When Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser launched his “War of Attrition” between 1969 and 1970, he was aware that he could not defeat Israel with a single blow. His objective was more nuanced: weakening Israel through protracted yet limited armed skirmishes that imposed political and psychological costs. The occasional artillery bombardment, commando raids, and sneak attacks forced Israel to spend resources and manpower, while the Soviets were deeply involved in Egypt’s defense posture. Although the entire campaign ended without territorial gains, it changed regional dynamics, redefined Israel’s defense plans, and prepared the stage for the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
The lesson—using endurance as a weapon—has not been forgotten by North Korea. Today’s Pyongyang seems to be selectively adopting Nasser’s logic. North Korea is aiming to acquire reliable multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability, accumulate conventional arms through Russian connections, and position itself to conduct long-term coercion rather than a decisive battle. Their key objective might be a war of attrition and not necessarily a conquest: to crumble South Korea’s preparedness, deplete its resources, and sow doubts about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence.
The Logic of Modern Attrition
If North Korea completes its MIRV technologies, it could complicate South Korea and its allies’ missile-defense calculus by increasing the number of warheads per missile. Even if it is not launched for real, Pyongyang could force Seoul to spend a substantial amount on missile interceptors and maintain a 24-hour alert status by staging missiles and demonstrating its drones periodically. With the passage of time, the cost-exchange ratio would gradually shift toward North Korea’s favor, just as Egypt once attempted to impose attrition through constant artillery pressure on Israel.
Beyond the missile threat, North Korea is developing means that could conduct near-constant cross-domain harassment. Drone penetrations into South Korean airspace, cyberattacks targeting logistics and communications, and low-intensity maritime clashes could continuously fatigue the South Korean forces. Although each of these activities could be manageable, the accumulated burden—in terms of repair, ammunition, and manpower—could reach a notable level.
Such a campaign could benefit from external elements. In the late 1960s, Egypt’s capability to conduct a war of attrition was reinforced by Soviet military advisors, ground-to-air missile systems, and constant resupply. Today’s Russia is playing a similar role. Russia provides selective technological transfer, ammunition procurement, and operational insights gained from the Ukraine war. Russia’s limited assistance in the field of electronic warfare (EW), counter-battery, and anti-air defense could enhance North Korea’s ability to conduct a war of attrition over longer stretches of time.
Lastly, the psychological domain could play a critical role. Apart from military gains, the prime objective of the war of attrition was to break Israel’s morale. By applying this principle, North Korea could exploit South Korea’s domestic divisions regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Each provocation—a single experiment, intrusion, or cyberattack—could test not only the physical defense readiness but also the political will to collectively respond by Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul.
Responding to Pyongyang’s Strategy
To prevent Pyongyang from replicating Nasser’s model, South Korea and its allies should upend the logic of attrition. The key task is to impose greater costs on the aggressor—in this case, North Korea—than the defender. To make that happen, it is imperative to lower the cost of interception, increase the speed of recovery, and reinforce perseverance among allies in terms of military, industry, and psychology.
Seoul’s missile-defense system—L-SAM, THAAD, and other missiles placed within Aegis destroyers—should be supplemented by a more affordable additional layer of defense; this includes laser interceptors (as they mature), gun-based close-in systems, and cyber or electronic tools capable of disrupting North Korea’s launch cycle. By expanding the kill web—and not exclusively relying on interceptor missiles—South Korea could maintain the operational tempo while lowering the price tag for defensive engagement.
Equally vital is real-time data integration among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. The trilateral missile-warning agreement established after the 2023 Camp David summit should evolve into a real-time fire-control-quality network. Such a development would enable any ally—either a South Korean Aegis destroyer, a Japanese system, or a U.S. battery—to attempt immediate interception from the vantage point. Such smooth sensor-shooter linkage would transform the trilateral deterrence from rhetoric to operational reality.
In addition, South Korea should prepare to respond rapidly and proportionally against localized attacks. By using precision-guided munitions, including Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) and extended-range rockets, South Korea should speedily retaliate against North Korean artillery and missile launchers. The key objective is to make sure every North Korean provocation would trigger a predictable, immediate, and high-cost response—a response that Pyongyang cannot afford to sustain.
Resilience on the domestic front is equally important. Air bases, ports, and logistics hubs should be strengthened, while movable repair units—capable of restoring operations within a couple of hours after an attack—should be deployed. The military and the economy should be able to maintain their functions under constant pressure by prepositioning fuel depots and modular runways while establishing a civil-military port integration plan.
In the field of the electromagnetic spectrum, South Korea should possess the ability not only to defend against jamming but also to conduct it. A tri-service cell that is dedicated to electromagnetic spectrum operations should be established, and it should mediate deception, spoofing, and interference operations intended to degrade the accuracy of North Korean artillery and missiles. Likewise, counter-drone defense should be promoted as a nation-level industrial program, enabling an effective response against massive swarm-drone attacks by tracking systems that combine radar, optical, and AI.
Trilateral Shield of Endurance
The U.S. and Japan should play a crucial role. U.S. naval and air assets, as well as Japan’s Aegis systems, provide durable defense capabilities that South Korea alone cannot offer. The trilateral should institutionalize an emergency resupply system of interceptor missiles, ammunition, and major components, while expanding common repair and logistics exercises that enable wartime mobilization and mutual maintenance during crises.
Maritime assurance should not be neglected. During a war of attrition, North Korea could sabotage South Korea’s trade routes or energy imports. By conducting constant anti-submarine warfare and minesweeping patrols in the East Sea, the U.S. and Japan could maintain Seoul’s economic lifeline.
Information and signaling are also important. Every North Korean provocation should trigger a transparent common response that includes automatic sanctions, cyber actions, and the disclosure of North Korea’s military networks. Such an approach would increase Pyongyang’s strategic costs while showcasing that continuous attacks would yield diminishing returns.
Meanwhile, extended deterrence should be visual and routinized. The U.S.-Japan-ROK joint nuclear consultation mechanism and periodic deployment of U.S. strategic assets would convince both the Japanese and South Korean publics that Washington’s commitment remains rock solid. The credibility of deterrence depends not only on capability but also on perception. Clarity would reduce anxiety, and it is itself another form of resilience.
Measure of Success
North Korea’s war of attrition would turn into a failure once the trilateral countries make such a strategy self-defeating. Success could be defined by three metrics: the price tag for a single defensive maneuver should be more swiftly reduced in comparison to North Korea’s cost of a single attack; recovery and repair tempo should outmaneuver the speed of damage; and the public’s trust in the U.S. extended deterrence should be strengthened even under pressure.
In 1970, Egypt’s war of attrition made Israel adapt, strengthen its defense, and reconsider its strategy. In 2025, South Korea and its allies should similarly respond before Pyongyang replicates the precedent. The key essence of anti-attrition is endurance—absorbing shock, sustaining operations, and demonstrating a calm resolve—rather than attack. If Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul could institutionalize such resilience, Kim Jong-un’s war of attrition would be unsustainable due to its own inefficiency.
A war of attrition succeeds only when the stronger fully understands that time is a weapon. In a competition of endurance, South Korea and its allies should remember that properly cultivated resilience is the ultimate form of deterrence.
