Russia has long been Turkey’s largest gas supplier, but its market share has dropped from over 60% two decades ago to 37% in early 2025. The decline comes as Turkey seeks to enhance its energy security and establish itself as a regional gas hub, exporting LNG and domestically produced gas to Europe.
Russia’s pipeline contracts supplying 22 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually through Blue Stream and TurkStream are nearing expiry, while Iran’s 10 bcm deal will end in 2026. Turkey plans to renegotiate smaller, more flexible contracts and rely more heavily on alternative suppliers, particularly the United States.
Developments and Current Situation
Turkey’s state energy company TPAO is rapidly expanding local production, while both state and private sectors have increased LNG terminal capacity. The country now has the infrastructure to import up to 58 bcm of LNG annually enough to meet its entire gas demand.
Ankara has already signed $43 billion worth of LNG deals with U.S. suppliers, including a 20-year agreement with Mercuria. By 2028, domestic production and LNG imports are projected to exceed 26 bcm, cutting pipeline dependence nearly in half. Despite this, Russian gas continues to flow due to competitive pricing, but analysts say Turkey will increasingly use its diverse energy mix as leverage in negotiations.
Why It Matters
Turkey’s move to diversify its gas supply marks a strategic turning point in both energy and geopolitics. By expanding domestic production and boosting U.S. LNG imports, Ankara aims to meet more than half of its gas demand by 2028. This transition threatens to weaken the dominance of Russia and Iran two of Turkey’s traditional suppliers and could reshape the last major European market for their gas exports. It also aligns with U.S. pressure on allies to reduce energy reliance on Moscow and Tehran, especially after the Ukraine war.
Key Stakeholders
The main stakeholders driving this transformation are Turkey’s Energy Ministry, BOTAS (the state gas importer), and TPAO, responsible for local exploration and production. On the supplier side, Gazprom (Russia), NIGC (Iran), SOCAR (Azerbaijan), and U.S. LNG exporters are key players.
The U.S. government supports Ankara’s diversification as it aligns with its geopolitical aim to isolate Russia and Iran economically. Meanwhile, European states like Hungary and Romania, which have started receiving gas from Turkey, benefit from increased energy diversification and security.
Implications
Turkey’s gas shift could redraw the regional energy map. For Ankara, it enhances energy independence, strengthens its bargaining power, and bolsters its ambition to become an energy hub bridging Asia and Europe. Economically, reduced dependence on pipelines makes Turkey less vulnerable to supply disruptions and politically motivated price pressures.
For Russia and Iran, however, this transition represents a significant loss of market share and influence in their last major European gas market. It could deepen the impact of Western sanctions and further limit their economic resilience.
Analysis
Turkey’s diversification strategy reflects a pragmatic balance between geopolitics and economics. While Ankara continues to cooperate with Moscow on projects like the Akkuyu nuclear plant, its pivot toward U.S. LNG and domestic production indicates a long-term effort to reduce vulnerability and increase autonomy.
By 2028, Turkey could emerge not just as a consumer, but as a regional energy power, supplying gas to European markets and shaping the continent’s post-Russia energy landscape. However, maintaining equilibrium between Western partners and traditional suppliers will require careful diplomacy, especially as Ankara leverages its central position in Eurasia’s evolving energy order.
With information from Reuters.
