The 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum (BXF) in September 2025, themed “Upholding International Order and Promoting Peaceful Development,” was portrayed by the Chinese media and experts as a platform for promoting solutions to international security issues.
In this commentary, the writer reflects on four key strategic messages he observed as a participant at the BXF.
(I) The World is again at a crossroads between Peace and War
Memories of World War 2 were intensively aired by Chinese speakers at the BXF, which officially began on September 18. But why September 18? Chinese speakers highlighted that the war started on September 18, 1931, when Japan staged the “Mukden incident” as a pretext to attack China. This incident marked the beginning of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and, more broadly, signalled the start of the World Anti-Fascist War.
Additionally, Chinese speakers emphasised that China made a significant strategic contribution to the Allied victory in the global anti-fascist war. Chinese soldiers and civilians shouldered the primary responsibility of fighting the Japanese on the Eastern battlefield of World War II. Therefore, China had exerted a profound influence on the overall course of the war. China used the BXF to highlight its role in ending World War 2, believing this role is underappreciated because the U.S. and the West – due to distrust during the Cold War and current geopolitical tensions – have deliberately distorted historical facts.
In a nutshell, China firstly wants to impress on the world that it played a significant role in setting the conditions for the establishment of the post-WW2 international order. Fast forward to today, China argues that the world is once again at a dangerous crossroads between peace and war. Relatedly, China’s use of history and the narrative of countering fascism is not a recent development that began at the BXF. This was the central theme of the 80th Victory Day celebration in early September. Also, Chinese President Xi Jinping had compared what he described as the modern-day U.S. hegemony to the fascist forces of 80 years ago when he met President Vladimir Putin in May 2025.
(II) Platform for Peace and Security for the Global South
The BXF has evolved into a key diplomatic instrument for the promotion of China’s vision of a multipolar world. Specifically, China aims to promote the BXF as an alternative platform for security multilateralism that is more palatable to the countries of the global south. Whether the BXF gets buy-in from the West may be secondary, as the global south essentially constitutes the global majority. Indeed, certain speeches and exchanges at the BXF raised issues that are more critical to non-Western countries and received less attention at other security conferences, such as the Shangri-La Dialogue.
For example, the BXF was an opportunity for a speaker from a Muslim country (Pakistan) to speak out in support of Gaza and the Palestinians, emphasising that there can never be peace without justice, dignity, and accountability. Peace is not only about the absence of war; silencing the gun is insufficient without promoting reconciliation. Gaza retook centre stage when the Chinese media captured Professor Yan Xuetong, Dean at Tsinghua University, reprimanding the Israeli military attaché to China over Israel’s military actions in Gaza. Whether this incident was premeditated was beside the point.
It was also noteworthy that the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) delivered a speech expressing the anxieties of ASEAN countries due to rising geopolitical tensions and U.S. tariffs. His speech mentioned that ASEAN can collaborate with key partners, including China, to provide a strong counterbalance to the rise of unilateralism, fragmentation, and protectionism, while promoting a just and equitable security governance system. This point suggested that the U.S., through its own actions, is causing American influence in Southeast Asia to decline.
The timing of the BXF in mid-September was strategic. In early September, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (U.N.) warned that the world is spending far more on waging war than on building peace. This warning created an opportunity for China to use the BXF to criticise the U.S. for being more belligerent today, especially with the rebranding of the U.S. Department of Defence into the Department of War. Chinese speakers also suggested that the U.S. selective understanding of historical events, such as the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, makes the Americans more predisposed to taking risks and securitising issues.
Amid the backdrop of these issues, China sought to leverage the BXF to persuade the world to be more amenable to what China is offering as a major power.
Firstly, China used the BXF to promote the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), which President Xi Jinping unveiled at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in early September. The point of the GGI is not to overturn the post-WW2 international order, but to defend or reinforce it. This point was reiterated in one of the plenary sessions when Major General (Ret.) Du Nongyi remarked to a NATO representative that the rules-based international order entails the principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter and not the behaviour shaped by the interests of the U.S. and NATO.
Towards the end of the BXF, efforts to promote the GGI continued as the Global Governance Institution – a Beijing-based entity – organised a side event titled “The Global Governance Dilemma Amid Great Power Competition and Frequent Conflicts” for selected participants of the BXF.
Secondly, it would be remiss not to assuage any anxieties that arose from the massive military parade at the 80th Victory Day celebration, which showcased China’s growing military power through the display of thousands of troops and hundreds of advanced weapon systems. In that regard, it was unsurprising that China’s Defence Minister Dong Jun, in his speech, asserted that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army(PLA) is prepared to cooperate with other militaries to maintain global peace.
(III) Promoting PLA as a Benign Force
At the BXF’s venue, there was a large photo wall that commemorated China’s 35 years of participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. It served to highlight important milestones in China’s contribution to global peace and commitment to international obligations. One photo that captured emotions featured Chinese navy medical personnel – on the “Peace Ark” hospital ship mission – in Bangladesh helping to deliver a baby who had a congenital heart problem. The photo wall also complemented briefing sessions on “China’s Armed Forces in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations” and “Chinese Navy’s Performance in Undertaking International Humanitarian Missions.”
The most impactful complement was the speech by the Vice President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). He highlighted that the world should not allow the erosion of international humanitarian law (IHL) and that respect for IHL must become a political priority. He also shared that in 2024, China, France, Brazil, Jordan, Kazakhstan, and South Africa joined the ICRC to launch “The Global Initiative to Galvanise Political Commitment to International Humanitarian Law”.
Taken together, photo wall, briefing sessions, and ICRC participation could be an approach that China designed to criticise the U.S. implicitly. It has been reported earlier in the news that the U.N. peacekeeping missions are under severe financial stress. Furthermore, U.S. President Trump decided to cancel $4.9 billion in foreign aid, of which approximately $800 million was intended for U.N. peacekeeping missions. Through the BXF, China sought to challenge the U.S. mantra of “peace through strength” with the PLA’s mantra of a “force for peace.”
(IV) Emerging Technology and Modern Warfare
The sessions on “Governance of Emerging Technologies” at the BXF received scant coverage from the international media. Nonetheless, these sessions underscored China’s interest in shaping international rules and norms on emerging areas of defence and security. The BXF highlighted China’s efforts as a major technological power to promote artificial intelligence (AI) for good. Chinese speakers mentioned China’s Global AI Governance Initiative (GAIGI), which President Xi Jinping launched in 2023, as well as the Action Plan for GAIGI unveiled in July 2025 at the World AI Conference 2025 in Shanghai.
Governance of emerging technologies represents another area of public goods subject to geopolitical rivalry. It may influence the conduct of war between major powers if it occurs in the future. The 2nd Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summit, held in Seoul, saw about sixty countries, including the U.S., endorse a “blueprint for action” to govern the responsible use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the military. China was among the countries that did not endorse the document.
Two reasons could explain China’s decision. Firstly, China wants to ensure it can compete with the U.S. in integrating AI into the military, especially amid technological competition and the growing risk of war. Secondly, China now sees itself as playing a larger role in shaping global AI norms at the U.N.; therefore, it prefers not to endorse AI frameworks that it regards as being dominated by the West.
At the philosophical level, Chinese experts have opined that the rules on the use of AI in the military essentially pertain to the concept of just war, which is not alien to Chinese culture. Balancing military objectives with humanitarianism is a principle that Chinese experts believe is deeply rooted in their history and a defining feature of 5,000 years of Chinese civilisation. By drawing similarities between modern-day IHL and Chinese culture, China seeks to present itself as well-placed to drive conversations on emerging or grey areas in IHL, particularly those related to new technologies in a military context.
Conclusion
Countries can expect the BXF to grow in significance as an instrument of defence diplomacy that promotes China’s vision and its role in a multipolar world. It aims to build trust amid concerns over the growing might of the PLA and to compete with the Shangri-La Dialogue for international mindshare.
At the BXF’s venue, booths displayed Chinese publications that essentially explain China’s vision, including the book “China’s National Security in the New Era,” released by the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China in June 2025. The first chapter of the book summarises the overarching message that BXF presented to the world: China is a source of certainty and stability in a turbulent world.
Nevertheless, if hushed conversations along the corridors of BXF’s venue about China’s plan – announced on September 10 – to establish a nature reserve at the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea are any indication, the BXF has its work cut out for it.
