Authors: Marin Ekstrom and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez
Uzbekistan has recently commenced construction of a new airport in Tashkent, valued at $2.5 billion, as a symbol of the country’s reinvention. The project, slated to begin operations in 2029, aims to serve as Central Asia’s key aviation hub by supporting more than 40 take-offs and landings per hour and serving 20 million passengers annually. Economists predict that increased air traffic at the airport could generate $27 billion in annual revenue and create thousands of new jobs.
To achieve this ambitious goal, Tokyo and Seoul will be critical partners: Japan’s Sojitz Corporation, which has extensive experience in the aviation sector, has agreed to invest millions of dollars and share technical expertise. As for South Korea, the Incheon International Airport Corporation (IIAC) signed a $24.5 million consulting contract to provide operational and service support for the development of the new Tashkent airport.
Investment Incoming
While the Tashkent airport is one of the most recent and buzzworthy examples of Uzbek cooperation with Japan and South Korea, it is hardly the only area of engagement. With a projected 6.2% economic growth rate for 2025, Uzbekistan is on track to become one of the five fast-growing economies in Europe and Central Asia, making it a highly attractive market for trade and investment. In July 2025, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) announced a three-year initiative to fund and implement $3.7 billion in projects across the energy, petrochemical, textile, and infrastructure sectors. Sojitz also agreed to expand its cooperation in the oil and gas sectors, including the Syrdarya II power generation facility. Mining is another lucrative sector, with the Japanese corporation Itochu investing heavily in Uzbek uranium mining operations.
Similarly, South Korea is playing a vital role in financing Uzbekistan’s infrastructure projects, including supplying high-speed trains for its electrified transport networks and providing over $12 million to promote sustainable resource extraction methods and supply equipment and training for Uzbek engineers. Another notable project is a South Korean-funded $150 million medical center in Tashkent.
High-Level Diplomacy
The two East Asian governments have also increased intergovernmental engagement with Uzbekistan in recent years. Visits and engagement between policymakers in Tashkent and Tokyo are relatively common: this year alone, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeshi Iwaya visited Tashkent in June, while then-Minister of Justice Keisuke Suzuki visited in May. While the new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, has yet to fully formulate her foreign policy strategy, it is hoped that she will continue Tokyo’s engagement with Uzbekistan.
Then-South Korean President Yun Suk Yeol visited Tashkent in June 2024, while President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and current President Lee Jae Myung spoke by phone in July. They pledged to strengthen the “special strategic partnership” and expand “multifaceted cooperation,” noting that Korean companies have invested over US$8 billion in the Uzbek economy.
Japan and South Korea have proven to be invaluable official development assistance (ODA) providers. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo’s primary international aid organ, along with other Japanese NGOs, have worked extensively on infrastructure and human capital development in Uzbekistan. While Japanese ODA to Central Asia is of lower priority compared to Southeast Asia, Tokyo has consistently remained a top donor to Uzbekistan and the rest of the region. South Korea- which famously transformed from a major aid recipient to a prominent aid donor – has currently designated Uzbekistan as a “priority partner country” in terms of its ODA allocation. South Korean development assistance increased tenfold from 2006 and 2019, concentrating on social infrastructure and public service projects. Given the current instability of the global humanitarian and international development sector, it is difficult to say with certainty which current and future projects involving Japan, South Korea, and Uzbekistan will be pursued. Nevertheless, ODA from Japan and South Korea has clearly had, and will continue to have, a positive lasting impact in Uzbekistan.
The Other Pillar: People-To-People Interactions
People-to-people relations, facilitated through tourism and educational opportunities, can serve as additional pillars to strengthen interstate relations. Tourism among the three countries is surging, as Uzbekistan has noted increased tourist traffic from Japan and South Korea and vice versa. Initiatives like “Cool Japan” and “the Korean Wave” have transformed the two East Asian nations into soft power titans, while Uzbekistan is emphasizing strategies such as its Silk Road mystique to boost its soft power and tourism potential. If construction of the new airport stays on track, by the end of the decade, Japanese and South Korean tourists will arrive at a state-of-the-art facility their governments helped build.
Studying abroad is a significant phenomenon in Uzbekistan, ranking fifth globally in 2021 in terms of the number of students studying abroad. Japan offers numerous scholarships, language programs, and exchange programs designed for Uzbek students to study there. South Korea is an even more popular destination, with an estimated 5,000 Uzbek students studying in Korean universities. While comparatively fewer Japanese and South Korean students study in Uzbekistan, exchanges among the three countries can only strengthen their long-term ties.
Finally, Uzbekistan contributes to South Korea’s academic community and workforce: nearly 100,000 Uzbek citizens were living in South Korea as of June 2025, comprising the fifth largest foreign-born population in the country.
The Big Picture
Japan and South Korea have also robustly engaged with Uzbekistan through regional forums. Japan spearheaded the “C5+1” framework, which organizes the five Central Asian republics into a regional unit interacting with an extra-regional actor, with its 2004 “Central Asia + Japan” dialogue. Global Powers like China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union adopted this model for their own engagements with the Central Asian states. The Japan-centered C5+1 has continued, with the most recent summit being held in Astana in 2025. South Korea has helped organize a series of Central Asia-Republic of Korea Cooperation Forums and was set to host the first Central Asia-Korea summit in Seoul in 2025. The arrest of deposed President Yoon Suk Yeol earlier this year, however, has delayed those plans. South Korea announced a “K-Silk Road” initiative in June 2024, an ambitious project encompassing such areas as natural resource extraction, development aid, and cultural exchanges- though the arrest of Yoon has also halted progress on these objectives.
As a corollary to this analysis, it is worth noting two recent developments involving Central Asian engagement with the Global Powers of China and the US, which often overshadow Japan and South Korea’s efforts in the region. A Chinese company reportedly plans to invest as much as US$500 million in Uzbekistan’s Andijan region to construct a hydroelectric power plant and modernize existing energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, US Ambassador-at-Large for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary Christopher Landau visited Tashkent in late October as part of a regional tour. 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the US-Central Asia C5+1 format, and US members of Congress have requested the Trump administration to organize a presidential summit to celebrate this achievement.
The point here is that the Global Powers will continue to engage Tashkent, and matching dollar-for-dollar investment to compete with them is unrealistic. That being said, Tokyo and Seoul are not necessarily positioning themselves to act like Global Powers in the region. Japanese engagement with Uzbekistan and Central Asia has been characterized by a flexible, piecemeal approach that targets key issues while forgoing rigid diplomatic protocol like geopolitical alliances or treaty obligations. In addition, Japan values “quality over quantity” regarding its projects: while it may not be as flashy or large-scale compared to its Global Power counterparts, Japan aims for long-term sustainability and success. South Korea, for its part, appears to be adopting a similar mode of engagement with Uzbekistan and Central Asia. Being involved in strategic projects, like a significant involvement in Tashkent’s new airport, will help Tokyo and Seoul continue to have a high-profile and visible presence in Uzbekistan’s development projects.
Conclusions
Since President Mirziyoyev took power in 2016, he has sought to create a “New Uzbekistan” characterized by economic dynamism and global integration. Tashkent’s relations with Global Powers like China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union have been extensively analyzed. However, two other countries that have developed their own special and successful partnerships with Uzbekistan are Japan and South Korea.
As the New Uzbekistan gains momentum, Tashkent must rely on international partnerships to sustain development and enhance its international prestige. Given the country’s history of subjugation under empires and global powers, Uzbekistan’s involvement with nations like Japan and South Korea offers an intriguing alternative: robust engagement with less risk of domination. In turn, these East Asian nations can expand their regional influence to offset rival powers, most notably China, and gain access to new markets and resources. The collaboration between these three countries thus offers mutual benefits for all parties.
*Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He covers geopolitical, defense, and trade issues in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. He has co-authored a report on water security issues in Central Asia, published by the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and given presentations on environmental issues that affect the region.
