region, which serves as a serious deterrent for any who would stand to oppose them. The US-Israel coalition has reportedly already achieved dominance in Iranian airspace, Israel’s Mossad has strong intelligence penetration inside Iran, and the US’ military backing is a significant boon to the Israeli effort.
On the other hand, Israel still faces some serious challenges if the war is to be drawn-out. Israel’s large distance from Iran means long flight times, complex aerial refuelling, limited sortie rates and logistical strain. Iran also possesses powerful indirect retaliation tools, such as its massive arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones, and its regional proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis and other militias). Israeli air power alone may be insufficient for victory, since Iran’s military infrastructure is hardened, geographically dispersed and largely underground. Experts have described the war as ‘salvo competition’ (whichever side first runs out of missiles/interceptors loses strategic advantage); Israel’s missile defense systems (like Arrow, Iron Dome, David’s Sling) are limited and expensive, whereas Iran’s are cheaper and easier to replace. Long attrition warfare may favour Iran over Israel as these expensive systems will undoubtedly strain the Israeli economy as they did in the 12-Day War. Some may suggest this explains the consistent Israeli reliance on blitzkrieg-esque annihilation tactics in Palestine. Moreover, the continued and simultaneous violent occupation in Palestine may leave few spare resources to be directed toward offensives in Iran.
Moving to the USA, the nation is increasingly being perceived as a reckless, unchecked imperialist on the world stage – taking what it pleases and caring little for consequences. America certainly has the potential for sustained war with massive strike capacity, operational momentum and a strong regional basing network. However, a long war risks retaliation from other superpowers more closely aligned with Iran (China, Russia) and higher casualty rates as bases and personnel are exposed for longer. Furthermore, the latest polls show that this war is relatively unpopular with Americans; a protracted conflict will only worsen perceptions of Trump taking unconstitutional plenary authority and using ‘rally round the flag tactics’ to distract from Epstein-related scandals at home. Surrounded by hawkish sycophants, however, it is unlikely Trump will back down anytime soon.
Wider Impacts and Conflict Ripple Effects
As always, a pivotal factor in this conflict is oil. Iran is the fourth largest oil producer in OPEC and one of the largest natural gas producers in the world. 30% of the world’s petroleum comes through the Strait of Hormuz, which is now closed. The conflict is already having a massive impact on energy markets: the UK gas price surged to its highest level for three years on 3 March, the FTSE 100 Index has fallen by over 2.5% and the US S&P 500 has also seen decreases. Utility price increases and market volatilities are suffered by citizens, not the governments who cause them. If these trends continue, support for the war is likely to fall even further. Given that oil investments are such a huge part of the world’s financial markets, we may even see ripple and contagion effects for other oil-dependent economies – temporary GDP surges, inflation and eventual downturns when supply expands again.
The oil issue also poses a particular threat to China. Trump’s takeover of Venezuelan oil has led to a large reduction in China’s imported fuel, Venezuelan oil is instead being redirected toward the US and Europe. If Iranian oil comes under US control, China could be in serious trouble. While they have stockpiled enough oil to last 100 days, one can only guess what happens after that – and only speculate at whether this US/Israel-Iran conflict is partially a proxy in the US’ ongoing rivalry with the Eastern power.
For the rest of the Middle East, the possible impacts differ in the short and long-term. If the conflict is quickly resolved, the regional balance of power may shift in Israel’s favour (especially if Iran is seriously militarily harmed) once they are a proven power with America’s (seemingly unconditional) support. Quiet regional alignment of Arab states with Israel against Iran may deepen, while Gulf states may double down on security coordination with the US. Overall, a short war may entrench existing regional arrangements. If protracted, however, conflict may spread across the region. Iran’s proxies (Hezbollah, Yemeni Houthis, Iraqi and Syrian militias) may become more involved, leading to a multi-front escalation. In the long-run, this could plunge many neighbouring states into conflict, deepen internal political polarisation and reshape the regional order.
For Palestine, this war means the possibility of being internationally sidelined despite ongoing brutal occupation. Iran under siege has far less capacity to support Palestine, meaning supply lines will be disrupted and they will be left alone to face Israel’s brutality. Palestinian diplomacy may also become more strained as Arab states normalise negotiations with Israel to prevent conflict in their own states. While Israel may be accepted to MENA communities, Palestine may be marginalised even more. Additionally, as Arab public opinion may remain staunchly pro-Palestine, internal Arab state tensions may arise between hedging governments and politicised citizens.
Finally, the war may be a signal of the end of the ‘long peace’ since the end of World War Two. Certainly, the post-1945 years have seen many proxy conflicts (US-USSR) and civil wars, but it has been a relatively peaceful period in comparison to the age of violent conquest preceding World War One. The attack on Iran may be the final nail in the coffin of ‘Pax Americana’. There is clearly a lack of organisational constraint or consideration at play on the global stage, as there was no UN Security Council agreement before this attack – the US and Israel simply acted as they wanted. As previously mentioned, the arguably unconstitutional nature of the invasion is also an important factor; the 1973 War Powers Resolution requires the President to consult Congress in every possible instance regarding War – the ‘possible’ qualifier signalling an element of acting in good faith on the President’s part. There was no consultation before Venezuela, nor before Iran. With the White House acting without international or internal legitimacy, and with Russia invading Ukraine for seemingly imperial purposes, it seems the age of rule-by-force and conquest may be returning – while liberal institutionalism is on its way out.
Conclusion
Importantly, this war is in its early days. We have no way of knowing how Iran will restabilise after Khamenei’s death and no way of knowing the future intentions of the ‘liberators’ – as the newly-named ‘Department of War’ has been notably secretive about its long-term plans in Iran. A lot rests on other global actors; will the UK maintain limited defensive involvement or commit to more offensive action? How will the Gulf and Arab states respond if Iran continued to target US bases in their territory? What may be the future role of Russia and China?
Terrifyingly, the US promises that the worst of the attacks on Iran are ‘yet to come’. One can only hope that the voices of the Iranian people are front and centre in future plans, and that their freedom – not American hegemony – is the guiding force in continued action.
