Indonesia is widely regarded as an emerging Asian middle power in the Indo-Pacific, but its strategic role is still unexpectedly vague. This commentary argues that Indonesia should adopt a selective and targeted “swing state” posture in the Indo-Pacific, rather than completely rejecting or accepting this label.
From middle power to swing state
In the global landscape, Indonesia is often described as an emerging middle power and is regarded as a potential key player in shaping the direction of core issues’ outcome. However, the role of Indonesia is still unclear, especially in terms of whether it should play the role of a regional “swing state.” This uncertainty may bring risks and opportunities to Indonesia’s long-standing independent foreign policy and ASEAN centrality.
For the purpose of this commentary, a middle power is not simply defined by its size or GDP, but by its ability and willingness to shape regional outcomes through niche diplomacy and agenda-setting, rather than through military dominance. Middle powers tend to favor multilateral institutions and pragmatic cooperation across blocs. By contrast, the term “swing state” originally comes from domestic electoral politics, where it describes a province or state whose vote can determine the overall result of a presidential election. This commentary further adapts this concept to the field of international relations: a “swing state” is a country whose support or opposition on key issues, like crisis responses, security arrangements, or major diplomatic initiatives, can reshape the balance between rival coalitions or visions of regional order.
In practice, Indonesia already displays several middle-power characteristics. It sits at the maritime crossroads of the Indo-Pacific, chairs and hosts key regional forums, promotes ASEAN centrality, and plays a quiet balancing role between the United States and China, avoiding formal alliances or simply choosing sides while engaging both in selective ways. However, Jakarta has not yet clearly articulated whether it seeks to be a more activist middle power nor identified the specific areas where it might be prepared to act as a “swing state.” To some external observers, Indonesia will increasingly resemble a mirror, reflecting great power preferences and regional consensus, rather than a compass that sets its own strategic direction. In Chinese terms, its posture at times risks being read as that of “a blade of grass bending with the wind” (qiang tou cao, liang bian dao), rather than a stable anchor in a contested region.
Three strategic paths
Against this backdrop, Indonesia faces three broad strategic options for how it positions itself as a middle power in the Indo-Pacific and whether it should act as a “swing state.”
The first is to maintain an ambiguous middle-power posture and avoid using clear “swing state” language. Jakarta would continue to emphasize its “independent and active” foreign policy, ASEAN centrality, and non-alignment, while refraining from explicitly describing itself as a “swing state.” This maximizes room for maneuver and reduces the risk of being forced to choose sides. But this ambiguity also limits Indonesia’s bargaining power, might cause partners to underestimate its leadership ambitions, and allows other middle powers to occupy the space of indispensable regional actors. In an increasingly polarized strategic environment, such ambiguity may no longer be read as principled neutrality but as weakness or unreliability.
The second option is to adopt a selective, targeted “swing state” posture within a middle power identity. Indonesia would still participate in international affairs as a constructive middle power country, but in a few key areas, such as regional crisis control, maritime security, and normative issues like promoting strategic autonomy and the central position of ASEAN, it will consciously play a role as a “swing state.” This approach allows Indonesia to focus on its most influential areas, thus consolidating its image as a problem solver and avoiding strategic overstretching. However, it also contains risks; the choice of issues must be extremely cautious. Once it is considered to be inclined to one side, the neutral posture that Indonesia is trying to maintain may be questioned.
The third option is to fully embrace a “swing state” identity across the Indo-Pacific agenda. Indonesia would actively brand itself as the central “swing state” of the Indo-Pacific and strive to become an indispensable balancing force on most major regional issues, whether it is mediating tensions between major countries, participating in shaping emerging security structures, or representing “middle ground” between confrontational camps. In theory, this can maximize Indonesia’s reputation and influence, but high returns are also accompanied by high risks. Expectations of all parties will be high. Once the mediation fails or the compromise fails, Indonesia can easily turn from a mediator to the focus of criticism. In addition, large countries may also regard their swinging position only as bargaining chips rather than equal partners. If Indonesia repeats its position under pressure, it is more likely to be labeled as “opportunistic” or “unreliable,” thus damaging its long-term credibility.
A selective swing state for the Indo-Pacific and the Global South
The most sustainable way lies in an adjusted version of the second plan; it allows Indonesia to realize the new reality of competition in the Indo-Pacific while giving full play to its existing advantages. By showing its key position in these issues and investing diplomatic resources to achieve results, Indonesia can change from being regarded as a mirror to a role more like a compass without overexpanding its power. Indonesia’s experience as the presidency of the G20 in 2022, hosting Western leaders and Russia at the Bali summit at the same time, and trying to maintain open communication channels despite serious differences on the issue of Ukraine. It has hinted at this selective “swing state” role, which is to use the right to convene and agenda control to prevent the complete breakdown of cooperation.
From this point of view, Indonesia’s role as a swing state is not only about narrow national interests; it can also be seen as a contribution to building a more stable and inclusive regional order and to the wider Global South. In areas like critical supply chains, digital governance, or climate finance, a selective “swing state” posture would allow Jakarta to alleviate the zero-sum pressure to choose sides and instead broker compromise solutions that keep space open for other non-aligned and developing countries. A country that once helped articulate the Bandung Spirit can now provide a similar reference for the Indo-Pacific. This is not a nostalgic return to 1955 but a modern understanding of how a large non-aligned democracy can occupy a key position among competing alliances without becoming a vassal of either side.
