On 9 September 2025, Israel carried out a precision airstrike in Qatar, reportedly to target a senior Hamas official. The strike was significant, not only for operational daring, but also for its geopolitical symbolism. Qatar hosts one of the largest U.S. military bases in the Middle East, known as Al Udeid Air Base, a United States forward base that has historically given Washington’s security umbrella to its allies in the Gulf. The episode sent shockwaves all across the Gulf and provoked a deeper, unsettling question: if Qatar, with thousands of American troops and advanced air defense systems on its soil, could not be shielded, what does this mean for the rest of the allies?
The players in the region are seeking alternative guarantors. In the West, few scholars think that Gulf states should look for more stable and credible guarantors, and China could be one option. After the Israeli strikes, another important development took place when Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement. The timing of the deal poses a critical question: are the major US long-standing allies in the Gulf, drifting away from Washington and seeking security guarantees elsewhere?
The Israeli air strike on Qatar demonstrates something more than a tactical operation against Hamas. It is a symbolic test of the credibility of U.S. deterrence commitments towards its allies in the Gulf. The inability of Qatari and U.S.-linked air defenses to prevent the attack greatly undermines confidence in Washington’s extended security assurances and intensifies debates among allies about self-reliance, indigenous defense build-ups, and diversifying defense options
Reports show that Israel deployed standoff precision munitions, more likely the Rampage, an air-to-surface missile that Israel previously used to engage high-value targets. Qatar, despite hosting U.S. Patriot batteries, radar networks, and integrated command systems at Al Udeid, remained unsuccessful in intercepting the incoming strike.
This failure highlights a critical dynamic: the credibility of air defenses is not only measured by technical kill rates, but also by political reassurance. The US had been reassuring Qatar of protecting it, but failed to do so. Here, security reassurance visibly faltered.
It shows that if Qatar cannot be protected with thousands of U.S. personnel on its soil, what confidence can smaller, more exposed allies, whether in Eastern Europe or East Asia, realistically maintain?
For adversaries, the lesson is clear: any symbolic attack against U.S. allies or partners will not trigger any immediate response. For allies, the lesson is harsher: the protective shield may not always extend to their territory, even when their soil is central to U.S. military operations.
Message to U.S. Allies: Security in Question?
For U.S. allies, the critical dilemma is not whether Washington retains overwhelming military superiority, which it does, but whether political will and operational guarantees can be relied upon in moments of crisis. The attack on Qatar suggests that U.S. security guarantees, though still formidable, are neither absolute nor automatic. The Israeli strike on Doha has shaken one of the foundational assumptions of alliance politics, that merely hosting a significant number of US troops does not guarantee security for the host state. The failure of the United States to intercept the incoming attacks delivered a significant blow to its credibility. While its unconditional support for Israel continues to carry heavy financial, diplomatic, political, and military costs. And now, after the Israeli attack on Doha, it has become clear to Arab leaders that when it comes to Israel, the US is either unwilling or unable to prevent Israel from attacking Gulf states.
Along with this, US President Trump signed an executive order that says, “In the event of such an attack, the United States shall take all lawful and appropriate measures — including diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military — to defend the interests of the United States and of the State of Qatar and to restore peace and stability.” but ironically, this is an executive order not a treaty. It does not resemble Article 5 of NATO, which is a lawful obligation and treaty. In the case of the next president in the office, that president is not obliged to defend Qatar. Since it is not a binding obligation on the United States to defend Qatar, the seriousness of such orders will remain questionable.
Keeping in view the current geo-political scenario, the Gulf states must strengthen their indigenous capabilities to reduce dependency, diversify their defense partnerships. The Gulf states may seek supplementary ties with non-Western actors over sole reliance on Washington.
The SCO Summit, China’s V-Day Parade, and the Prospect of China as a New Guarantor
The timing of the Doha strike directly coincides with growing multipolar rhetoric, reinforced by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin and China’s grand V-Day parade, demonstrating China’s expanding military muscle. Meanwhile, in the face of US compromised security guarantees, can China be a new guarantor?
For more than a decade, China has been pursuing a massive military modernization and has also established a strong economic footprint across the globe. For that reason, China might act as a balancing force but cannot provide full-fledged security guarantees to the Gulf states. It means China replacing the United States in the Gulf is unrealistic. Rather, if Gulf states lean on Pakistani expertise for security, Chinese technology will be the shadow in the room.
More than that, China cannot ensure full-fledged Gulf security because Chinese defense spending is one-third of total US funding, which is 232 billion USD, with the USA having established global force postures for decades, and China has just entered the race. The US, for a very long time, sustained a worldwide network of overseas military bases; the USA ran a mature theater command with a dense alliance network and standing headquarters across the Middle East. Whereas China has only one active overseas base in Djibouti, most of the Chinese bases are in the Indian Ocean region, in South East Asia, but China still has embryonic access, especially in the Middle East. That demonstrates that China focuses more on regional theatre. Moreover, PLA has advanced ISR and air-defense systems at home, but global reach enablers, large ISR constellations integrated with forward-based command nodes, pre-positioning, expeditionary maintenance, and interoperable coalition C2, are the comparative advantages of the United States rather than China. Due to which China lags behind the USA in providing security guarantees to the Gulf states.
On the other hand, China, through its economy and diplomacy, can exploit moments of vulnerability for the United States. Beijing already has strong diplomatic leverage in Gulf states that previously China has brokered a deal between Iran and Saudi Arab, demonstrating diplomatic utility. Moreover, its economic weight creates influence, and selected arms sales, port investments, and energy ties are rising. Therefore, China’s role as a genuine guarantor remains aspirational rather than operational.
Also, the recent India-Pakistan tensions, coupled with demonstrated battlefield use of Chinese military equipment, had a catalytic effect on the demand for Chinese military equipment, and the Chinese defense industry gained legitimacy across the world. Chinese systems gained credibility in the eyes of potential buyers in the Gulf because they were tested in real-time combat. The Saudi-Pak partnership has created a strategic opening for the Chinese defense market in the Gulf region. Through Pakistan, it provides Beijing with an avenue to expand its footprint in the world’s most lucrative arms markets. Through such avenues, China might sell HQ-Q9, HQ-19 air defenses, and fifth-generation fighter crafts to Gulf states. This diversification would reduce the Gulf states’ exclusive dependence on the US and provide an alternative military supplier to the Gulf.
In conclusion, the Israeli air strikes have opened a new Pandora’s box for Gulf security and caused a serious doubt on US security guarantees when it comes to deterring Israel against any aggression. The lesson for states is clear: in an era of contested multipolarity, reliance on a single security patron is increasingly precarious. Diversification, indigenous build-up, and careful hedging are likely to define the new era of global security alignment. To American allies worldwide, the incident sent a chilling message to reconsider sole military reliance on the USA. While China has increasingly visible military power, it lacks the institutional framework and global credibility to replace the US as a true guarantor in the Gulf.
